kamus filsfat
A
Abad
Eternal a parte post, without end. Secara bahasa berarti selamanya,lestari,secara istilah adalah waktu, zaman yang tidak ada akhirnya untuk masa depan atau eksistensi yang berlangsung dalam zaman yang tidak ada akhirnya lawannya adalah azal, eternal parte ente wtihout begin. Sebagian biasa menyamakan dengan dahr. Menurut para filsof istilah abad dan azal bisa digunakan sama. Dunia ini adalah abadi dan azali,pandangan yang ditentang oleh kelompompok ortodox, terutama Ghazali, menurut mereka hanya tuhan yang abadi dan azali.
Abadi
Nisbat kepada abad, atau untuk wujud yang tidak akan punah atau sesuatu yang ada dalam abad. Para hukama membaga wujud kepada 3 bagian : Azali abadi :itu adalah wujud tuhan yang dari dulu selalu ada dan akan terus ada, atau untuk wujud-wujud non materi (mujarad) yang ada sejak azali dan akan ada terus. 2 : Bukan azali dan bukan abadi adalah wujud-wujud materi yang selalu akan ada dan akan rusak, keberadaannya terpotong-potong tidak azali dan tidak abadi. 3: abadi ghoeru azali :jiwa-jiwa manusia wujud mereka qadim dan tidak azali tapi abadi dan tidak akan punah (fani).
Abstraksi (tajrid)
Abstraksi adalah sebuah kemampuan nalar untuk menanggalkan komponen-komponen inderawi sedemikian hingga sehingga muncul gambaran-gambaran atau konsepsi-konsepsi dalam nalar. Tingkat kemurnian suatu konsepi tergantung kepada tingkat abstraksi. Semakin tinggi abstraksi dilakukan semakin murni (semakin bersifat non material) suatu konsepsi. Abstraksi terdiri dari beberapa jenis/tahap (tingkatan).
- Abstraksi fisis : Pengalaman inderawi melahirkan sensori ideas (konsepsi yang mengacu kepda dunia materi sepertikonsep manis,panas, bising.
- Abstraksi matematis : menanggalkan benda yang berangka sehingga lahir sejumlah konsep matematis, seperti bilangan, volume, ruang, bentuk, luas bahkan titik,
- Abstraksi etis menciptakan konsep etis seperti baik burukm nilai-nilai moral
- Abstraksi estetis, menciptakan konsep esteteik seperti keindahan, teratur harmonis.
- Abstraksi epistemologis menfiktapan konsepsi epistemologis eper benar salah
- Abstarksi ontologis menciptakn konsep sebab akibat,subtansi, aksiden
- abstraksi metafisis menciptakan konsep seperi wajiul wujud, mumkin wuud dlll.
Abuditqitiqa
Analytica Posteriora or the Second Analytics. Buku Aristoteles yang keempat tentang logika, Lihat Analutiqa Thani.
Abarkhus
Hipparachus: Ahli astronomi Yunani, ahli matematika dan geograpi dari abad ke2 sebelum masehi ( of 2nd century B.C)
Abidhqulis
Empedocles (c. 490 -c. 435 B.C.): Filsuf sebelum Socrates, lihat Anbadqulis.
Abiqurus
Epicurus. (342? -270. B.C.): Filsuf Yunani, mazhab Epicureanisme (abiquriyah) Greek philosopher; the school of Epicureanism ( Abiquriyah, q.v.) named after him. He taught that pursuit of pleasure is the end-all and be-all of morality, but emphasised that the genuine life of pleasure must be a life of prudence, honour and justice. In natural philosophy he adopted the atomistic theory of Democritus (Dimiqratis, q.v.) and accepted the view that the element of chance or deviation occurs in the otherwise straight motion of atoms.
Abiquriyah
Epicureanism, the school of thought, mainly ethical as founded by by Epicurus (Abiqurus, q.v.). It is noteworthy that contrary to the usual meaning of the word in English, Epicureanism on the whole inculcates simplicity of life: the fewer the desires, the better it is; for a greater number of desires is likely to bring greater dissatisfactions which one ought to avoid at all costs. Though like cyrenaics (Qaurniyah, q.v.) Epicurus regarded pleasure or happiness as the end of life, unlike them he preferred the lasting pleasures of the mind to the immediate pleasure of the body. Prudence, honour and justice for him were the cardinal virtues. He also gave high place to friendship and taught that one should not fear death for "death does not yet exist". He even adopted Democritean atomism for moral reasons; it abolished, according to him, all superstitious fears of death and punishment in hereafter.
Aen/Ayn
External , objektive
A’yan Objektive, reality
A’yan Tsabitah
Essensi abadi dari sesuatu yang bersama membentuk dunia ide atau dunia spiritual yang menjadi intermediansi antara tuhan dan alam materi fenomena fisik (arketif permanen, fixed entity, fixed essence)
Al-Ajsama Sab’ah
Seven bodies, 7 jenis mineral atau metal dalam ilmu filsafat : emas,silver, ironn, copper dll
ibtihaj
Frui or to enjoy God, i.e. to have the bliss and beatitude of the experience of the Divine.
abad
Eternal a parte post, i.e. eternal without end as opposed to azal (q.v.), eternal a parte ante, i.e. eternal without beginning. Sometimes used synonymous with dahr (q.v.), i.e. time in the absolute sense. According to the philosophers the two terms abad and azal imply each other an the world is both pre-eternal and post-eternal, a view very seriously challenged by the orthodox (notably by Imam Ghazali) for according to them God alone is abadi and azali.
Ibda‘
Creation from absolute nothingness; to be distinguished from the cognate terms
Mencipta dari yang sama sekali tidak ada, untuk membedakan dari istilah cognate seperti khalq, takwin dan ihdats yang .......
khalq, takwin and ihdath, all of which presuppose the temporal priority of cause to effect. In Ibda‘ there is no priority of cause to effect; there is only priority in essence so that effect comes to be after not-being with a posteriority in essence. Ibda‘ again is of higher order than ihdath or takwin in so far as it signifies granting existence without an intermediary, be it time, or motion, or matter one or other of which is necessarily presupposed in ihdath and takwin. Further Ibda‘ is specific to the creation of intelligences, khalq to that of the natural beings and takwin to that of the “corruptible” among them.
Abarkhus
Hipparachus: Greek astronomer, mathematician and geographer of 2nd century B.C.
Ibisqulas
Hypsicles: Greek mathematician. Some of his books were translated into Arabic by Qusta ibn Luqa and also perhaps by al-Kindi.
Ibtulamayus
Ptolemy: astronomer, mathematician and geographer of 2nd century C.E. see Batalmiyus and al-Majisti.
al-ab‘ad al-thalathah
The three dimensions of a material body: length, width, and depth. These dimensions do not enter into the definition of a thing; they are just some of its accidents and not part of its existence, even though they determine its state.
Ablus
Apollonius; See Balinus.
Abuditqitiqa
Analytica Posteriora or the Second Analytics. Aristotle's fourth book on logic; See Analutiqa Thani.
Abidhqulis
Empedocles (c. 490 -c. 435 B.C.): Greek pre-socratic philosopher; see Anbadqulis.
Abiqurus
Epicurus. (342? -270. B.C.): Greek philosopher; the school of Epicureanism ( Abiquriyah, q.v.) named after him. He taught that pursuit of pleasure is the end-all and be-all of morality, but emphasised that the genuine life of pleasure must be a life of prudence, honour and justice. In natural philosophy he adopted the atomistic theory of Democritus (Dimiqratis, q.v.) and accepted the view that the element of chance or deviation occurs in the otherwise straight motion of atoms.
Abiquriyah
Epicureanism, the school of thought, mainly ethical as founded by by Epicurus (Abiqurus, q.v.). It is noteworthy that contrary to the usual meaning of the word in English, Epicureanism on the whole inculcates simplicity of life: the fewer the desires, the better it is; for a greater number of desires is likely to bring greater dissatisfactions which one ought to avoid at all costs. Though like cyrenaics (Qaurniyah, q.v.) Epicurus regarded pleasure or happiness as the end of life, unlike them he preferred the lasting pleasures of the mind to the immediate pleasure of the body. Prudence, honour and justice for him were the cardinal virtues. He also gave high place to friendship and taught that one should not fear death for "death does not yet exist". He even adopted Democritean atomism for moral reasons; it abolished, according to him, all superstitious fears of death and punishment in hereafter.
H
Harakat Tabi’i
Harakat, gerakan yang lahir dari si agen,fail.pelaku tanpa sadar dan tanpa ia ketahui kalau sesuai dengan tabiat awaliyah si fail dan tanpa mengerahka energi dari luar. Seperti jatuhnya badan dari atas atau tumbuhnya tanaman.
Intiqhal A’radh muhal (Perpindahan A’radh adalah mustahil)
Untuk memahami ini kita harus memahami dulu definisi jauhar (substansi) dan Mahiyat. Para filsuf mengatakan jauhar adalah mahiyat yang jika ada diluar dan bukan ada di tempat, seperti : jasmani (body), nafs (jiwa), Aqal (intelek), Hayula, shurah (form), sementara Ardh (accindental) adalah mahiyat yang jika ada di luar ada di maudhu, tempat : tanpa tempat ia tidak bisa ada...........
ittihad fi’ l-idafah, also called ittihad fi’ l-nisbah
Union by relation, said of two or more pairs of things when the terms or parts of each pair have the same relation or ratio as the terms or parts of the other pair, e.g. the relation individually of two brothers to their father or the relation of ration 2 : 4 to the ration 3 : 6 ; the relation between such pairs is technically called to be that of munasabah (q.v.).
ittihad fi’ l-jins
Union by genus, said of two or more things when they belong to the same genus, e.g. man and horse belonging to the genus animal; relation between them is technically called to be that of mujanasah (q.v.).
ittihad fi’ l-khassah
Union by property (proprium), said of two or more things when they have a common property, e.g. triangles of all kinds have the sum of their two sides greater than the third; this relation between them is technically called to be that of mushakalah (q.v.).
ittihad fi’ l-kamm
Union by quantity, said of two or more things when they are of equal quantity, e.g. two seers of cotton and two seers of gold with reference to weight, or one yard of cloth and one yard of a tape or stick with reference to length; the relation between such things is technically called to be that of musawah (q.v.)
ittihad fi’ l-kaif
Union by quality, said of two or more things of the same quality: color, taste, smell or any other quality; the relation between them is technically called to be that of mushabahah (q.v.)
ittihad fi’ l-nau’
Union by species, said of two or more things or individuals belonging to the same species, e.g. Zaid, Bakr and ‘Umar subsumed under the species "man"; the relation between them is technically called to be that of mumathalah (q.v.).
ittihad fi’ l-maudu
Union with reference to "subject", said to be of two or more predicates when they pertain to the same subject in a proposition for example when it is said, "Honey is yellow and sweet and soft".
ittihad fi’ l-wad’
Union with reference to the composition of parts of constituents of two or more bodies, for example the skeletal systems of two mammalians or vertebrata; this similarity in the composition of parts of two or more bodies is technically known as muwazanah (q.v.).
ittisal
A term used in logic to denote the connection between the antecedent and the consequent in a conditional or hypothetical proposition. Also means continuous. see al-qadiyat al-shartiyah.
al-athar al-‘ulwiyah
"The things on high": an expression used by Muslim philosophers and scientists for meteorological phenomena such as meteors, thunder, lightning, seasons, rain, snow, hailstorm, dew, etc. Quite often it is used as title of works on the study of these phenomena and more particularly for Aristotle’s work Meteorolgica containing four books.
ithbat al-Bari
Proving the existence of God. Muslim philosophers seem to be fully conversant in their own way with the so-called traditional arguments for the existence of God, viz. the cosmological argument, the teleological argument and the ontological argument; it is, however, the first which they have emphasized most and of which they have given many more variant forms than those of the others.
Uthulujiya Aristatalis
The theology of Aristotle, a pseudo-Aristotelian work which the Muslim philosophers in all sincerity ascribed to Aristotle. It really is a running paraphrase of the eight sections of the last three books of Plotinus’s Enneads (i.e. IV3, IV4, IV7, IV8; V1, V2, V8; and VI7).
ijitima al-naqidain
Bringing two contradictories together, which is a logical impossibility; for two contradictories cannot be predicated of the same subject at the same time in the same respect, as contradictories in their very nature exclude each other. This is, however, done to reduce the argument of an adversary in a discussion to a logical absurdity. See also muqati’ and naqidan.
al-ajsad al-saba‘ah
"The seven bodies": an expression used by the philosophers to denote seven kinds of minerals or metals: gold (dhahab), silver (fiddah), lead (rasas), black lead (usrub), iron (hadid), copper (nahas) and a hard glass substance (kharsin).
al-ajnas al-‘ashr
The ten genera, the name given sometimes to the ten Aristotelian categories; see al-maqulat al-‘ashr.
ihtijaj
To give a logical argument or proof; it has three major modes or kinds: syllogistic argument (qiyas, q.v.), inductive argument (istiqra, q.v.) and argument by analogy (tamthil, q.v.).
ihdath
Coming into temporal existence; see ibda‘.
Ihdath al-jaww
"The events of the firmament", i.e. the meteorological phenomena such as meteors, thunder, lightning, seasons, rain, snow, hailstorm, dew, formation of minerals etc. The term is often used for the science of meteorology. See also al-athar al-‘ulwiyah.
Ihsar
The quantification of a proposition through the use of one of the quantity indicators (al-faz al-musawirah, q.v.); see al-qadiyat al-mahsurah.
akhadha juz’ al-‘illah makan al-‘illah
The fallacy of taking a part of the cause or only one condition of the cause as the whole cause.
akhadha mabi’ l-‘ard makan bi’l-dhat
The fallacy of accident; it consists in confounding an essential with an accidental difference as in the following example. " ‘Is Plato different from Socrates?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Is Socrates a man?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then Plato is different from man.’" The fallacy lies in assuming that whatever is different from a given subject must be different from it in all respects, so that it is impossible for them to have a common predicate.
al-akhlat al-arba‘ah
The four humours, i.e. the four chief fluids of the body, viz. blood, phlegm, choler orbile and melancholy or black bile; the theory of four humours, quite common with Muslim philosophers and physicians, originated from Hippocrates (Burqat, q.v.).
Ikhwan al-Safa’
"the Brethren of Purity" a free scholarly association of scientists and philosophers established at Basra in about 373/983 with a branch in Baghdad. They authored fifty-one treatises know as Rasa’il Iknwan al-Safa’ (Treatises of the Brethren of Purity) which form an Arabic Encyclopedia of science, philosophy and religion, probably the first of its kind in the world of literature.
idrak
Perception or apprehension; the term is used, however to denote any kind of cognitive experience of the particular objects whether it is due to external sense-organs (i.e. idrak al-hiss) or on account of internal senses such as formative faculty (al-quwwat al-mustasawwirah or khayal, q.v.), estimative faculty (al-quwwaat al-mutawahhimah, q.v.), imagination (al-quwwat al-mutakhayyilah, q.v.) or rational faculty (al-quwwat al-‘aqliyyah, q.v.). Sometimes cognition, through the external senses, is distinguished from that through the internal senses by calling the former mahsusat and latter wajdaniyat.
adwar-o-akwar
The recurrent or cyclic periods in the history of cosmic evolution; a term used mostly by the philosophers of illuminationism (ishraqiyun).
Iraqalitus
Heraclitus (fl. in 5th century B.C.) Though generally called the "Obscure," he was one of the most brilliant of the pre-Socratic philosophers. He maintained that all things change and nothing is permanent.
Irkhila’us
Archelaus – Greek philosopher, the disciple of Anaxagoras (Anaksaghuras, q.v.).
Aristatalis
Aristotle(384–322 B.C.) pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander… almost all of the works of Aristotle except his Dialogues (about 27) were available to the Muslim philosophers in their Arabic translation. The called Aristotle al-mu‘allim al-awwal, i.e. the “the first teacher”, and keenly studies his works either directly or through his commentators such as as Alexander of Aphrodisias (Iskandar Ifrudisi, q.v.), Themistius (Thamistiyus, q.v.), Simplicus(Sinbliqiyus, q.v.) and others. Muslim Philosophers are not to be blamed for being not altogether able to distinguish between the genuine and apocryphal works of Aristotle. More important of the later current among are: “The Theology of Aristotle” (Uthulujiya Aristatalis, q.v.), Liber de Causis” (Kitab Khair al-Mahd, q.v.) and Secreta Secretorum (Sirr al-Asrar, q.v.)
Aristarchus: Greek astronomer of 3rd century B.C.
Aristippus of Cyrene (c. 435-366 B.C.) Greek philosopher, disciple of Socrates and founder of the school of Cyrenaicism (Qaurniyah, q.v.). He taught that seeking of pleasures is the true end of life and that pleasures are to be judged by their intensity and duration alone. Physical pleasure are the keenest, and present pleasures are sure and as good as that of the future; so why not pluck pleasures as they pass?
Archimedes (C. 287-212 B.C.): Greek mathematician, physicist and engineer known especially for his work in mechanics and hydrostatics. Famous for the discovery of the principle that a body immersed in fluid loses in weight by an amount equal to the weight of the fluid displaced. Many of his works were well known to Muslim Philosophers through their Arabic translation and commentaries on them by Hunain ibn Ishaq (d. 246/877), al-Mahani (d. c.261-71 /874-84) and Yusuf al-Khuri (fl. 290-6/902-8).
The Organon (the organ or instrument for acquiring knowledge): a name given by the followers of Aristotle to the collection of logical treatises. The Organon originally consisted of 6 treatises: Categoriae (Qatighuriyas, q.v.); De Interpretatione (Bari Irminiyas, q.v.); Analytica Priora (Analutiqa, q.v.); Analytica Posteriora (Analutiqa Thani, q.v.); Topica (Tubiqa, q.v.); and Sophistici Elenchi (Sufustiqa, q.v.). The Muslim philosophers, however included 3 more treatises in their Arabic version of the Oraganon, viz Isagoge (Isaghuji, q.v.), an introduction written by Porphyry (Firfuriyus, q.v.); Rhetorica (Rituriqa. q.v.), Aristotle’s treatise on the art of public speaking; and Poetica (Buyutiq, q.v.), a work on the art of Poetry.
The four elements or roots: fire, air, water and earth of which all bodies in the world, mineral, plant, or animal are composed; this notion of the four elements was common to all Muslim Philosophers, but it originated with the Greek philosopher Empedocles (Anbadqulis, q.v.) who was first to postulate it; more often the term used is al-‘anasir al-arba‘ah See also ustuqussat.
Oribasius, Greek physician (c. 325-c. 400 C.E.).
Eternal without beginning as opposed to abad, eternal without end. See also abad.
The fallacy of many questions; see mughalatat al-as’ilat al-muta‘addadah.
Speusippus (fl. 348-339 B.C.): Greek philosopher, nephew and disciple of Plato and after his death (348-347 B.C.) succeeded him as the head of the Academy (Aqadhamiya, q.v.)
Negation of the consequent (tali q.v.) in the minor premise of a conditional conjunctive syllogism or negation of one of the alternatives in the minor premise of conditional disjunctive syllogism. See also al-shartiyat al-muttasilah and al-shartiyat al-munfasilah.
Affirmation of the antecedent (muqaddam, q.v.) in the minor premise of a conditional conjunctive syllogism or of one of the alternatives in the minor premise of the conditional disjunctive syllogism. See also al-shartiyat al-muttasilah and al-shartiyat al-munfasilah.
Qualitative change in a body from one state or condition into another, e.g. water becoming hot after it was cold; also called harakah fi’l-kaif (q.v.).
Reasoning in general but more specifically the mode of reasoning in which we proceed from the given facts or effects to the inference of their causes. Also Inference. See also al-burhan al-’inni.
Capacity, i.e. power, actual (bi’l-fi‘l) or potential (bi’l-quwwah) possessed by a thing either to act in a certain manner or to suffer a certain change; it may be innate or acquired. The term is used by the Muslim Peripatetics more often in the metaphysical discussion of potentiality and actuality. See also al-kaifiyat al-isti‘dadiyah.
Induction, i.e. arriving at a general conclusion or a universal proposition through the observation of particular instances, e.g. "All crow are black" or "All ruminants are cloven footed".
Imperfect induction, i.e. the induction which does not fulfill the conditions of scientific induction, e.g. the statement: "All animals move their lower jaw which chewing food," which is falsified by the fact that the crocodiles in the chewing process move their upper jaw rather than the lower one.
Roots: a term of Greek origin for elements, i.e. fire, air, water and earth, more common them in Muslim philosophy for which is ‘anasir (q.v.). A subtle distinction, however is sometimes made between the to terms. ustuqussat is supposed to refer to the fact of composition or generation (kaun) of every natural body which is composed of roots whereas the term ‘anasir refers to the possibility of its being decomposed or corrupted (fasad) again into separate elements. See also al-arkan al-arba‘ah.
Asclepius of Tralles: Greek philosopher and mathematician of the 6th Century C.E.; pupil of Ammonius (Amuniyus, q.v.), wrote a commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics mentioned by al-Kindi.
Asclepidades of Bithynia: Greek physician of 1st century B.C. opposed Hippocrates (Buqrat, q.v.) in his theory of disease.
Alexander of Aphrodisias: the peripatetic philosopher, head of the Lyceum between 198 and 211 C.E. One of the greatest commentators on Aristotle. Some of his commentaries are known now only through Arabic translation of them. He had a considerable influence on the development of Muslim Philosophers’ theory of intellect, though in the final form their version of this theory is much more subtle and sophisticated than Alexander of Aphrodisias and even Aristotle could possibly think of; see various kinds of ‘aql.
words used to negativise the subject or the predicate or both of a proposition. See also al-qadiyat al-ma‘dulah.
Perplexity felt in deciding between truth and falsity of a statement.
The fallacy of ambiguous minor; see mughalatah ishtirak al-hadd al-asqhar.
The fallacy of ambiguous major; see mughalatah ishtirak al-hadd al-akbar.
The fallacy of ambiguous middle; see mughalatah ishtirak al-hadd al-aust.
Equivocation, particularly the ambiguous use of any one of the three terms of a syllogism (qiyas, ; q.v.); see mughalatah ishtirak al-lafzi.
"The principiality of existence or being," i.e. the ontolgical priority of the being or existence (anniyah, q.v.) of a thing to its quiddity or essence (mahiyah, q.v.): a doctrine expounded by Mulla Sadrah (979-1050/1571-1649) as against the opposite view held by the Muslim Peripatetic philosophers. See also mahiyah.
An expression used in Arabic religio-philosophical literature for the followers of Buddah who is himself sometimes named as Buda Yusuf (q.v.).
"The People of the Shaded Place," i.e. the Stoics, so called because the founder of the school of Stoicism, Zeno (fl. 308 B.C.), use to teach in a stoa (a porch) in Athens. The Stoics inculcated a complete control of one’s desires and appetites and indifference towards pleasure and pain, for thus alone could one become master of one’s self and attain virtue for virtue’s sake. All men, according to them are of one blood, of one family; and so one should treat others as "sacred beings". As for their view of the universe their doctrine is pantheistic. The teachings of the Stoics had a considerable influence on Muslim philosophical thinking, particularly in the field of logic. See also rawaqiyah.
"Most fitting or best," a thesis of Muslim theodicy that God does what is best for mankind.
Self-evident first principles or axioms like a part is less than the whole of which it is part, equals added to equals are equals, or two contradictories cannot be true of the same thing at the same time and in the same respect.
Necessary presuppositions of a science which are accepted as initial truths and which are the base of the entire superstructure of that science like the principles that every event has a cause and that the same cause has the same effect.
Relation, one of the ten Aristotelian categories (al-maqulat al-‘ashr, q.v.); it denotes the relationship between two things such as father and son or master and apprentice or, more generally, the relation of a thing to all other objects.
Consideration. (AnAc) 
Relational, relative. (AnAc)
Contraries; for the logical nature of contraries, see diddan.
The fallacy of four terms; see mughalatat al-atraf al-arba‘ah.
"Natural numbers", i.e. cardinal numbers, one, two, etc.
Enlightened knower. (AnAc)
‘ayn
External, objective. (AnAc)
Objective reality. (AnAc)
The eternal essences of things which together form the world of Ideas or the spiritual world which is intermediary between God and the material world of sensible phenomena. {Permanent archetypes, fixed entities, fixed essences [see Sadra, al-Asfar, “in the convention of some ahl al-Kashf wa’l-Yaqin, mahiyyat are called ‘al-a‘yan al-thabitah’, 1: 49, line 4]. updated by: (AnAc)}
Agathodaemon (other Arabic variants are Aghathudhimun and Aghadhimun) represented in the tradition of the philosophy of Illuminationism (al-hikmat al-ishraqiyah) as one of the ancient Egyptian sages. Sometimes he is considered the son of Hermes II, sometimes the associate of Socrates (Suqratis, q.v.) and occasionally one of the pupils of Ptolemy (Batlamiyus, q.v.). More generally he is considered an authority in the occult sciences. It is said that he invented a clock that could lure the snakes, scorpions and other reptiles out their holes. Ibn al-Nadim lists him among the foremost alchemists. In short, it is difficult to identify Aghathadhimun, and in all probability the name stands merely for a mythical personality.
Plato(428-7 –348-7 B.C.): one of the greatest of Greek philosophers; disciple of Socrates (Suqratis, q.v.) on whose dialectic his whole philosophy is mainly based. The central doctrine is his theory of Ideas according to which Ideas, Forms, or Universals are eternally real as opposed to the transitory and relatively unreal objects of sense-perception (see al-muthul al-Aflatuniyah). Though some of Plato’s dialogues, viz. the Republic, the Laws and the Timaeus were available to the Muslim philosophers as early as Hunain ibn Ishaq (195-264/809-10-877), it is interesting to note that most of the Muslim philosophers did not recognize Plato to be a real representative of Greek philosophy, or at least they subordinated him to Aristotle. Nevertheless Plato’s influence on Muslim philosophy, particularly on Muslim ethics and political philosophy, is quite visible, while it is paramount on the philosophers of Illuminationism (Ishraqiyun) who being critics of Aristotle and Muslim Aristotelians (Mash‘iyun,) regarded Plato as the chief authority in philosophy and made the Platonic mysticism as the keynote of their theosophical Illuminationism.
Neoplatonism, a school of philosophy which wove all the strands of existing systems (Platonism, Aristotelianism, Pythagoreanism, Stoicsim, Gnosticism, etc.) into a single web of thought. Founded by Ammonius Saccas (Amuniyus, q.v.) in the second century C.E. in Alexandria, ending with Proclus (Buruqlus, q.v.) in the 5th century. Its greatest interpreter however was Plotinus. See al-Shaikh al-Yunani and Uthulujiya Aristatalis for the influence of this school on Muslim philosophical thought.
Analytica Posteriora or the Second Analytics, Aristotle’s fourth book on logic; see Analutiqa Thani.
Academy: Plato’s school of philosophy in Athens, established by him in 387 B.C. The Academy lasted under various forms until closed by Christian intolerance of the Roman Emperor Justinian I the Great in 529 C.E., whereupon the seven(?) philosophers (Neoplatonists) took refuge in Persia at the court of Nushirwan the Great.
Euclid: Greek geometer; flourished in Alexandria about 300 B.C. He systematized the geometrical knowledge of his time in the 13 books of Elements, first translated into Arabic by al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Matar (fl. in 170/786). Many commentaries are written on this work by Muslim scientists. The name of Uqlidis soon became synonymous with geometry itself. Many of his other works were well known to to the Muslim scholars but some writings on mechanics ascribed by them to Euclid, for example, a book on the "Heavy and Light" dealing with the notion of specific gravity mentioned in al-Fihrist and tow treatises on "Lever" and "Balance" do not seem to be genuine.
Euclides of Megara(450 ?–374B.C.): Greek Eleatic philosopher, contemporary of Plato, and like him, disciple of Socrates; founder of the Megarian school. Titles only of his works are know now. Often mistaken by medieval Muslim writers for Euclid (Uqlidis) the geometer.
Lit. "persuasion"; in logic it means a mode of reasoning by which the mind of the listener is convinced by a statement even when it lacks the required demonstration or proof.
iktisab
Acquisition. (AnAc)
Concomitance [see S. Afnan, Avicenna: His Life and Works, 93]; entailment. See also lazim. (AnAc)
Coercion, constraint. (AnAc)
a’immat al-asma’ (and) al-a’immat al-sab‘ah
The term a’immat al-asma’ (lit. the leading names) refers to the seven principal names of God, viz. al-hayy (the Living); al-‘alim (the knower), al-Murid (the Willing, or the Purposer); al-Qadir (the Powerful); al-Sami‘ (the Hearer); al-Basir (the seer); al-Mutakallim (the speaker). The qualities or attributes denoted by these seven principal names of God are named al-a’immat al-sab‘ah (lit. the seven leaders).
Extension. (AnAc)
The three dimensions of a body: length, breadth and depth. See also al-ab‘ad al-thalathah.
“the lower mothers”: and expression used to denote the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth. See also al-arkan al-arba‘ah.
“the higher mothers”: as opposed to al-ummahat al-sufliyah (the lower mothers) the term denotes the intelligences and souls of the celestial spheres. See also al-‘uqul al-‘asharah.
"The cardinal virtues ", e.g. Plato’s four cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Cardinal virtues are "the mothers of virtues", i.e. Other virtues are regarded as merely derivative forms of these virtues.
Ammonius Saccas (c. 175–c. 250 C.E.): teacher of Plotinus (Fulutin, q.v.) and reputed founder of Neoplatonism. The surname Saccas (the sack-bearers) was derived from the occupation by which he originally earned his living.
The instant or present moment as an indivisible wedge between past and future.
Analytica Priora or the First Analystics: Aristotle’s third book on logic; other variants are Anulutiqa and Analutiqa Awwal– also entitled as al-Qiyas in Arabic; it deals with the combination of propositions in the different forms of syllogism(qiyas, q.v.)
Analytica Posteriora or the Second Analystics: Aristotle’s fourth book on logic; other variants are Abuditiqta or Afudiqtiqi, also entitled as al-Burhan in Arabic; it deals with the conditions to be fulfilled by the premises of a valid demonstration and thus distinguishes a sound syllogism from an unsound one.
Empedocles (c. 490 –c. 435 B.C.), known to Muslim philosophers by other Arabic variants of his name: Abidqulis, Abidhqulis, etc. A pre-Socratic philosopher, physicist, physician and social reformer, Postulated the existence of the four elements (al-‘anasir al-arba‘ah, q.v.) or roots (ustuqussat, q.v.) out of the mixture of which all things came to be, love and hate being the cause of motion and so of the mixing of these elements. Held the view that sense-impressions are caused by effluxes from the objects. All these views of Empedocles became current with Muslim philosophers; but their knowledge of him was based mainly on what reached them through the works of Aristotle and Plutarch, and they often associated him with Neoplatonists.
Abstract [amr intiza‘i, see Asfar, 1: 48, line 6]. (AnAc)
"The ever-abiding now", wherein tow eternities, i.e. azal (q.v.) and abad (q.v.) perpetually meet; the present moment as an image of eternity. Al-an al-da’im is usually considered to be the root of time (asl al-zaman) or its very inner essence (batin al-zaman)
Andronicus (fl. 1st century B.C.): Greek Peripatetic philosopher, the famous editor of Aristotle’s works; See Matatafusiqi.
"The perfect man", i.e. the one in whom are combined all the various attributes of divinity and humanity, or one who has realised in his person all levels of being –a notion common to the Muslim philosophers and mystics. Interesting to note is the highly eclectic(?) conception of "the perfect man" held by the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa, q.v.): "The perfect man" is of East Persian origin, Arabian in faith, Babylonian in education, Hebrew in astuteness, a disciple of Christ in conduct, as pious as a Syrian monk, a Greek in natural sciences, an Indian in the interpretation of mysteries and, above all a Sufi or a mystic in his whole spiritual outlook".
The present moment in constant flux and so ever indivisible.
Lit. "being acted on:, but technically the category of "passion" as one of the ten Aristotelian categories (al-maqulat al-‘ashr, q.v.) also called yanfa‘il (to be acted on). Infi‘al as opposed to fi‘l (q.v.) (the category of action) is the reception of the effect of an affecting agent.
Sensible qualities of things or persons such as are of transitory nature, for example the blush on the face of man on account some embarrassment or pallidness on account of fear; the sudden change of one state into another is called istihalah (q.v.). Opposed to infi‘aliyat; see below
Sensible qualities of things such as are firmly rooted in them like sweetness in honey or salinity in brine; opposed to infi‘alat (q.v.); see also al-kaifiyat al-mahsusah.
Anaxagoras (c. 499 –c.428 B.C.): the last philosopher of the Ionian school of Greek philosophy. He taught that their are infinitesimally small particles (or seeds) containing the mixture of all qualities. These were distributed in the universe originally in a chaotic form, to which nous, i.e. Mind gave an order and system by a movement of rotation. All things come to be and cease to be through the coming together and separation of the seeds. Nous, however, is simple, unmixed and alone. It is the cause of original motion in the material elements or "seeds"; without partaking of the nature of matter, it is itself a spiritual essence. Since the universe displays harmony, order and purposiveness, it is a teleological principle. Anaxagoras indeed was the first to give a teleological explanation of the universe.
Anaximander of Miletus (c. 610 – c. 545 B.C.) a pupil of Thales (Thalis al-Malti, q.v.). He wrote a book on natural philosophy considered to be the first Greek work on philosophy. In this he expounded his notion of the "boundless" or "infinite" which according to him, is the first principle or primary substance, eternal and imperishable containing within itself all contraries such as heat and cold and moist and dry. The phenomenal universe has been evolved through the separation and union of these contrary elements.
Anaximenes of Miletus (d. c. 528 B.C.) According to him, air is the primary substance from which all things are derived by varying degrees of compression or rarefaction. Probably the first to teach that moon receives its light from the sun.
Lapse, passing away. tajaddud wa inqida': renewal and lapse (AnAc)
"The regent lights", which according to the philosophers of Illuminationism (Ishraqiyun), govern the affairs of the celestial spheres.
Analytica Priora or the First Analystics, Aristotle’s third book on logic; see Analutiqa.
"Thatness" of a thing, i.e. its existence as opposed to quiddity. In God alone, according to the Muslim philosophers, is His essence one with His existence; in everything else it is possible to think of its essence without knowing whether it exists or not. The term anniyah is used sometimes in the sense of huwiyah ("itness") of a thing, i.e. its self-identity. See also huwa huwa.
Aaron of Alexandria (fl. between 610 and 641 C.E.). His Pandect, a Greek medical encyclopedia divided into 30 sections, was the first book translated from Syriac into Arabic by Masarjawaih of Basra in 64/683 under the title Qarabahin.
Persons possessing practical experience in a field of study; the experts in a subject.
People possessed with heavenly visions.
Lit. "the people of the shaded place", a name given to the Stoics: see ashab al-mazallah and rawaqiyah.
Lit. "the people of the balance", but technically the term means simply logicians because of their use of logic, which is sometimes called "the science of balance" (‘ilm al- mizan) to weigh the truth and falsity of statements and arguments.
Indetermination as to the quantity of a proposition (opposed to ihsar, q.v.) ; see al-qadiyat al-muhmalah.
Eudemus of Rhodes: Greek philosopher of 4th century B.C.; pupil and friend of Aristotle whose work Eudemian Ethics (Udhimya, see below) is supposed to have been edited by him.
Eudemina Ethics, the title of one of the three books by Aristotle on ethics; see Udimas.
Autolycus (fl. c. 310 B.C.): Greek astronomer and mathematician. His work on "the revolving sphere" was known to Muslim scientists and philosophers through its Arabic translation by Hunain ibn Ishaq (d. 264/877).
A priori data or premises which have the status of first principles, i.e. the propositions which are inherent in the intellectual faculty of man–the Laws of Thought, for example.
Iamblichus (d. c. 335 C.E.): a Neoplatonic philosopher, pupil of Porphyry (Firfuriyus, q.v.). He developed more the mystical side of Neoplatonism (al-Aflatuniyat al-Muhdathah, q.v.)
Heron the Mechanic of Alexandria (fl. early 1st century B.C.); author of numerous works on mathematics, physics and mechanics, some of which were known to the Muslim philosophers and scientists through Arabic translations by Thabit ibn Qurrah and Qusta ibn Luqa.
Arabicised form of the Greek word Isagoge meaning "introduction", sometimes translated as al-Madkhal. It is originally an Introduction to Aristotle’s logical treatise on Categories (al-Qatighuriyas, q.v.) composed by Porphyry (Firfuriyus, q.v.). It deals with the five predicates (al-alfaz al-khamsah, q.v.) and also with the terms of speech and their abstract meanings. This little treatise, first translated into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ has been commented on a number of times. Besides the adaptations and epitomes of this work, many independent works on logic by Muslim philosophers have been entitled as al-Isaghuji, the most famous of them being one by al-Abhari (c.597-664, c.1200-1265).
Lit. "Where?", but technically the category of place as one of the ten Aristotelian categories (al-maqulat al-‘ashr, q.v.); it denotes the particular place where a thing is.
Eudoxus of Cnidos (c. 408 –c.355 B.C.): studied philosophy under Plato. Known chiefly for his works on mathematics and astronomy, some of which reached the Muslim philosophers and scientists.
"Which one?" or "What?" –one of the interrogative pronouns used in order to discuss the form and matter of definitions and propositions in connection with the problems that arise in science. Ayyan denotes that form of the question which is put to know the differential quality of a thing in order to distinguish it from other things belonging to the same class; see also muta‘alliqat al-qiyas wa‘l-burhan.
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-Bah
bariqah
A flash of illumination or inspiration from God in the sour of man, which does not tarry long.
Bari Irminiyas
De Interpretatione (The Interpretation), the title of the second of Aristotle’s book on logic, also named as al-‘Ibarah or al-Tafsir; it deals with the formation of different kinds of propositions through the combination of simple ideas or terms.
Balinus
Apollonius: many other Arabic variants of this name to be met with in Muslim works on the history of philosophers and scientists are: Abulluniyus, Abuluniyus, Ablinas and Ablus. Two persons named Apollonius were known to the Muslim thinkers:
- Apollonius of Perge (c. 200 B.C.), which name appears almost invariably with epithet al-Najjar, i.e. "the Carpenter"; a Greek mathematician of third century B.C., whose Conics (al-Makhrutat) and other works wre translated into Arabic and commented upon.
- A sage whose personality is based on the Greek tradition about Apollonius of Tyana, a neo-Pythagorean philosopher of 1st century C.E. He is known as a hakim, i.e. a philosopher but often also called sahib al-talismat, i.e. a magician and miracle-worker.
Babus
Pappus: Greek geometer of late 3rd and early 4th century C.E. His chief work: "Mathematical Collection", was known to the Muslim philosophers and scientists; now extant only in incomplete form.
badihat
Self-evident datat or premisses, i.e. propositions the truth of which is open to direct inspection and requires no appeal to other evidence, like the statement that a part is les than the whole of which it is the aprt or that two contradictories (naqidan, q.v.) cannot obtain in the same individual at the same time.
badihi
That to which we give our assent without any question or investigation; opposed to nazari.
barzakh
Lit. "the intervening space", but technically the term denotes the "world of Ideas" which is considered intermediary between the material or phenomenal world and the world of pure spirits (mufariqat, q.v.) as well as of God. In the philosophy of Illuminationism (al-hikmat al-ishraqiyah, q.v.) barzakh means simply boy as opposed to light (nur.). Barzakhs, thus are dark bodies which become illuminated through the light recived from th spirit. The heavenly spheres being bodily are also barzakhs, but they are living barzakhs as compared to the physical bodies of this world which are dead barzakhs.
Buruqlus
Proclus (410-485 B.C.): Neoplatonic philosopher and saint, regarded as the last great teacher of (the Hegel) of Neoplatonism. He wrote extensive commentaries on Plato’s and Aristotle’s works. His Elements of Theology, a work on Platonic theology, partly translated into Arabic and re-arranged under the title Kitab al-khair al-Mahd (q.v.) was ascribed by the Muslim philosophers to Aristotle.
Barminidus
Parmenides (6th –5th century B.C.): head of the Eleatic school of Greek philosophy; classical exponent of monism. Reality for him is Being which is a plenum filling all space and reaming constant. Empty space or void cannot be. Non-Being, becoming, or creation is impossible. Multiplicity, change and time are illusions. Zeno (Zainun al-Akbar, q.v.), his famous pupil, offered a defence of this block-reality philosophy in terms of his famous paradoxes.
burhan
The term is used in philosophy in various slightly different senses: (1) mode of argumentation; (2) the argument itself; and (3) the manifest evidence or proof of a convincing argument –in this last sense the term is also used in the Qur’an (4:174; 12:24).
al-Burhan
The Arabic title given to Aristotle’s fourth book on logic, viz. Analytica Posteriora or the Second Analytics. See Analutiqa Thani.
al-burhan al-inni
The mode of reasoning which proceeds from effect to cause; as "a proof that a thing is", it starts from the particular fact which is given or is perceived and infers the cause or reason of its existence; also called technically istidlal (q.v.) as opposed to ta‘lil (q.v.)
al-burhan al-tatbiqi
A mode of argument employed to disprove the possibility of the infinite regress of causes as, for example, in the cosmological argument for the existence of God; more generally the term denotes the impossiblity of the infinte series of any successive sequence of events in the past or in the future.
al-burhan al-khatabi
The rhetorical argument based on premisses of the kind of maqbulat (q.v.) and maznunat (q.v.). See also al-qiyas al-khatabi.
al-burhan al-siddiqin
"The argument of the truthful ones", i.e. a kind of teleological argument employed by the prophets and saints, which much like al-burhan al-inni (q.v.), starts from th signs of God, manifest in the natural phenomena and in men’s own selves, and thereby establish the existence of God.
al-burhan al-qati‘
Decisive proof or apodictic demonstration. See al-burhan al-mutlaq.
al-burhan al-limi
The mode of reasoning which procees from a cause to its effect. As "a proof why a thing is", it starts from the cause or the universal and deduces the effect or the particular from it: the cause here is not merely the efficient cause (al-‘illat al-fa‘iliyah, q.v.) but also the formal cause (al-‘illat al-suriyah, q.v.), i.e. the reason why a thing is; technically also called ta‘lil (q.v.) as opposed to istidlal (q.v.).
al-burhan al-mutlaq
Absolute proof or apodictic demonstratioin of a conclusion in a logical syllogism from propositions or premisses which are certain and self-evident, i.e. such as belog to the category of yaqiniyat (q.v.)
al-basa’it al-ustuqussiyah
"The elemental simples" , i.e. the four elements: fire, air, water and earth. See also al-arkan al-arb‘ah and ustuqussat.
al-basa’it al-mjarradah
"The abstract simples," an expression used by Mulla Sadrah (979-1050/1571-1640)[website - Biography] to denote the intelligences and souls of the celestial spheres. See also al-‘uqul al-‘asharah.
al-basa’t al-‘aqli
"Conceptually simple", i.e. of which it is impossible to think that it could be divided even mentally, for example a point in geometery.
basar
"Sight": it is power placed in the two hollow nerves which meet each other in the brain; thence they separate and go to th etwo eyeballs. By this power are perceived rays of light, colours, shapes, sizes, motions, the beautiful and the ugly and other things. There are, however, three different theories of vision discussed by the Muslim philosophers.
- According to the theory labelled as Platonic theory of vision; a ray of light emanating from the eye falls on the surface of an object, and this enables us to see it. Ibn Sina, however, considers this theory untenable; for were it true we should be able to see things in the dark as we see them in the light.
- According to the second theory, it is the formative faculty (al-quwwat al-mutasawwirah, q.v.) itself which, so to say, goes out to the object to meet it, and hence we see it. This theory too is untenable; for were it true we would not be able to distinguish the objects which are absent from those which are present.
- The third theory, which is called the Aristotelian theory of vision, holds that whenever light falls on an object its shape transmitted through the various transparent media is imprinted on the vitreous humour of the eye, and hence we see it.
Batlamiyus (al-Qaludhi)
Ptolemy(the son of Claudius): Astronomer, mathematician, geographer and physicist of Alexandria of 2nd century C.E.; know to the Muslim scientists and philosophers mostly for his notable astronomical work Meagle Syntaxis (Grand Composition) generally called Almagest from the title of its translation in Arabic. The first know Arabic translation was made by al-hajjaj ibn Yusuf ibn Matar (fl. between 170/786 and 218/833), and it was followed by many other translations and also commentaries. Muslim philosophers’ grandiose construction of emanationistic cosmologies (nine celestial spheres with their souls and intelligences –the lower emanating from the immediately higher) is largely based on the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. According to this system, stars, the sun and (other) six planets each studded in a celestial sphere revolve around the earth, the centre of the universe. Muslim scholars studied Ptolemy’s works on geography, optics and the theory of music with great interest. Sarton considers his influence upon later times, until the middle of 16th century, second only to Aristotle.
Buqrat
Hippocrates of Cos (fl. 5th century B.C.): "the Father of Medicine", Greek physician, one of the greatest of all times. All his major works were translated into Arabic as early as 2nd –3rd/8th –9th century and keenly studied by Muslim physicians, most of whom also happened to be philosophers.
Buthaghuras
Pythagoras of Samos (c. 572-497 B.C.), the head of Pythagoreanism. See Fithaghuras.
Buda Yusuf
A name sometimes given by Mulsim philosophers to Gautama Buddha (563?-c. 483 B.C.), the Indian philosopher and founder of Buddhism.
Butiqa
The Arabicised title of Aristotle’s Poetica; see below.
Buyutiqa
The Arabicised title of Aristotle’s Poetica or the Poetics, (the other variant being Butiqa), in Arabic entitled also as al-Shi‘r; generally considered by Muslim philosophers to be one of Aristotle’s books on logic, i.e. the last part of the logical Organon (al-Arghanun, q.v.) which deals with the fine art of stirring the imagination and soul of the audience through the magic of words.
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-Daal
dakhilatan taht al-tadadd
The two sub-contrary propositions; see al-qadiyatan al-dakhilatan taht al-tadadd.
da‘im
Perpetual. (AnAc)
darajah
Stage. (AnAc)
dalalah
The manner in which a vocable (lafz) signifies the meaning of a thing that it designates; it is of three kinds: dalalat al-mutabaqah (q.v.), dalalat al-tadammun (q.v.) and. dalalat al-iltizam (q.v.). {Also: connotation, signify the meaning (of something) [see S. Afnan, Avicenna: His Life and Works, 92-3]. (updated by: AnAc)}
dalalat al-iltizam
Signification by association or implication between the word and its designatum, when, for example, the word "roof" is used to designate the walls as well; the latter designatum is associated with or implied in the former.
dalalat al-tadammun
Signification of partial accord between the word and its designatum, when, for example, the word "house" is used to signify only a part of the house, i.e. its roof only or walls only, etc.
dalalat al-tatafful
A term used by Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi Maqtul (549-587/1153-1191) for dalalat al-iltizam (q.v.).
dalalat al-haitah
A term used by Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi Maqtul for dalalat al-tadammun (q.v.)
dalalat al-mutabaqah
Signification of complete accord between a word and its designatum, when, for example, the word "house" is used to signify the whole of the house taking all its parts, the walls, the roofs, the floors, etc. into consideration.
dalil
A word of common use in philosophical discourse but bearing different meanings among which the following should be distinguished: ( i ) designation or indication by which a sign "leads" to another sign or thing; (2) proof in a general sense to be distinguished from a proof in the strict sense, i.e. from the syllogistic proof [al-burhan al-mutlaq (q.v.) or al-burhan al-qati‘ (q.v.)] in deductive logic by which the particular is deduced from the universal; (3) more specifically the proof by which the cause is inferred from the effect or universal from the particular; see also istidlal and al-burhan al-’inni.
al-dalil al-iqna‘i
The persuasive argument; see iqna and qiyas al-iqna‘i.
al-dalil al-murafa‘ah ila al-shakhs
The fallacy of argumentum ad hominem: a kind of the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi (mughalatat al-natijah ghair al-muta‘alliqah, q.v.) ; see also mughalatat al-dalil al-murafa‘ah ila al-shakhs.
dahr
The eternal duration in which eternity in past (azal, q.v.) is in a constant union with eternity in future (abad, q.v.). Dahr being the innermost essence or part of time (zaman, q.v.), encompasses it altogether. Dahr, compared with time and measured by it, is found to have a permanence corresponding exactly to the permanence of time with reference to what is contained in it; see also sarmad.
daur
A term used in logic to denote the circularity in argument or proof which occurs when a proposition is put forward followed by a number of propositions successively and at the end the last proposition is posited as the proof of the original proposition. It is, thus, a kind of petitio principii. In a simpler form it may be merely the rotation of two proposition, one used as a proof of the other. See also al-musadarah ‘ala’l-matlub al-awwal and muqati‘.
Dimiqratis
Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-370 B.C.): famous in Muslim philosophy for his theory of atoms; generally considered to be the founder of Greek atomism and also of the notion of empty space.
Dayujans al-Kalabi
Diogenes of Sinope (412 ?-323 B.C.): Greek cynic philosopher; studied under Antisthenes (c. 444-368 B.C.); the founder of cynicism (kalabiyah, q.v.). Diogenes rejected all social conventions. According to a tradition current in Arabic as well as in Persian literature, he once went through streets holding up a lantern "looking for an honest man". According to another similar tradition, he was visited at Corinth by Alexander the Great who asked if he could oblige the philosopher in any way, "Yes", Diogenes, "stand from between me and the sun."
-AinThe world of the souls and intelligences of the celestial spheres; see al-‘uqul al-‘asharah.
De Interpretatione: the Arabic title of Aristotle’s second book on logic. See also Bari Irminiyas.
Prime number, i.e. a number having no intergal factors except itself and unity –for example, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, etc.
Obversion, i.e. deriving a propsition by way of an immediate inference from a given propsition without transposing its subject and predicate (as is done in ‘aks, q.v.) and without changing its quantity but merely by chaning its quality which is done by negativising the original predicate, e.g. propositon "No men are non-mortal"; the former proposition is called ma‘adul minhu (q.v.) and the latter ma‘dul (q.v.).
The fallacy of non-sequitur, i.e. the one in which there is complete lak of logical connection between the premises advanced and the conclusion drawn. See also mughalatah ‘adm al-luzum bi’l-tab‘.
Accident. As one of the predicables (al-alfaz al-khamasa) ‘ard is that quality which adhere to a subject (maudu, q.v.), but–opposed to property –it neither constitutes its essense, nor does it necessarily flow form it, e.g. the color of man. According to the Peripatetics (al-Mashsha’un, q.v.), accidents may change, disappear, or be added, while substances (jauhar, q.v.) remains the same. Accident, thus, has no independent existence, but exists only in another being, a substance or another accident. According to the Mutakallimun, more particularly the Ash‘arites, however, an accident cannot exist in another accident but only in a substance. But no substance can ever exist apart form its qualities or accidents. Hence, the substance being inseparable from its accidents, like the latter, is also merely transitory, i.e. has only a momentary existence. Everything that exists, thus, consists of mere transitory units (atoms) having only a moment’s duration and needs must, therefore, be perpetually re-created by the will of God. See also al-fasl al-khass and al-fasl al-‘amm.
A term made current by the great Muslim philosopher and sociologist, Ibn Khaldun (732/808/1332-1406), for the sense of common honor and loyalty which binds togetehr the members of a family, clan, or tribe and thus is the cause of the solidarity of such institutions.
The planet Mercury or its sphere (falak); see also al-kawakib al-sayyarah.
The first intelligence, i.e. the first effusion or emanation from God, the Necessary Being (al-wajib al-wujud) or the First Principle (al-mabda’ al-awwal). The existence of the first intelligence is possible in itself as well as necessary through the First Principle; further it knows its own essence as well as the essence of the First Principle. From its twofold existence and twofold knowledge springs, according to the Muslim Peripatetic philosophers like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, the whole series of emanations, i.e. the nine celestial spheres with their nine intelligences as well as their nine souls. See also al-‘uqul al-‘asharah.
Intellect in action or the actualised intellect which, through the illumination that it receives from the agent intellect al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al (q.v.), is activated into thinking upon the univeral forms of objects as well as ultimate concepts.
Habitual intellect; see al-‘aql al-mustafad.
Practical reason or intellect which enables us to adopt the right course of action to attain what is useful and good.
The active intellect or the agent intellect, the lowest of the intelligences of the celestial spheres which gives "form" (surah, q.v.) to individual things, and so is called wahib al-suwar (q.v.), i.e. the giver of forms or dator formarum. Active intellect is continually in action and it rouses the material or potential intellect (al-‘aql al-hayulani, q.v. al-‘aql bi’lfi‘l, q.v.) from its state of latency by activating in it the thought of the universal forms and eternal truths. This transforms the material or potential intellect inot intellect in action (al-‘aql bi’l-fi‘l) which being more and more actualised through the illumination of al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al becomes similar to it and thus attains the status of the acquired intellect, i.e. of al-‘aql al-mustafad (q.v.).
The problem of intellects so keenly discussed by all the Muslim Peripatetics is much more complicated and subtle than can be described here. It, however, originated from somewhat obscure and ambiguous statement of Aristotle in the last book of his treatise on the soul (De Anima), in which he makes the distinction between the creative or active intellect and the passive intellect. Active intellect, he states, is the third besides the object and the passive intellect, as light is the third besides the eye and the object. Thus, active intellect is said to create the truths that we know, just as light may be said to make colors which we perceive by its aid. We see here at work Aristotle’s general principle that "what is potentially comes to be actually by the agency of something that already is actually" (Metaphysica, 1049b 24). Aristotle in this entire discussion leaves unexplained the unity and individuality of human personality. Hence the Muslim philosophers reformulated the whole theory and brought to it many refinements and elaborations not to be found in Aristotle or his commentators.
Accquired intellect, i.e. the intellect possessed with the comprehension of the universal forms, ultimate concepts and verities of knowledge by which possession it partakes more and more of the agent intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al, q.v.); also sometimes called al-‘aql bi’l-malakah.
The seperated intellect, i.e. the intellect or intelligence of a heavenly sphere which is the cause of its motion; see also al-‘uqul al-‘asharah.
Theoretical reason or intellect which enables us to form universal concepts, comprehend meanings and interconnections of things, enter into argumentative discussion and have abstract thinking in general. See also al-quwwat al-‘aqliyah.
The material intellect, also called al-‘aql bi’l-quwwah, i.e. potential intellect. It is the human intellect in its dormant form, merely a latent capacity to apprehend the universals and eternal truths subsistent in the active or agent intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al, q.v.).
The ten intelligences, i.e. the first intelligence (al-‘aql l-awwal, q.v.) in combination with the nine intelligences one for each of the following nine celestial spheres in a decending order: (1) the second intelligence of the sphere of the primum mobile; (2) the third intelligence of the sphere of the fixed stars (al-kawakib al-thabitah, q.v.); (3) the fourth intelligence of the sphere of Saturn (Zhhal); (4)the fifth intelligence of the sphere of Jupiter (Mushtari); (5) the sixth intelligence of the sphere of Mars (Marikh); (6)the seventh intelligence of the sphere of the Sun (Shams); (7)the eighth intelligence of the sphere of Venus (Zuhrah); (8)the ninth intelligence of the sphere of Mercury (‘Utarid); (9) the tenth intelligence of the sphere of the Moon (Qamar). This last is named as (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al, q.v.) which is a kind of creative and regulating power governing this world of ours. It is noteworthy that the belief that each celestial sphere has a separate intelligence of it own, originated from Aristotle who even held that there were not ten intelligences but fifty or more.
An invalid mode of reasoning which does not warrant any logical conclusion, e.g. the denial of antecedent (raf‘ al-muqaddam, q.v.) or the affirmation of consequent (wad’ al-tali) in a hypothetical syllogism; opposed to muntij (q.v.). See also mughalatah wad‘ al-tali.
Conversion, i.e. deriving a proposition by way of an immediate inference from a given propositon by transposing its subject and predicate but without changing its quality and without distributing a term in the inferred proposition (ma‘kus, q.v.) which is not already distributed in the given proposition (ma‘kus minhu, q.v.); sometimes called al-‘aks al-mustawi to distinguish it from al-‘aks al-naqid (q.v.) see also mun‘akis.
Conversion; see ‘aks.
Contrapositon, i.e. an immediate inference in which from a given proposition we infer another proposition, having for its subject the contradictory of the given predicat, e.g. from the propostion of the form "All S is P" we have through al-‘aks al-naqid "No not-P is S"; it thus involves first obversion (‘adl, q.v.) of the given proposition then conversion (‘aks, q.v.) of the obverse (ma‘dul, q.v.).
The sufficent cause of a thing, i.e. the cause which is adequate to produce an effect, e.g. a certain quantity of medicine to bring about the desired cure; more usually it consists of a number of positive casual conditions; opposed to al-‘illat al-naqisah (q.v.).
The formal cause of a thing, i.e. the form or shape (surah, q.v.) given to a thing while producing it; with Aristotle it is also the inner idea or essence of a thing.
The final cause of a thing, i.e. the purpose, aim or final end for which a thing is produced; with Aristotle it is primarily the realisation of the inner idea or essence of a thing in actuality; sometimes also called al-‘illat al-lima’iyah (q.v.).
The effcient cause of a thing, i.e. the efficiency or labor of an active agent that produces a thing, e.g. the efficency or labor of a carpenter in producing a table.
The final cause of a thing, the purpose or final end for which a thing is produced; also called al-‘illat al-gha’iyah (q.v.).
The material cause of a thing; see al-‘illat al-hayullaniyah.
The insufficient cause of a thing, i.e. the cause which by itself is inadequate to produce an effect, e.g. medicine alone may not be adequate to bring about the esired cure without careful nursing, proper dieting, complete rest and other hygienic conditions; opposed to al-‘illat al-tammah (q.v.).
The material cause of a thing, i.e. the stuff or substance of which a thing is made; with Aristotle it does not have to be necessarily a physical substance but anything: physical, mental, or, spiritual, e.g. the human passions, interests and conflicts are the material cause of a novel or a drama.
The four causes, viz. the material cause (al-‘illat al-hayullaniyah, q.v.), the formal cause (al-‘illat al-suriyah, q.v.), efficent cause (al-‘illat al-fa‘iliyah, q.v.) and the final cause (al-‘illat al-gha’iyah, q.v.). These four causes may all appear together in the defination of a thing, for example, a knife may be defined as an iron implement (material cause) of such shape (formal cause) made by the ironsmith (efficient cause) for cutting things (final cause).
"Inspired knowledge", or "knowledge derived from the presence of God", i.e. mystical comprehension–inspired by an encounter with God–of things spiritual.
Element. Theory of elements current with Muslim philosophers was that of four elements: fire, air, water and earth, which originated with Empedocles (Anbadqulis, q.v.)though they sometimes added to them ether as the fifth element specific to the body of celestial spheres; the terms used cognate with ‘anasir were ustuqussat (q.v.) and arkan (see al-arkan al-arb‘ah)
Modes of being, viz. necessity (wujub), possibility (imkan) and impossibility (imtina‘); the term is also used to denote the corresponding modalities of propositions (see jihah).
The supreme element, an expression used to denote the first intelligence; see al-‘aql al-awwal.
The heavy element, the atoms of which always move downward like the atoms of earth which are said to be absolutely heavy or like those of water which are relatively so.
The light element, the atoms of which always move upward like the atoms of fire which are said to be absolutely light or like those of air which are relatively so.
Lit. "eye". With the philosophers it denotes a particular concerete thing perceived in the outside world as distinguished from the concept of that thing in the mind; in this sense it is synonymous with the term shaks (q.v.). It is also sometimes used in the sense of substance (jauhar, q.v.). The Sufis, on the other hand, use the term ‘ain for the inner essence of a ting and more specifically for the universal idea of a thing eternally existing in the mind of God. Hence the term al-a‘yan al-thabitha (q.v.) (where thabitha means stable or eternal) for the eternal ideas existing in the mind of God which are said to be really real, of which this world is a mere shadow or dream according to the Platonic tradition.
Affirmation of the consequent, an involved mode of reasoning which does not warrant any logical conclusion; opposed to naqid al-tali (q.v.). See also mughalatah wad‘ al-tali.
The affirmation of the antecedent in the minor premise of a mixed hypothetical syllogism (al-qiyas al-sharti al-muttasil, q.v.) leading to the affirmation of the consequent (tali, q.v.) in the conclusion, a valid mode of reasoning called the positive mode (Modus Ponens) of hypothetical syllogism; opposed to naqid al-muqaddam (denial of the antecedent) which is a form of logical fallacy. See also mughalatah raf‘ al-muqaddam.
A
An, On (
Batas, pemisah antara yang lalu dan yang akan datang,atau had musytarak antara yang lampau dan yang akan datang , dalam istilah adalah had atau ujung (tharaf) zaman, nisbat An terhadap zaman seperti nisbat titik atas garis.
Abad
Eternal a parte post, without end. Secara bahasa berarti selamanya,lestari,secara istilah adalah waktu, zaman yang tidak ada akhirnya untuk masa depan atau eksistensi yang berlangsung dalam zaman yang tidak ada akhirnya lawannya adalah azal, eternal parte ente wtihout begin
Abadi
Nisbat kepada abad, atau untuk wujud yang tidak akan punah atau sesuatu yang ada dalam abad. Para hukama membaga wujud kepada 3 bagian : Azali abadi :itu adalah wujud tuhan yang dari dulu selalu ada dan akan terus ada, atau untuk wujud-wujud non materi (mujarad) yang ada sejak azali dan akan ada terus. 2 : Bukan azali dan bukan abadi adalah wujud-wujud materi yang selalu akan ada dan akan rusak, keberadaannya terpotong-potong tidak azali dan tidak abadi. 3: abadi ghoeru azali :jiwa-jiwa manusia wujud mereka qadim dan tidak azali tapi abadi dan tidak akan punah (fani).
Aen/Ayn
External , objektive
A’yan Objektive, reality
A’yan Tsabitah
Essensi abadi dari sesuatu yang bersama membentuk dunia ide atau dunia spiritual yang menjadi intermediansi antara tuhan dan alam materi fenomena fisik (arketif permanen, fixed entity, fixed essence)
Al-Ajsama Sab’ah
Seven bodies, 7 jenis mineral atau metal dalam ilmu filsafat : emas,silver, ironn, copper dll
Burhan Shidiqin
Argumen teleologikal yang dilakukan oleh para nabi dan orang-orang suci, mirip burhan inni, yang dimulai dari ayat-ayat tuhan, manifestasi penomena alam, manusia sendiri yang mengukuhkan keberadaan tuhan
Gradasi (ikhtilaf Tasykiki)
Adam : secara bahasa artinya tiada. Nothingness. Lawan dari ada (wujud/being). Adam terbagi ke dalam beberapa bagian. Adam mutlaq yaitu ketiadaan sama sekali. Adam itu tidak bisa didefiniskan karena ia memang tidak ada.
H
Hikmat
Ada beberapa definisi untuk hikmat yaitu
1. Hikmat adalah mengetahui keadaan dan karakter eksistensi eksternal, seperti apa adanya, sesuai kapasitas kemampuan manusia. Eksistensi eksternal adalah Hewan, tumbuhan, benda-benda, atom, ekstensi metafisika, dari dzat Hak (Allah) hingga mubda’at (yang diciptakan, mukhtara’at, kainat), bahkan hayula ula, semua adaalh eksistensi eksternal atau wujud khoriji.
2. Hikmat (Shairuratul insan, Aliman, aqliyan, mudhahiyan lil ‘alami aeni (manusia seperti halnya alam luar berubah menjadi alam akal. Pertanyaan bagaimana manusia menjadi alam aqli? Jawabannya sederhana adalah kita harus tahu apa itu ilmu? Ilmu adalah teraihnya gambar segala sesuatu dalam jiwa, jiwa seperti halnya cermin bisa merefleksikan seluruhnya. Jadi apa yang kita lihat di alam luar terdapat juga dalam jiwa manusia. sehingga jiwa itu menjadi alam juga, namun ini adalah alam ‘aqli.
3. Hikmat adalah Tasyabuh bil kholiqi ‘ilman wa ‘amalan. [1] Hikmat yaitu menyerupai tuhan dalam ilmu dan amal. Dalam hadis disebutkan ‘abdi atho’ani hatta aj’aluka mitsli, Hambaku taat kepadaku sehingga aku jadikan ia sepertiku.
Idrak, persepsi, apprehensi
Istilah untuk segala jenis pengalaman kognitif, terhadap objek partikular. Idrak itu ada idrak hiss (external sensen organs), quwwan mutashawirah-khayal (formative faculty), quwwan mutawahimmah (estimative faculty), Queeah mutakhayilah (imaginasi), quwwah aqliyah (rational faculty).
Isytirak lafzi (Equivocation)
I’tibar, consideration
Itifak (kebetulan, Insidental)
Itifaq adalah kosa kata-kosa kata yang mengandung berbagai arti dan juga digunakan untuk beberapa hal. Sebagian dari artinya adalah :
- Dengan arti menoIak ilat (causa) Fail (subjek) seperti yang dikatakan oleh kamu ateis dan mulhidin : Kemunculan alam adalah kebetulan, yaitu dunia ini ada dengan sendirinya, tanpa ilat yang mengadakannya.
- Dengan arti menafikan ijab Fail seseorang yang menolak urgensi (darurat) adanya hubungan antara ilat dan ma’lul, mengangap eksistensi ma’lul dalam wadah ilat bukanlah sesuatu yang hatmi (pasti) dan menganggap sesuatu yang menyalahi aturan (takhaluf nofadzir). Mereka mengatakan, “Kalau ilat terealisasi maka adanya ma’lul adalah itifaqi (kebetulan).
- Dengan arti menafikan ilat ghoyah (tujuan), sebagian berpandangan bahwa hubungan antara fail dan ghoyat tidak tercipta secara daruri dan bisa salah, dengan arti kata bisa jadi fail melakukan sesuatu dengan tujuan tertentum namun fi’il (pekerjaan) itu berakhir di tujuan lain dan itu bukan maksud fail. Dan tidak melakukan untuk itu. Atau dalam hal Fail-fail Thabi’i mereka mengatakan. Fail ini tidak memiliki tujuan pekerjaan seperti itu juga tidak mengerti tujuan dan arah yang tertentu dan juga tidak ditentukan untuk sampai ke titik tertentu.
- Dengan arti kebetulan dalam urusan real/hakiki yaitu sebab dan ilat untuk sebagian peristiwa, Sebagian berpendapat bahwa selain ilat yang empat (ilat fail, ilat shuri, ilat madi dan ilat ghoyi) ada juga ilat lain dalam alam wujud ini yaitu dengan nama itifaqi (kebetulan).
Berdasarkan istilah pertama, hal yang kebetulan adalah fenomena yang mungkin dan tidak punya fail. Menurut kepada arti kedua hal yang kebetulan adalah ma’lul meskipun wujudnya wajib secara daruri keluar dari fail, Menurut istilah ketiga hal yang kebetulan adalah ghoyat/tujuan yang berlaku atas fi’l tapi bukan maksud si fail, menurut istilah keempat adalah hal yang kebetulan yang berdasarkan kepada itifaqi/kebetulan, dan kebetulan dalam arti semua ini adalah batal/batil dan kesalahan/kebatalan masing-masing ini sudah dibuktikan.
Itkhilaf Tasykiki (Gradasi)
Perbedaan antara kuat dan lemah, yang dahulu (taqadum) dengan yang terakhir, belakangan (taakhur), tambahan, kelebihan (ziyadat) dengan kekuarangan (nuqsan), dan sejenisnya dinamakan dengan perbedaan/ikhtilaf tasykiki (gradasi)....................................................................................
K
Kuliyyatul Khomsah (Lima Universal)
Logikawan menawarkan sebuah metoda yang terpakai hingga kini dalam memberikan definisi. Predikat esensial sebuah term (afrad) terdiri dari dua konsep universal (1) Genus (Jins) dan (2) Pembeda (Fashl, Differentia). Disamping itu terdapat dua pola predikat aksidental (non-esensial), yaitu (1) sifat khusus (‘Aradh Al-khash, Proprium) dan (2) Sifat umum (‘Aradh Al-‘Am), sementara term yang hendak difenisikan disebut Spesies (nau’). Karana kelima pengertian ini merupakan konsepsi-konsepsi universal ,maka disebut juga sebagai kuliyatul khomsah (lima universal); yaitu :
- Spesies (nau’)
- Genus (jins)
- Pembeda (Fashl, Differentia)
- Sifat khusus (‘Aradh al-Khash, Proprium)
- Sifat umum (‘Aradh Al-‘Am, Accident)
L
Logos
Logos adalah
Nalar sebagai logos bertentangan diamtral dengan mitos.
Karakter logos dibedakan dengan karakter mitos
Karakter logos
- Menuntut penjelasan (albayinat).
- Menuntut akuntabilitas (pertanggung jawaban)
- Dialogis dan transparan
- Manusia sebagai subyek
- Menyapa realitas
- Menyingkap makna
- Merindukan kebenaran
- Bekerja dengan prinsip hukum
- Bekerja secara konsisten
- Bekerja dengan keteraturan.
- Bekerja dengan tujuan dan hikmah
- Mendamba cahaya dan penerangan
Karakter Mitos
- Menghindari penjelasan
- Menghindari akuntabilitas
- Antidialog, tertutup
- Manusia sebagai objek
- Mengelabui realitas
- Menyelubungi makna
- Mencari pembenaran
- Tidak ada prinsip hukum
- Tidak ada konsistensi
- Tidak ada keteraturan
- Buta dengan tujuan
- Memuja kegelapan
Quwwah dan Fi’il (Potensi dan Aktual/Aktif)
Makna Quwwah dan Fi’il
Eksisnya sesuatu dalam A’yan (dunia real, esensi, substansi), dimana memberikan efek-efeknya disebut fi’l (aktual). Dikatakan Wujudnya dengan fi’l dan kemungkinan sebelum berlakunya disebut Quwwah. Di katakan wujudnya bil quwwah setelah itu. Semisal air yang mungkin berubah menjadi uap, selama ia air, maka ia air bil fi’l dan uap secar bil quwwah. Jika ia berubah menjadi upa ia menjadi uap secara fi’l dan lenyaplah (batalah) quwwah. Dari wujud itu ada yang bil quwah dan ada yang bil fi’l.
Setiap
Mengenai Wajib Ta’ala
Untuk mengitsbatkan wujud dzat, sifat dan af’al-Nya
Untuk meng-itsbatkan (membuktikan) dzat Yang Maha Tinggi
Hakikat wujud- yang asli tidak ada yang lain lagi-yang murni (shorfatun) yang tidak dicampuri dengan yang lain, karena kebatalan (nonsen) yang lain tidak ada kedua-Nya-Wajib wujud, karena keniscayaan (dharurah) tsubut asy-syaei li nafsihi (sesuatu menempel, tetap, tsubut pada dirinya) dan lawanya tidak boleh
Taratub ‘Alam (Struktur, susunan Alam)
Alam-alam yang tiga berurutan secara wujud. Alam Akal sebelum alam mitsal, Alam Mitsal sebelum alam Materi (madah) wujudnya. Karena fi’liyah murni yang tidak dicampuri (la tasyubu), quwah lebih kuat, lebih tegas wujudnya dengan yang wujudnya bil quwah-murni,saja aau yang dicampuri quwwah. Mufarig sebelum Muqarin dengan madah. Akal mufariq lebih sedikit batasan (hudu), ikatan (quyyud) dan lebih luas, lebih sederhana wujud nya dibanding mitsal mujarrad. Setiap kali wujud itu lebih kuat dan lebih luas maka martabatnya dalam silsilah tertib dari hakikat wujud musyakikah (gradasi wujud) lebih dahulu (Aqdam). Dan lebih dekat kepada mabda awwal; yaitu wujud murni yang tidak ada batasan yang membatasinya atau suatu kesempuraan yang membuatnya berkurang. ‘Alam akal adalah wujud yang paling aqdam dan semuanya dan kemudian diikuti oleh alam mitsal dan alam madah berikutnya.
Bisa difahami dari penjelasan tadi bahwa tartib, struktur tadi adalah tartib ilah (causa) jadi alam akal adalah ilat mufidhah terhadap alam mistal dan alam mitsal ilat mufidhah atas alam materi.
‘Akal Thuliyah (Akal Vertikal,)
Yang keluar pertama adalah akal satu (ash-shadirul awwal, ‘aqlun wahidun).
Karena Allah Swt adalah satu, tunggal, esa yang basith dari segala jihat, terlarang keluar yagn banyak dari-Nya. Baik itu yang shadir Adalah mujarad seperti akal ardhiyah atau materi seperti na’u-nau; materi karena yang satu tidak bisa keluar darinya kecuali satu. Yang keluar (shadir) dari Allah ta’ala adlah akal satu yang menceritakan (yuhaki) dengan wujudnya yang satu dhilli (bayangan) terhadap wujud Wajib Allah dalam wahdahnya (ketunggalannya).
Akal awal adalah Washitah (perantara) dalam keluarnya Al-Faidh.
Makna awaliyah adalah keterdahuluanya dalamwujud atas wujud yang lain yang mumkinat, yaitu iliyah, maka ia dalah ilat mutawashitah antaranya dan antara Allah Swt dan antara seluruh shurah dan itu juga washitah untuk seluruh yang ada di bawahnya.
Jihat mutakatsirah dalam Akal Awwal
Akal awal sekalipun satu dalam wujudnya ,basith dalam shudurnya...................
Al-‘Uqul Ardhiyah (Akal-akal horosontal)
Kelompok Israqi telah membuktikan bahwa dalam wujud ada akal-akal Ardhiyah, diantara dia tidak ada iliyah dan ma’luliyah. Ia sejajar dengan genus-genus (anwa’) yang ada di alam madi. Semuanya mengatur apa yang sejajar dengan genus ini di sebut dengan arbab al-anwa’ (tuhan genus) dan matsalul aflatun karena ia bersikeras mengatakan demikian. Dan ini ditolak oleh Masyaiyun (peripatetik) mereka menisbatkan tadbir kepada akhir akal yang disebut Akal Fa’al (akal Aktif).
Yang membuktikan hal itu berselisih tentang hakikatnya. Pendapat yang paling sah – seperti yang dikatakan- bahwa untuk setiap na’u-na’u madah (materi) ini terdapat satu fard mujarad (entitas,individu noncorporeal, transenden) ketika awal wujudnya. Ia memiliki semua kesempurnaan secara lengkap secara fi’il; Yang mumkin bagi na’u itu; ia berkepentingan,memperhatikan afrad madiyah. Ia mengatur, mentadbir dengan perantraan surah na’u’iyah. Ia mengeluarkannya dari quwah kepada fi’lihah dengan gerakan harakah jauhariyah yang juga diikuti harakah ‘ardhiyah. Mereka telah membuktikan dengan beberapa segi yang kurang sempurna.
Alam Madi (alam materi)
Adalah alam masyhud (bisa diinderai), martabat wujud yang paling rendah, dan paling akhosyu ( ....) ia dibedakan, berbeda dari yang lainnya dengan ta’aluqnya shurah yang ada padanya dengan madah (materi) dan keterkaitannya dengan quwah (potensi) dan isti’dad. Tidak ada yang wujud kecuali semua kesempurnaan di awal wujudnya (dimulai) dengan quwah (potensi) kemudian ia keluar dengan fi’liyah, dengan secara tadriji (berproses, bertahap) dan harakah. Mungkin saja ada yang merintangi rintangan-rintangan. Alam ini, adalah alam tazahum (sesak) dan alam Tamanu’ (saling menahan, melarang, mencegah).
Karena Alam ini bergerak (mutaharik) dengan jauhanrya; mengalir (sayalan) dengan dzat-nya, maka dzat itu adalah tajadud (selalu baru)itu sendiri dan taghayur (perubahan) itu sendiri. Bukan ia ia menjadikan sesuatu itu selalu baru, sehingga terlarang menyandarkan mutaghayir kepada tsabit dan relasi antara hadis dengan qadim.
M
Maqulat secara bahasa artinya yang dikatakan. Dalam mantiq dipakai dengan arti mahmul. Contoh dalam ta’rif Mahiyah : Mahiyah adalah apa yang dikatakan (ma yuqolu), atas jawaban ma huwa, yang dimaksud ma yuqolu adalah ma yuhmalu. Atau dalam ta’rif Jins (Genus) misalnya, Jins (genus) adalah huwa maqul (yang dikatakan) atas katsrah mukhtalifah haqaiq fi jawabi ma huwa (hakikat yang banyak dalam jawaban apa itu) yang dimaksud maqul adalah mahmul.
Maqulah dalam filsafat dan mantiq ada makna khusus. Menurut makna khusus maqulah adalah genus tertinggi (jins ‘aliy) yang tidak ada lagi genus di atasnya lagi). Genus seperti dalam tataran, bentuk seperti ini dinamai Maqulah yang bisa dihamlkan (diberi predikat) atas misdaq-misdaq (ekstensi)nya dengan haml dzati (=mahmul dzati maudhunya sendiri). Namun dirinya sendiri bukan mafhum dzati, mahmul dzati itu.
Tema maqulat, untuk pertama kalinya dikemukakan oleh Aristoteles dalam buku Cathighuriyas (maqulat) dan juga dalam buku Thubiqiya (jadwal). Dalam buku-buku itu ada 10 jumlahnya. Setelah itu juga muncul dalam buku-buku mantiq dan kemudian masuk dari mantiq ke filsafat dan banyak dibicarakan oleh para filsuf peripatetik.
N
Nafs
Nafs adalah jauhar (substansi) yang secara dzat terpisah/mujarad/transenden dari materi, namun dalam fi’il-nya ia terikat dengan materi. Materi dimana nafs (jiwa) berhubungan dalam fi’ilnya, disebut badan. Nafs tanpa badan tidak bisa melakukan apa-apa. Hubungan antara nafs dan badan, dimana nafs melakukan pengelolaan tanpa perantara dan melakukan tadbir (pengaturan), di saat yang sama ia juga menerima reaksi (munfa’il) (badan) dan dipengaruhi. Sering sekali rasa sakit dan kelezatan yang muncul di badan karena perubahan-perubahan bisa menjalar ke nafs. Nafs tanpa badan tidak bisa menjadi baru (hadits, muncul). Memang mungkin saja setelah muncul dan hudutsnya ia bisa terpisah dari keterikatan dengan badan dan tanpa badan ia tetap kekal.
Nafs Al-Amri
Penjelasan para filsuf tentang nafs al-mri berbeda-beda. Sebagian mengatakan yang dimaksud dengan amri dari kata nafsu amri adalah Alam amr yaitu satu akal kuliy (universal) dimana di dalamnya terdapat semua bentuk (shurah, form) ma’qulat. Yang dimaksud dengan sesuainya satu qadiyah (proposisi) dengan nafs al-amr yaitu qadiyah (proposisi) itu sesuai (muthabaqat) dengan shurah-shurah ma’quli yang ada di akal.
Sebagian lagi mengatakan, Maksud nafs al-amri yaitu dirinya sendiri (it self), jadi dalam kosa kata ini kata benda dzahir menempati dhomir (kata ganti, pronoun) . Jadi sebagai ganti pernyataan ‘Hadza kadza fi nafsihi’ diganti ‘hadza kadza fi nafs al-amri’. Jadi misalnya ‘Adam (nothingness) dalam nafs al-amri batil secara dzat, maksunyd ‘Adam dalam dirinya demikian....
Alamah Thabathabi berpandangan bahwa nafs al-amri adalah zaraf (wadah) yang menjadi bahan pertimbangan akal untuk semua tsubut dan tahaquq, untuk mengistbatkan (konfirmasi) dan tahaquq (realisasi) ia menjadi pertimbangan akal. Nafs al-amri sebenarnya adalah ‘am tsubut (tsubut yang umum) yang mencakup 3 martabatnya yaitu :tsubut wujud, tsubut mahiyah, dan tsubut mafhum-mafhum i’tibari ‘aqli. (wujudnya terbukti, terkonfirmasi, fix, mahiyahnya terbukti dan konsep-konsep qua akal, dengan signifikansi akal, dalam opini akal, dalam kapasitas akal.
Makna Nafs al-amr
(Diterjemahkan dari kitab at-tamhid fi al-hikmati al-‘aliyah. Ali syirawani)
Hakikat wujud itu memiliki keberadaan (tsubut) dan eksistensi (tahaquq) sendiri, bahkan wujud itu tidak lain dari keberadaan (tsubut) itu sendiri. Dan mahiyah itu mengada -tsubutan wa tahaquqan- dengan wujud eksternal sehingga terlihat efeknya (atsar) atau terkadang dengan wujud mental (wujud dzihni) yang tidak menimbulkan atsar (fala tatarotab alaihi atsar), dan bukan dengan nafs dzatnya, sekalipun keduanya bersatu di luar (eksternal). Dan mafahim i’tibariyah (konsep-konsep artifisial) aqliyah, seperti mafhum wujud. Wahdah dan iliyah ia juga punya nahwu tsubutan bi tsubuti mashadiq muhkiyah laha, dan jika mafahim ini tidak diambil dari mashadiqnya ukhidat mahiyah fi afradiha wa fihududi mashadiqiha. Tsubut am ini yang mencakup tsubut wujud dan mahiyah dan mafahim ‘itibariyah aqliyah disebut degan nafs al-‘amr.
(di bawah ini bersumber dari buku mabani falsafeh islami karya ayatollah mukhtar aminiyan) cetakan markaz intisarat daftar tabligot haucah ilmiah qum)
Wujud itu terbagi 4 bagian :
1. wujud fi nafsihi li nafsihi (wujud wajibul wujud)
2. Wujud fi nafsihi li nafsihi bigoerihi (wujud jauhar)
3. wujud fi nafsihi li goerihi bi georihi (wujud ardl)
4. la fi nafsihi li goerihi bi goerihi (wujud robith)
P
Proposisi
Jika definisi/ta’rif masuk ke dalam muara pembahasan tashawur, maka Proposisi masuk ke dalam pembahasan tashdiq (judgement, putusan) Proposisi adalah suatu wadah yang menunjukan relasi antara yang dihukumi seperti, ‘hari ini panas.’ Kita menghubungkan term ‘hari ini’ dengan ‘panas’. Proposisi bisa dinilai benar atau salah jika sesuai dengan kenyataan (realitas). Itulah sebabnya dikatakan kita bisa mendapatkan pengetahuan objektif dengan pengetahuan tashdiq dan bukan dengan tashawur. Dalam bahasa Proposisi dilambangkan dengan kalimat berita. Ada subyek (pengertian/konsepsi yang diterangkan) dan ada predikat (yang menerangkan). Kalimat tanya dan perintah bukan lambang proposisi. Kalimat tanya masih mencari hubungan antara subjek dan predikat ,sementara kalimat perintah justeru menuntut hubungan diantara subjek dan predikat yang belum ada.
─ Dari segi isi hubungan antara Subejk dan predikat : 1. Proposisi analitik (predikat bukan sesuatu yang baru bagi Subjek) 2. Proposisi sintetik (Predikat sesuatu yang baru bagi Subjek).
─ Berdasarkan bentuk hubungan antara S dan P : 1. Proposisi Kategoris 2. Proposisi kondisional hipotesis.
─ Berdasarkan kriteria penilaiau atau sumber penilaian : 1. Proposisi filosofis 2. Proposisi Matematis 3. Proposisi Empiris
─Berdasarkan Kuantitas Subjek : 1. Proposisi Universal 2. Proposisi Partikular
─ Berdasarkan ada tidaknya hubungan antara S dan P :1. Proposisi Afirmatif 2. Proposisi Negatif.
Proporsi literal (qodliyah lafdziyah): proporsional yang dilihat dari segi lafadnya.
Proporsional rasional (qodliyah ma’qulah): Proporsional yang dilihat dari segi I’tibar mafhumnya.
Qodliyah tsunaiyah adalah yang mahmulah (predikat) qodiyahnya bersifat wujud mutlak seperti insane maujud . karena murni mengitsbatkan sesuatu jadi tidak ada robit (penghubung) antara insane dan maujud, jadi disebut qodliyah tsunaiyah dan du juz’i.
Qodliyah tsulatsiyah adalah yang mahmul (predikat/atribut) qodliyahnya bersifat muqoyad seperti insane katib, ini adalah mengitsbatkan sesuatu untuk sesuatu, yaitu dua hal untuk satu hal yang lain,
Wajib bidzat : adalah dzat yang wujudnya berasal dari dzatnya dan bukan dari yang lain semisal Dzat Allah.
Wajib bil Ghoeri : dzat yang wujudnya dari yang lain, dirinya bukan wajib semisal wujud ma’lul yang berasal dari ilat.
Wajib bil qiyas ilal ghoeri : dzat yang mendapatkan wujud karena dikiyaskan dengan yang lain. KEtika kita mengukur dua hal, kita lihat sesuatu yang kedua terhalang untuk mendapatkan wujud, kecuali kalau sesuatu yang pertama ada wujudnya. Baik karena tuntutan dzatnya seperti wajibnya wujud ma,lul kalau dikiyaskan dengan wujud ilat atau karena keperluan dzatnya seperti wajibnya wujud ilat kalau dikiyaskan dengan wujud ma’lul.
Imtina’ bil qiyas ila ghoeirihi : adamu syae (nothingness) dibandingkan dengan wujud ghoeru imtina’
(di bawah ini disadur dari buku Western Philosophy : an introdukction. Jhon Reginald Hollingdalle yang sudah diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasa Persia)
Ada 4 Perbedaan utama antara filsafat dan ilmu : pertama filsafat bukanlah koleksi kesimpulan, kedua proses berfilsafat bagian dari filsafat itu, ketiga ilmu tidak berusaha untuk menjelaskan kenapa dunia seperti ini atau menganalisa tujuan eksisensi. 4 Meskpun ilmu terpisah dari filsafat tapi ilmu di kukuhkan oleh filsafat dan ilmu mengikui filsafat.
Berikut ini disadur atau dinukil dari glossary filsafat yang ada dalam situs radicalacademi.
Species adalah ide yang universal dan bias diprediksi yang mengekspresikan seluruh esesi sesuatu.
Spinozisme : adalah doktrin Baruch Spinoza yang berpandangan bahwa ada eksistensi tetapi hanya substansi tunggal, infinit tidak diciptakan dimana materi dan pikiran (mental) adalah atributnya, bersipat panteistik monisme metafisik.
Subalternation dalam logika adalah posisi logika antara affirmative universal dan particular dan antara universal dan particular negatip.
Subjek dalam epistemology adalah yang memiliki knowledge (pengetahuan), persepsi, pikiran, mental atau lebih jauh lagi memiliki status pengetahuan internal atau The knower.
Subjektivisme : Doktrin yang berpandangan bahwa kita dapat mengetahui apa yang ada dalam kesadaran secara segera.
Substance sebuah wujud yang sifatnya untuk eksis dan untuk dirinya bukan dalam yang lain seperti dalam subjek.
Skolastikisme Sistem filsafat yang berlakudi zaman pertengahan, yang secara umum mengikuti garis prinsip aristoteles. Mereka membela pandangna dualisme Tuhan dan ciptaannya, mental dan materi, pikiran dan benda, dan melawam monisme dan panteisme, mereke membela realisme moderat dan anti ultra realisme, nominalisme, dan konseptualisme. Itu bersifat spiritualisme dan non materialistic. Eksperimental dan bukan apriorstik, objektivisme dan tidal subjektivisme dan dalam persepsi indera presentasional dan tidal agnostic atau representasional atau idealistic, konsern dengan pengetahuan intelektual, memnela rasionalisme moderat, anti sensisme, positivisme dan innatisme.
Skeptikisme alasan orang yang meragukan pengatahuan realitas system keraguan yang menjadi karakteristik filsafat skeptic.
Solipsisme sikap skeptical dimana si pemikir pasti terhadap pemikiran internal miliknya.
Causal proposition : Sebuah proposisi yang menggabungkan dua pernyataan dimana yang satu menjadi alasan atau ilat bagi yang lain.
Princip of Causality : Prinsip yang menyatakan bahwa apapun yang keluar dari keadaan non eksistensi kepada keadaan eksistensi harus ada ilat (causa) untuk eksistensinya
Jauhar,substansi
(agar supaya hakekat sesuatu dapat ditentukan, maka dipergunakan pengertian-pengertian tertentu,yaitu substansi, atribut atau sifat dasar dan modus.
Jauhar, substansi adalah apa yang berada sedemikian rupa sehingga tidal memerlukan sesuatu yang lain untuk berada. Tiap substansi memiliki sifat asli atau atribut.
Modus (jamak modi) adalah segala sifat substansi yang tidak mutlak dan yang dapat berubah.
Sy
As-Syaei malam Yajib lam Yujad (Sesuatu selama tidak wajib maka tidak akan wujud)
Sesuatu selama belum mencapai batas wajib maka ia tidak akan wujud, tetapi ia tetap ada dalam area imkan . Untuk memahami kaidah kita bisa memperhatikan kaidah lain yaitu, tarjih biduni morojah muhal (menetapkan pilihan tanpa alasan adalah mustahil). Sesuatu yang mumkinul wujud itu sama posisinya terhadap wujud dan ‘adam, untuk memilih salah satu harus ada morojah yaitu ilat diluar dirinya.
T
Term
Term adalah pengertian, konsep, ide yang dinyatakan dalam lambang. Kata adalah lambang verbal suatu pengertian.
Aspek-aspek term
1. Berdasarkan jumlah pengertian : 1 univok : kata yang mempunya satu pengertian (ex. Manusia). 2. ekuivok : kata yang mempunyai lebih dari satu pengertian (ex. Bisa, bulan, buku).
2. Berdasarkan isi : Konotasi (intensi, mafhum), denotasi (ekstensi, mishdaq), Sederhana, komplek, relatif (yang tidak berdiri sendiri), Mutlak (yang berdiri sendiri).
3. Berdasarkan kuantitas : Universal, Partikular (satu kelompok), Singular (satu diri).
4. Berdasarkan kualitas : Positif, Negatif, Privatif (meniada, kehilangan potensial, ex, buta, tuli,bisu ).
5. Berdasarkan kandungan makna : Makna penuh (ia membeli rumah), Makna kandungan (ia mengetuk rumah), makam lazim (ia berkebun di rumah).
6. Berdasarkan pembagian kategori (Aristoteles) : Substansi ,kualitas (sifat ciri), Kuantitas, tempat, waktu, relasi, situasi/kedudukan, status /kepunyaan, aksi (tindakan penyebab), pasivitas (akibat tindakan).
Relasi antar term
Ekuivalensi (tasawi)
Diferensi (tabayun)
Implikasi (umum wa khusus mutlak)
Asosiasi (umum wa khusu min wajhin)
Dimula lagi 5 nove 2005. setelah kompter di servis, syawal, setelah sport bagus
Imtina’ i’adah al-Ma’dum biaenihi (terlarangnya adam kembali dengan dirinya sendiri)
Para hukama berkata, “Sesungguhnya adam terlarang kembali dengan dirinyasendiri. “pendapat ini diikuti juga oleh para mutakalim, tapi mayoritas membolehkannya. Syaikh sendiri menganggpa imtina; ‘i’adah al-ma’dum sesuatu yang dharuriy. Dan bahkan termasuk fitriyat. Karena fitrah menetapkan kebatilan syaiiyah al-ma’dum. Sehingga tidak mungkin disifati i’adah. Mereka mengajukan argumentasi
1-kalau boleh kembalinya ma’dum di suatu zaman dan kembali di zaman lain, maka akan terjadi takhalul adam antara sesuatu dengan dirinya dan itu mustahil karena ketika itu akan ada maujud dengan aenihi dalam dua zaman yang dipisah (mutakhalil) dengan ‘adam. Sementara pada dasarnya yang memuat sebagian orang berpenpat bolehnya i’adah al’ma’dum adalah karena mereka mengira bahwa ma’ad-yaituyang dikaakan oleh syariat- tidak lain dari kembalinya ma’dum,padahal maut itu jenis istikmal dan bukan in’idam dan zawal.
BEING AND EXISTENCE
Paparan singkat tentang realitas alam
Being and Reality
Fondasi filsafat saint untuk semua pemikiran metafisik disebut dengan ontologi.
The foundational philosophic science for all metaphysical thought is
called ontology, the philosophic study of being in its most general
and widest aspects. During this introduction, we will be going to
the very core of existence and being.
This essay contains the following sections:
Being and Reality
The Kinds of Being
Being as an Analogous Concept
The Supreme Principles of Being
The Properties of Being
The Divisions of Being
The Four Causes of Being
INTRODUCTION
The term being means thing, reality. It means anything that exists
or can be thought of as existing. Being is a very important term in
metaphysics, indeed it represents the basis of all metaphysical
thought.
We form the general concept of being by looking at the things around
us. They are things or beings. All things have a common element;
they are existible. This means they are either actually in existence
or could be in existence (possible existence).
Since the term being is the expression of a concept, it has both a
comprehension (or connotation) and an extension (or denotation). The
comprehension or connotation of a concept is the sum total of all
the attributes which constitute the concept, expressed in the
definition of the content of the concept. The extension or
denotation of a concept, on the other hand, is the sum total of all
the individuals and groups to which a concept can be applied.
The comprehension of the concept being is the simplest of all
concepts because it contains only a single element in its
definition. Being means that which is existible, anything that is
not nothing. The extension of the concept being is the widest of all
concepts; it can be applied to absolutely everything that exists or
can exist.
The beings or things of which we are usually immediately aware are
those we contact through our senses. We see human beings, trees,
chairs, dogs, and so on and we call all of these things, beings.
This is the common-sense view of being. This common-sense awareness
of being differs, however, from the metaphysical awareness of being.
There is, in other words, another way to view being than just as
sensible, material, physical reality.
BEING AND REALITY
We can differentiate between two types of abstraction. Common sense
shows us the reality of material things and provides us with the
means to group things together into classes based on what they have
in common. For example, we group poodles, German shepherds, collies,
bulldogs, and cocker spaniels into a class called dogs. Furthermore,
we group dogs, cats, birds, fish, and elephants into a class called
animals. We do this by abstraction, taking those elements a group of
individuals have in common and joining these individuals together in
a class. Classes can become larger and more universal as we go from
dogs to animals to living things. This process can be called total
abstraction, the abstraction of the universal whole in progressive
stages.
It is possible for us, however, to grasp realities or beings in a
different way. We can, for example, take a specific feature that
makes a being to be what it is and concentrate on that. Our
intellect, instead of merely contemplating reality in a simple
fashion, can contemplate it in an intensive and penetrating way. The
natural scientist does this when he deals with reality from a
scientific point of view. The biologist doesn't just use the concept
of animal as we do in our ordinary awareness, he concentrates
intently on the concept of, for instance, invertebrate animal. His
use of concepts is more penetrating and, of course, more exact. This
can be called formal abstraction.
Formal abstraction itself can take place on different intellectual
levels as we penetrate further and further into reality. We can
actually identify three levels of formal abstraction.
The first level of formal abstraction, which we'll call physical
abstraction, refers to our concentration on the material qualities
of things. These material qualities include elements such as whether
something is rough or smooth, hot or cold, its color, its shape, its
size and so forth. We separate these material qualities from any
individual thing in which they may be found. The color green, for
example, must actually exist in some individual thing, but we can
still contemplate the concept greenness apart from any specific
thing. It doesn't matter whether we first become aware of a green
leaf or a green automobile, we can still deal with the concept of
greenness in and of itself. This is physical abstraction.
The next level of formal abstraction, which we'll call mathematical
abstraction, leaves out all sensible matter and concentrates solely
on the magnitude, extension, and quantity that is present in things.
For example, we can use the terms line, square, point, and triangle
without considering any material quality such as color, size, and so
on. A circle can be thought of without any materiality at all. This
is mathematical abstraction.
The highest level of formal abstraction, which we'll call
metaphysical abstraction, consists in divesting things of all that
distinguishes one kind of thing from another kind of thing,
selecting only those elements in which all things or beings agree
and which they have in common. Such abstract concepts, then, will
apply to all beings. The concepts being, substance, true, cause, and
actuality, for example, can be applied to all things. This is the
ultimate level of reality to which our intellect can penetrate. We
can deal with being itself, without any conditions of individuality,
or quality, or quantity. We can concentrate on what it means for a
thing to be. This is metaphysical abstraction.
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Properti being/wujud .
Section 2: The Properties of Being
Topics:
a. Properties;
b. Unity;
c. Truth;
d. Goodness;
c. Beauty and Perfection.
a) Properties
A property of a thing is what belongs to it by natural necessity
because the thing is that specific nature. It is not a part of a
thing; it is a quality or characteristic of a thing which is
necessarily there because the thing is that sort of thing. It
follows upon the perfectly constituted nature or working-essence of
a thing.
Thus, we say that the ability to laugh is a property of man. For
when human nature is fully constituted; when nothing (such as
immaturity, organic defect, disease, unconsciousness) thwarts the
normal functioning of that nature, man will inevitably be able to
laugh. Yet the power to laugh is not a part of man's nature; it is
something consequent upon that nature when perfectly constituted. A
property is sometimes called an attribute.
The properties of being are of two classes:
(1) Those that belong to being as such, and are therefore
transcendental;
(2) Those that belong to many beings, or even to most, and are
therefore general.
The transcendental properties of being are three:
(1) Unity or oneness;
(2) Truth or trueness;
(3) Goodness.
The general properties of being are two:
(1) Beauty;
(2) Perfection.
b) The Unity of Being
Every being has unity inasmuch as it is that one thing, incapable of
existing as a multiplication of itself. For unity means
undividedness, and to say that a thing has unity is to say that it
is undivided.
Of course, a thing made of parts can be divided into parts, but the
unity of the thing consists in the fact that it is not divided, nor
can it be divided and remain that identical thing that it is. A
being as such is incapable of becoming a plurality of itself, a
multiplication of itself, a series of repetitions of itself. Other
things of the same kind may come from it by generation, but each of
these things is itself and not the being from which it comes. A
bodily thing divided into parts ceases to be that one undivided
reality; it has no longer its being as that reality. And each part
is now that one part; it is a thing with its necessary unity.
The unity of a being is called transcendental because it is limited
to no one class of things, but belongs to being as such. Whatever
exists, exists in the oneness of its being. Whatever can exist, can
exist only inasmuch as it can come into existence as that one thing.
Therefore philosophers say Ens et unum convertuntur, "Being and
unity are interchangeable." Of course, the concept of being as being
is not precisely the same as the concept of being as one; there is a
distinction of reason between being and unity; therefore these terms
are not perfectly synonymous.
Transcendental unity is of several types or aspects. We call it
concrete unity when it is the unity of a thing itself, independently
of the view of the mind. We call it abstract unity (such as unity of
genus or of species) when it is the unity of the mind's concept of a
thing. Thus John and his dog are each one concrete thing; but, in
the abstract view of the mind these two are one inasmuch as they
belong to the one genus, animal. Again, transcendental unity is
essential if it is the oneness necessary to an essence, whether the
essence be a substance or an accident; this is unity of simplicity
in things not composed of parts, and unity of composition in things
made of parts.
In addition to transcendental unity we may mention here that unity
which is proper to bodily things. This is quantitative unity or
mathematical unity. In philosophy we call this type of unity
predicamental unity.
In considering substances, we must inquire what it is that
determines the essential and concrete and predicamental unity of
each; and we must also inquire what constitutes the thing in its
essential and abstract unity as a specific kind of thing or member
of a specific class. In a word, we must inquire what is the source
or principle of the thing's individuality, and what is the source or
principle of the thing's species.
Now, among bodily substances, the principle of individuation is
found in its material being, its quantified material. The principle
of specification is found in that substantial element which makes
the bodily substance in question an existing body of this kind; this
is called the substantial form of the bodily substance.
(Of matter and form we shall speak in some detail in the study of
the Cosmological Question.)
Here we must add, however, that when there is question of spiritual
substances, these are not individuated, since only a bodily thing
is, strictly considered, subject to individuation, that is, to
quantified identification, to numbering as this one, this integer.
Complete spiritual substances (and always we mean created and finite
spiritual substances) are pure forms or substantial species, and not
individuals.
A being, by reason of unity, is that one thing, that idem ens; the
Latin term gives us the English identity. A being has identity in or
with itself alone, not with other things. It is but looseness of
speech that permits us to say, for instance, "These two books are
identical." The books are not identical, but alike or similar. We
use more accurate speech when we speak of "identifying a person,"
for then we say who that person is himself, not that he is like some
other person. A being is identical with itself, and this is the
effect of its unity.
The opposite of identity is distinction. Distinction is the absence
of identity among two or more things or among two or more ideas of
one thing. Distinction among things is real distinction; distinction
between or among different mental aspects of one thing is logical
distinction or distinction of reason. Logical distinction may be
purely rational, lacking a basis in things, or it may have a
foundation in reality.
The distinction between a man and his weight is a real distinction,
for the man is one thing and his weight another. The distinction
between animal being and rational being in the one human person is
logical, for the one identical being is here both animal and
rational, and these terms do not indicate parts of that being, but
different real aspects of that which is identical in the undivided
person. But this logical distinction has a basis in reality, since
there are beings which are animal without being rational (beasts)
and beings, too, which are rational without being animal (the human
soul after a death; angels, should they exist).
The distinction between the meaning of a term and the meaning of its
essential definition (and these two are identical meanings; an
equals-mark might be placed between them; the definition is only a
fuller statement of what the term means) is a purely logical
distinction without a basis in reality.
The old Latin terms for logical distinction are these:
(a) For logical distinction with a foundation in reality,
distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re or distinctio rationis
ratiocinatae;
(b) For purely logical distinction without a basis in reality,
distinctio rationis sine fundamento in re or distinctio rationis
ratiocinantis.
Among bodily things and their material accidentals, real distinction
(which does not necessarily mean separation or separability) results
is a multiplicity or a multitudo. Inasmuch as the items of a
multiplicity can be measured or counted, they make up a number. And
number is defined as "a multiplicity measured by one," that is, a
multiplicity which can be counted one by one.
c) The Truth of Being
Every being, inasmuch as it is a being, is knowable by an adequate
mind. And inasmuch as it is knowable, a being is the basis of the
truth which exists or can exist in the mind which is adequate to
know it. And this constitutes what we call the truth or trueness of
being.
The truth we speak of here is ontological truth, or truth of things,
or truth of being, which is discussed in the study of the
Epistemological Question.
Truth involves mind. A thing or being is what it is. And it is
knowable as such by an adequate mind. In this its truth consists.
Indeed, mind comes first, for created being depends for it
possibility upon the knowledge of it in the Creator's mind before it
had any existence. Increate Being is Infinite Truth Itself,
identified in perfect simplicity with Infinite Mind.
Every being is true; every true thing is being. Omne ens est verum;
ens et verum convertuntur. Being regarded as being is distinct by a
logical distinction from being regarded as what is true; but between
being and truth (that is, being and true being) there is no real
distinction. Hence, there is no transcendental or ontological
falsity.
d) The Goodness of Being
Goodness is desirability or appetizability. A thing is good inasmuch
as it can be the object of a tendency, appetite, or desire. Now
being as such is capable of having the character of the goal or
object of appetite. Therefore, being as such is good. We can say
here, as we said when speaking of the unity and the truth of being,
"Every being is good; every good thing is a being," Omne ens est
bonum; ens et bonum convertuntur. There is a logical distinction
between being as being and being as what is good, but not a real
distinction.
The goodness of which we speak here is ontological goodness. It is
the goodness of things, of reality, of being. It is transcendental
goodness, for it is coextensive with being which is transcendental.
It consists in the fact that being as such (that is, anything
positively existible) can be the aim, object, purpose, or goal of an
appetency or desire.
There are two other basic types of goodness, physical goodness and
moral goodness.
Physical goodness is the goodness of a physis or created nature.
It consists in the fact that the nature or "working essence" lacks
nothing that should be found in it according to the aim, plan,
desire, appetency of its maker. Thus, for example, a man's health
is good, by physical goodness, in so far as the man's bodily
organs and functions are what they ought to be, and lack nothing
of what they ought to be. Thus, bread is good bread in so far as
it has what bread should have in point of ingredients and
preparation, and lacks none of these elements; in other terms, the
bread is good inasmuch as it fulfills the seemly aim, desire,
appetency, purpose, of the honest baker.
Moral goodness consists in the agreement of human acts (that is,
deliberate thoughts, words, deeds, desires, omissions) with the
standard or rule of what such acts ought to be. It is the
fundamental thing which the human properly will wants and desires.
Thus we notice that both physical goodness and moral goodness fit in
with our general description of goodness as desirability or
appetizability.
The opposite of goodness is evil or badness. Evil is not being, but
absence, lack, or defect of being. Inasmuch as positive being exists
it is necessarily good by ontological or transcendental goodness.
There is no ontological evil. But there is physical evil, and there
is moral evil.
Physical evil is the lack or absence in a creature of some
element, item, or quality that should be there. In so far as a
created physis (that is, nature or "working essence") suffers such
a lack or absence, it is not good, "no good," physically evil, or
physically bad. Thus, of a watch which lacks but a tiny
hairspring, we say that it is "no good." Thus, of bread that lacks
any one ingredient, or the proper proportion of ingredients, or
any of the qualities that should come from suitable mixing and
baking, we say that it is "not good" or "bad." Thus, of a man who
suffers from one organic lesion or disease, we say that his health
is bad. The evil exampled here is physical evil.
Moral evil is the lack or absence of agreement between a human act
and the rule of what it ought to be. In so far as a human act
lacks agreement with the moral law in any point (in itself, in its
purpose, in its circumstances) it is morally evil.
We can readily see from all this what is meant by the axiom Bonum ex
integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu, "For a thing to be
(physically or morally) good, it must be wholly good; it is made
evil by any deficiency or lack." We do not say that a thing is
necessarily entirely bad because of one lack or defect, but it is in
so far bad, and if the lack be of great importance it may be wholly
bad, as in the case of the watch which lacks but a hairspring and is
wholly useless for purposes of recording time. And, on the other
hand, a thing, in so far as it approaches the full character of what
it ought to be, is good. Thus we may say of bread that it is of good
flavor but poor (or bad) texture.
e) Beauty and Perfection of Being
Unity, truth, goodness, are transcendental properties of being, for
they are coextensive with being; they are really (though not
logically) identified with being itself. Along with being, these
three properties are sometimes listed as "the transcendentals." The
properties we are now to mention, that is beauty and perfection of
being, are not transcendental, for, while they are properties of
most beings, they are not properties of all; that is, they are not
properties of being as such.
Beauty is the property which makes a being pleasing to behold. For
a thing or being to be beautiful it must have a certain integrity
or completeness, a certain fulness or richness, a certain variety
of pleasing aspects, a certain unity or harmony which come of
order and balance and proportion, a certain shining splendor which
crowns all the other elements and gives them effectiveness. These
are the objective constituents of beauty in a thing. The
subjective element is the pleasurable beholding of the beautiful
thing, whether by the mind alone, or by the senses and the mind
together, with the approbation (or enjoyment) of the will alone,
or of the will and sense-appetency together. Beauty finds notable
expression in the fine arts: architecture, painting, sculpture,
poetry, music, an allied arts such as that of the actor, that of
the orator, that of the writer of artistic prose, that of the
producer of fine needlework. The science of things beautiful is
called Esthetics.
Perfection is the rounded completeness of a created nature. It is
the fulness of being required by a reality to be at its best.
Perfection may be entire or partial; thus perfect health is an
entire perfection; perfect eyesight is a partial perfection.
Perfection may be pure or mixed, inasmuch as it is perfection
simply or has imperfection mingled with it; thus, life is a pure
perfection; the power of thinking things our (that is, of
reasoning) is a mixed perfection, for while it is a wondrous power
it is indicative of our imperfection in not knowing things at once
without the labor of thinking them out. A perfection present as
such is formally present; a perfection present in effect or
equivalently is virtually present; a perfection present in a
manner which transcends creatural experience is eminently present.
Summary of the Section
In this Section we have defined property or attribute, and have
indicated the meaning of transcendental property and of general
property of being.
We have defined and classified the unity of being, and have
determined the principle of individuation and the principle of
specification of creatural being.
We have studied identity and distinction.
We have learned what is meant by the truth of being and by the
goodness of being.
We have seen that the transcendental properties of being are
coextensive with being itself, and distinct from being by only a
logical distinction.
Incidental to our discussion of transcendental unity, goodness,
truth, was some account of multiplicity, of physical and moral evil,
and of logical and moral falsity.
We have briefly described the beauty of being, and have listed its
objective and its subjective elements.
We have mentioned the expression of beauty in the fine arts.
We have defined perfection and have mentioned various types, phases,
and degrees in which it appears.
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DOLHENTY ARCHIVE: What is Philosophical Realism?
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What is Philosophical Realism?
by Jonathan Dolhenty, Ph.D.
Philosophy is the attempt to understand the most basic facts about
the world we inhabit and so far as possible to explain these facts.
This enterprise is not the exclusive concern of certain specialists,
but one in which every human being is deeply involved, whether or
not he is clearly conscious of it.
Every way of life is based upon a way of looking at life. The way
you look at life is your philosophy. Just as there are many ways of
life, so are there many philosophies, some more true and some less
true. So important is this basic enterprise of man, so much hinges
upon the avoidance of confusion and error, that since the time of
the ancient Greeks a certain discipline has been set aside for the
concentrated consideration of philosophical problems and for the
careful comparison and criticism of different ways of answering
them. This discipline is called philosophy.
While there are many philosophies, and many of these contradict one
another and others have even led to and supported terrible acts of
barbarism against mankind, there is one philosophy that has stood
the test of time, been accepted by virtually all ordinary men, and
forms a rational foundation for truth and morality. This philosophy
is called the philosophy of Common Sense, Critically Examined and
Expanded. It is not ordinary common sense opinion, but common sense
opinion subjected to rigorous examination and criticism. It is an
authentic philosophy of Realism, based on demonstrated principles of
objective truth and using objective evidence as its sole criterion
of truth.
Why an authentic philosophy of Realism? For three reasons:
This philosophy has been pursued and developed by great minds from
the fifth century B.C. in ancient Greece throughout the whole of
Western history down to the present day and it has stood the test
of time.
This philosophy of Realism does not violate any basic insight of
what we call common sense, possessed by all rational men at all
times.
This philosophy of Realism contains an important core of truth
which cannot help but enlighten the individual intellect as it
starts out and continues its quest for understanding and truth.
The Philosophic Battlefield
Our culture and society today are decidedly under the influence of a
philosophy of Subjectivism, an unrealistic, and even anti-realistic,
philosophy which is both relativistic and pragmatic. Subjectivism is
the result of the intellectual battle which has waged between the
philosophies of Idealism (actually Idea-ism) and Materialism (or
Naturalism) for the past several centuries.
According to Subjectivism (whether Idealist or Materialist), there
is no such thing as objective truth (truth is relative) and there
are no objectively defined, universally true principles of moral
behavior (morality is relative). This has led to the current
situation which is permeated with intellectual chaos, resulting in
disastrous practical consequences for everyone.
There is little doubt among knowledgeable observers that our present
age is on the verge of conceptual collapse. Consider this:
If Subjectivism is valid, then all truth is relative, and the laws
of physics and the laws of civil society are simply arbitrary.
If Subjectivism is valid, then morality is merely a matter of
opinion and personal taste, and personal responsibility is simply
a figment of our collective imagination.
Subjectivism also undermines empirical science, undermines our
entire concept of jurisprudence, and undermines any attempt to
promote a human and humane morality. We are all subject to the whims
of the moment and are all victims of the latest public poll.
The only reason our culture and society have not totally collapsed
is because there are still enough remnants of authentic Realism
around to keep the present situation from falling into an
intellectual "black hole." How long this situation will last is
anyone's guess. This makes a solid presentation of the philosophy of
Common Sense all the more important. We need to promote a philosophy
of authentic Realism, with its principles of objective truth and
objectively defined morality. If for no other reason, we need to do
this in sheer self-defense.
We must keep this in mind:
If there is no such thing as objective truth, then any - that
means any - proposition has a claim to truth, no matter how insane
or absurd.
If there is no such thing as a universally valid principle of
morality, then any behavior or human act of any type can be
permitted, no matter how heinous it may be.
Should this be the case, then we all will be subject to the latest
social conventions, no matter how insane or absurd, and our pleas
for being judged by objective standards of truth and morality will
be for naught.
Incidentally, the latest practical application of Subjectivism (and
by far the most dangerous) is something we might call Politicism.
This means that every human problem is considered to be basically
political, needs to be solved by political means, and all decisions
regarding truth and morality are decided by public polls. If you
think this is an extreme statement, consider that not so long ago,
some of the worst criminals ever to walk the earth, members not of a
"primitive" society but a "civilized" culture, justified their
horrible behavior by saying: "I was just following the orders of my
superiors." (and one can substitute leaders, or government, or
church, etc.).
Truth does exist and it does matter. Moral principles exist and they
do matter. The philosophy of Common Sense, Critically Examined and
Expanded, provides a solid rational foundation for these principles,
using the spontaneous convictions of ordinary people, coupled with
the criterion of objective evidence, utilizing the correct
principles of philosophical analysis and subject to the rules of
logic and accepted scientific methods. This philosophy is the
genuine philosophy of Realism, to which our society must return if
it is to be reformed and transformed into a true civil society of
free and equal individuals.
What is an Authentic Realism?
Realism is the name given to a certain philosophic way of thought
first inaugurated by Plato and Aristotle, developed and refined in
the Middle Ages, and still living at the present time. This unique
record of historic continuity gives Realistic Philosophy a certain
advantage over other alternatives. It can truly be said that
Realistic Philosophy has been adopted and cultivated by more great
minds for a longer time and in more diverse cultural settings than
any other philosophy available to us.
Realistic Philosophy is opposed to the fundamental doctrines of
metaphysical idealism and materialism, ethical relativism, and
epistemological subjectivism. It holds that philosophy is a genuine
science in its own right, a systemized order of true knowledge, and
that its principles and judgments are based on objective evidence
open to any observer.
Although realistic philosophers may disagree with one another on
some specific practical issue or on the application of realistic
principles to any particular problem, all realistic philosophers
agree on three basic theses:
There is a world of real existence, a world made up of substantial
beings related to one another, which exists independently of any
human opinions or desires, a world which men have not made or
constructed.
The substances and relations that are part of this world of real
existence can be known by the human mind as they are in
themselves. Truth is the correspondence between mind and thing,
and certitude is possible. The criterion of truth is objective
evidence in whatever form it is presented to the knowing mind.
Such knowledge can offer sound and immutable guidance for
individual and social action and is, in fact, the only reliable
guide to human conduct, individual and social.
Realistic Philosophy is perfectly in accord with what our common
sense tells us. We inhabit a world consisting of many things which
are what they are, independent of any opinions and desires we may
have, and by using our reason, we can know something about these
things as they actually are. Furthermore, this knowledge is the
safest guide to human action.
Common sense holds these opinions, but vaguely and confusedly
without critical examination. Common sense is largely unaware of the
implications of these principles and their interrelations with one
another. And because common sense uncritically accepts these
principles, it is often unable to defend them against objections
and, therefore, is easily led astray into non-realistic modes of
thought.
Realistic Philosophy, on the other hand, precisely formulates these
principles and judgments, analyzes their component concepts, and
examines them in the light of the evidence. Realistic thought has
discovered many implications and systematic connections between and
among these principles. Because of its more exact analysis and
critical examination of the evidence, Realistic Philosophy is able
to undertake the arduous task of defending its insights against
alien ways of thought and of answering critical questions.
Every realistic theory in whatever field must be checked by the
original data of experience as they are apprehended either by sense
or by reason. In this sense, every realistic discipline is radically
empirical. The main disciplines of realistic philosophy are:
Realistic Metaphysics: the study of being or first philosophy,
which examines the fact of existence which reason discovers in
every empirical datum of whatever sort. It includes the
subdisciplines of ontology (study of being qua being), cosmology
(study of material being), philosophical anthropology (study of
animate being, including man), and theodicy (the philosophical
study of God or First Cause).
Realistic Epistemology and Logic: the study of human knowledge and
how, by means of concepts and other mental representations, we
know extra-mental objects, and how concepts must be arranged in
propositions and arguments if they are to become the instruments
of true knowledge in any field of thought.
Realistic Ethics: the study of the human good and those acts which
are required by human nature for its perfection, including the
habits of choice, or virtues, which must be developed to produce
these acts, and the common good of all individual men that is the
final end of rational action, including the cooperative structures
of habit and choice that are required for the attainment of this
end. Ethics, in its capacity as an applied philosophy, includes
the subdisciplines of esthetics, political philosophy, social
philosophy, jurisprudence, philosophy of education, philosophy of
history, and philosophy of religion.
The basic insights of Realistic Philosophy are as old as the human
race. The first important name in the history of realism is that of
Socrates, who lived in ancient Greece from 470 to 399 B.C. He left
no writings but we know of him through his pupil Plato (427-347
B.C.), who refined and expanded on the foundations laid down by his
teacher and founded a school of philosophy at Athens called the
Academy.
The Influence of Plato
Realistic Philosophy is indebted to Plato for asserting the
distinction between the faculty of sense, by which we apprehend
something that is ever changing and relative to us, and the faculty
of reason, by which we apprehend something changeless, as it is in
itself. This knowledge is attained by concepts or ideas, which are
universal, changeless, and invisible. Concepts or ideas are very
different from material things, which are individual, ever-changing,
and visible to us. If truth is to be obtained, the ideas must not
only be clearly grasped, but also be analyzed and synthesized
according to the necessary nature of things.
Plato thought that the universe we live in is independent of us, not
made by us, and remains whatever it is regardless of what we may
think or desire. Moreover, the universe is very complex and probably
includes many things about which we have no knowledge at all. Man is
a composite being, composed of a material body and something which
moves and animates it, which he called the soul or psyche. The body
and all other things are in a constant state of change and are a
mixture of two components: something vague and indefinite from which
they emerge and a definite form which makes them what they are.
The Influence of Aristotle
Plato left many philosophical questions unsettled and many of his
theories are not clear. It is to Plato's pupil Aristotle (384-332
B.C.) that we turn for further systematic development of realistic
philosophical thought. He was the first great realistic thinker to
achieve a comprehensive system of realistic philosophy through
reading, meditation, and study. You may know that Aristotle was also
one of the teachers of Alexander the Great, a Macedonian prince who
went on to conquer most of the known world of his day. Aristotle
apparently did not approve, however, of the means by which Alexander
went about his conquering, and he left the Macedonian capital,
returned to Athens, and founded a philosophical school of his own
called the Lyceum.
Aristotle did not accept many of Plato's doctrines and he went on to
correct many of Plato's errors. Aristotle systematized philosophy
and built a comprehensive world-view which was truly remarkable. He
used the scientific knowledge of his day, much of it the results of
his own investigations and analyses, and he built his philosophy on
solid empirical grounding. We now know, of course, that much of his
scientific work contained errors, but the principles of his
philosophical endeavors are still as valid today as they were then.
He set the foundations for all realistic philosophy to come.
The Aristotelian school survived to the third century A.D. Greek
philosophy began to decline once it moved away from the firm
principles set down by Aristotle and a revised Platonism, called
Neo-Platonism, began to catch hold. Worse still, new philosophical
schools, including Stoicism and Epicureanism, began to attract
students. These newer schools of thought eventually resulted in a
philosophical skepticism which accompanied the cultural decline of
Greece and the Roman empire.
The Influence of Thomas Aquinas
For many years, the work and thought of Aristotle was lost to the
western world. During the twelfth century, however, his works began
to seep into western Europe and the value of Aristotle's philosophy
was recognized by a few of the Christian scholars of the period,
particularly Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. It was Aquinas who
finally succeeded in working out a more comprehensive and
penetrating realistic synthesis, based on Aristotle's principles,
than had ever before been done. His works are among the great
classics of Realistic Philosophy.
There are problems, however, with the great synthesis developed by
Thomas Aquinas. His work is marred by some scientific observations
which we now know are false. His subordination of philosophy to
Catholic theology has raised many problems for some realistic
philosophers. The social philosophy of Aquinas contains some
outdated and, by today's standards, reprehensible social notions
such as a defense of slavery. All this aside, the Thomistic
synthesis remains one of the greatest achievements in the history of
philosophy.
Unfortunately, instead of correcting the errors and defects in the
system of Thomas Aquinas, the philosophers who came after him began
to go off into non-realistic modes of thought. Their theories
brought about a decline in realism and provided the basis for what
would become known as "modern" philosophy, a movement which has led
to the intellectual chaos which we see around us today.
The Beginnings of Modern Subjectivism
René Descartes (1596-1650) is the philosopher most noted for the
beginning of the philosophic disaster which was to come. He sharply
separated reason from the senses and, being distrustful of sense
knowledge, declared that only through our clear and distinct ideas
could we have valid knowledge. Ideas were not based on sense
knowledge, but were innate in the mind and could be brought to
consciousness and developed into knowledge without the aid of
experience. This and many other nonrealistic principles were
introduced by Descartes into modern thought.
Philosophy had now taken a suicidal turn. What was once a genuine
science of philosophy now divided into two camps of opposing
theories, neither of which was based on realistic thinking. One
group was called the Rationalists, and included thinkers like
Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) and Gottfried von Leibnitz (1646-1716).
They distrusted sense knowledge and taught that only reason and a
priori insights provided a valid foundation for knowledge. The other
group was called the Empiricists, and included John Locke
(1632-1704) and David Hume (1711-1776). They denied the capacity of
reason to apprehend external existence and based all knowledge on
sensation. The prejudice shared by Rationalism and Empiricism is
that we cannot know things directly but we can only grasp their
impressions. Rationalism is concerned with the impressions made on
the intellect, Empiricism with the impressions on the senses.
Dissatisfied with both Rationalism and Empiricism, the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) attempted a synthesis of both.
He failed miserably and his failure resulted in the rise of a
philosophy called Idealism (actually it should be called Idea-ism),
which ended up being a modern form of Subjectivism. Subjectivism
denies that any objective truth can be ascertained at all. The real
world of existence cannot be known in itself. Truth is relative.
The undisciplined speculations of the Idealists brought philosophy
itself into disrepute and intellectual thought had drifted a long
ways away from realistic principles. Philosophy today is dominated
by three nonrealistic modes of thought:
There is a movement toward radical skepticism and disillusionment
which includes Positivism, Scientism, and Existentialism, all of
which deny the possibility of attaining objective truth in any
comprehensive sense.
There is another movement which searches for irrational
substitutes to replace reason. Pragmatism is one such movement.
Truth is relative and amounts to what works or what is successful
in bringing about a satisfying conclusion.
Still another movement is Materialism or Naturalism, which asserts
the self-sufficiency of nature, denies any strictly immaterial
existence, and considers knowledge as a sort of complex, material
process. This inevitably leads to Subjectivism, that truth is
relative and reality cannot be known in itself.
This is where we are today. The world of intellectual thought has
been dominated by nonrealistic philosophies for the past three
centuries and we can now see the result of such intellectual chaos.
If we cannot really know the world as it is, then all truth is
relative and anyone's truth is as good as another's. If we cannot
really know the world as it is, then there are no universal and
objective principles of morality, and moral behavior and the
evaluation of it becomes merely a personal preference, a matter of
"taste" rather than a matter of truth.
The Solution to Modern Intellectual Chaos
There is a solution to the problems and intellectual chaos created
by Subjectivism, Relativism, and Materialism. We must return to the
realistic philosophic principles originally set down by Plato and
Aristotle and then refined and expanded during the Middle Ages, and
use these principles to further develop Realistic Philosophy in
light of today's scientific advances.
Realistic Philosophy is not a closed system of thought, as many
critics have mistakenly supposed. It is a genuine open system of
investigation, a comprehensive and continually developing
world-view, capable of using new knowledge from the natural and
social sciences to expand our intellectual horizon and provide
practical solutions to the many problems we face today.
As already pointed out, the foundational beliefs of an authentic
Realism are:
There is a world of real existence which men have not made or
constructed;
This real existence can be known by the human mind;
Such knowledge is the only reliable guide to human conduct,
individual and social.
In summary:
The three basic doctrines listed above are held by all men of
common sense. But an authentic Realism is not just common sense.
It is common sense, critically examined and expanded. Ordinary
common sense holds the above doctrines as opinions, but vaguely
and confusedly without critical examination. An authentic Realism
precisely formulates these principles, analyzes their component
concepts, and examines them in the light of the evidence.
Common sense opinion is largely unaware of the implications of
these principles and their interrelations with one another.
Authentic realistic reflection has discovered many implications
and systematic connections. Because of its uncritical acceptance
of these doctrines, common sense opinion is often unable to defend
them against objections and thus is easily led astray into
nonrealistic modes of thought, such as has happened today.
A philosophy of common sense, critically examined and expanded, an
authentic Realism, because of its more exact analysis and critical
examination of the evidence, is able to undertake the arduous task
of defending these insights against alien ways of thought and of
answering critical questions.
For books about Classical Realism, see Dr. Jonathan Dolhenty's
Recommended Bookshelf for Students of Classical Realism
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A Mini-Course in Ontology
The Ontological Question is the question of reality in its most
general, most abstract, most profound meaning. It is the question of
being, that is, of being as such, and not of being as it stands
determinate in this nature or that nature or the other nature. It is
the question of being or reality stripped of the limitations that
come of materiality, that is, of bodiliness or of dependence on
bodily things. Hence, it is the question of nonmaterial real being.
Here we have the heart of metaphysics, and metaphysics is the heart
of philosophy. For philosophy is the ultimate science of all things,
of all reality, and here we have all reality drawn into a mighty
focus and seen as a single thing, as being. The branch of philosophy
which answers the Ontological Question is known as Ontology or
Fundamental Metaphysics.
This mini-course is divided into the following four Sections:
Section 1 - The Nature of Being
Section 2 - The Properties of Being
Section 3 - The Classification of Being
Section 4 - The Emergence of Created Being
Section 1: The Nature of Being
Topics:
a. Metaphysics;
b. Being;
c. Determinants of Being.
a) Metaphysics
It is most important that the student learn early and learn well the
precise meaning of this term metaphysics. For there are many, even
among the learned, who use the word amiss, and misuse gives us
reason to suspect the presence of misunderstanding.
Metaphysics literally means after-physics. And physics here means no
laboratory science of bodies with mass and inertia. It means
natures. The Greek physis is the same as the Latin natura or the
English nature, and it means a working essence.
Now, the essence of a thing is its fundamental make-up, its basic
character as such a thing. And when this essence is looked upon as
the source and font of activities or operations, it is called a
nature. Thus, if you want to know the essence of a thing, you look
up its definition; its definition tells you what it is. But when you
know its nature, you what is does or can do.
The essence of a human being, for instance, is a substantial
compound of body and soul. The nature of a human being makes this
substantial compound of body and soul the source of all activities
that properly belong to a human being: growing, sensing, thinking,
willing, etc. We do not say that it is essential to man to think; we
do say that is natural to man to think. Nature is essence as the
source of operations.
Now, there are many essences in the world around us -- plants,
animals, human beings, lifeless things. Each of these essences has
its proper activities, and, in view of these, each essence is a
nature or physis. And, since it is this bodily world that first
engages our attention and is the scene of our immediate experience,
we speak of the things in this world as belonging to the physical
order. This, be it understood, is a cramped use of the term
physical, for physical, taken literally, refers to any physis (or
nature or working essence) whether it be bodily or non-bodily. But,
as we say, the phrase the physical order is employed to designate
this world of bodily things. Hence any study, any science, of things
in this bodily universe is called a physical study, a physical
science.
Now, there are things which the mind notices here in the bodily
world which are manifestly not limited to this world but belong to
the non-bodily world as well, that is, to the world of spiritual
things and to the world as abstractly known. For instance, the term
substance (which means a reality that is existible as itself, and
not as a mere mark or qualifier of some other thing) is not
necessarily limited to bodies. We can conceive of spiritual
substance as easily as of bodily substance.
Again, a thing which is understood is transferred, so to speak, into
the knowing mind; it is represented there in idea or concept; that
is, it is re-present there. The idea itself is a mental image; we
are not talking of the idea itself, however. We are now considering
the thing as it exists in the knowing mind through the
instrumentality of the idea.
Manifestly this cognitional existence (or intentional existence, as
it is called) is not the same as the physical existence of a thing
known; but it is a real existence none the less. My idea of tree, as
an idea, is in and from the mind; it is a logical being, not a real
being. But my knowledge of tree in and through the idea tree is
knowledge of reality; it is real knowledge; I know real being; and I
know it by reason of the fact that tree is stripped by mental
abstraction of all limitation which makes each tree the one
individual bodily thing it is.
For my knowledge of tree holds good of any tree, of every tree,
regardless of size, botanical kind, location, or even actual
existence since it holds good of every possible tree. In a word,
though a tree is bodily in the physical order (or the order of
bodily things) and though it is sheerly mental in the logical order
(or order of ideas) it is real in the order of things or realities
abstractly known.
Now, the realities (and hold hard to that term realities) which can
be found not only in the bodily world or the physical order, but
also in the supra-physical order, whether this be the spiritual
order of substances, or the order of realities known in a
supra-material way, are said to belong to the metaphysical order.
And a science of these things is a metaphysical science.
Metaphysics, as the name of a science, means the science of
nonmaterial real being. We have seen that such being is either a
spiritual substance, or a bodily thing which is stripped of
materiality by abstraction; it may also be any being, substantial or
accidental, which exists or has influence in the field of bodies and
non-bodies alike and hence is not limited to the material.
Substance is a metaphysical term; cause is a metaphysical term; such
terms also are essence, accident, relation, and many, many others.
For substance can be material or it can be spiritual and is still a
substance; thus substance is not held exclusively to the material or
physical order, and is, in so far, nonmaterial; and it indicates
reality, not a mode of being in the mind; hence it is both
nonmaterial and real, and is, in itself, a metaphysical term and
concept.
Cause can have place among bodily realities, spiritual realities,
and can be traced also in mathematical relations, and in mental
relations which are non-mathematical; cause can exist among
substances, among accidents. It is not held down, therefore, to the
order of things material; that is, it is nonmaterial. Yet it is
real; it is conceived as a reality, and where it exists, it exists
as a reality. It belongs to the order, not of this physis, or of
that physis, or of the other physis, but sweeps up and over and
inclusively upon all. It comes after the limited physes; it is
meta-physical; it is metaphysical.
And so with the other examples mentioned. All the terms noted are
not so inclusive as the term cause, but it is clear that all of them
are free from the limitations which would hold them exclusively
applicable in the realm of bodies; hence we say they are
nonmaterial; and they indicate reality; they are nonmaterial and
real, and therefore they are metaphysical.
Metaphysics, therefore, is the science of nonmaterial real being.
Now, the Greek word on (stem, onto-) means being; and the
termination -logy suggests science. And so the fundamental part of
metaphysics, which deals with being as such, has been given the name
which means "the science of being," that is, the name ontology.
b) Being
The term being means thing, reality. It means anything that exists
or can be thought of as existing.
The Latin term for being is the coined word ens. Ens has a strength
that is lacking in the English term being. Perhaps this is because
ens is coined (for it would be the present participle of the Latin
verb esse "to be," if that verb had a present participle, which, as
a matter of fact, it has not), and is not a term in constant current
use as the English being is. Ens is used exclusively and precisely
in a philosophical sense as a noun, whereas being is used in our
casual daily speech both as noun and as participle. In the present
study, however, we use being as a noun to indicate thing or state.
The Latin ens, by the way, is the etymological source of the English
term entity.
The term being, like every term, is the expression of an idea or
concept. Now, as those of you who have studied the Logical Question
should already know, an idea has a content or make-up called its
comprehension; and a field of meaning, of denotation, called its
extension. We have also seen that ideas, in point of extension, are,
in themselves, universal, although they may be contracted to the
character of particular and singular ideas.
A universal idea expresses in the mind some one thing, that is, some
one essence, which is found in each and every member of the
extension of the idea; therefore the universal idea is predicable of
all and each of these members (called inferiors or subjects of the
idea). There are five possible modes of predication, viz., generic,
specific, differential, proper, accidental; usually these are called
simply genus, species, difference, property, accident. Every
universal idea will be predicable of its inferiors in one of these
five ways.
Now, when we regard the idea of being as a universal idea, that is,
as representing in the mind some one thing, some one essence, that
is common to all its inferiors, we find that there is simply nothing
conceivable which is absent from the scope or extension of the idea
being. But how does it apply to its inferiors; how is it predicable
of them?
Certainly not as accident, property, or difference; and certainly
not as species. For these are restricted classifications of a way or
mode of predication, and, as we have just noted, there is absolutely
no restriction in the mode in which being is predicated of its
inferiors, for it not only applies to all, but to their differences
and particularities as well.
Everything is a being, every difference of things is a being, every
special character is a being, every conceivable thing is a being. Is
the one classification left, that is, is genus the mode of
predication proper to being? Not precisely. For a genus is, after
all, predicable of a class of inferiors, and there are boundaries of
that class, and things outside those boundaries to which the genus
does not apply or of which it is not predicable. This is not the
case with being. Hence the idea being does not apply to its
inferiors as a genus.
But we have said that every universal idea must apply to its
inferiors in one of the five ways called the predicables. Being does
not so apply. Therefore being is not a universal idea. It is more;
it is a transcendental idea. It soars above all classifications and
is predicable of everything. But, since genus is the most wide of
the modes of predication, we may say that being, in its application
to inferiors, is closer to genus than to any of the other four
predicables.
And so, loosely speaking, we say being is "a sort of genus" or "a
genus by figure of speech"; in short, we say being is a genus by
analogy or that being is an analogical genus.
What we have said of the idea of being is to be said as well of the
term being. It is a transcendental term, not merely a universal
term. It applies to its inferiors (terms that can be used as subject
when it is predicate) as an analogical genus.
Being is understood by the mind as contrasted with its opposite,
that is, non-being or nothing. For, as the eye cannot behold a
visible object exactly unless it stand against a contrasting
background, so the mind cannot see being except against the
background of non-being or nothingness. And the mind sees, even as
it grasps being as necessarily contradictory to non-being, that "a
thing cannot be and not-be at the same time and in the same way."
This judgment the mind inevitably pronounces as a self-evident
certitude and truth. This is the fundamental first-principle, the
first of self-evident truths, which serves as root-reason and solid
basis for every other judgment. This self-evident truth, this
principle (that is, this guiding truth), is called "The Principle of
Contradiction."
Out of the idea of being then (which is the very first idea in the
order of time and in the order of thinking, since our first grasp of
anything is as a thing) comes at once the judgment which is
enunciated as the principle of contradiction. Further analysis of
the idea being makes evident other principles.
For, after seeing that a thing cannot be and not-be in the same way
and simultaneously, the mind sees that the classifications of being
and non-being are all inclusive, and it necessarily judges,
"Anything either is or it is not; there is no middle ground between
being and non-being. "This judgment, so enunciated, is "The
Principle of the Excluded Middle."
Again, the mind, contemplating the idea being as contrasted with
non-being or nothing, corroborates its finding by asserting the
identity of being and the identity of non-being, thus: "Whatever is,
is; and that which is not, is not." This is "The Principle of
Identity."
Finally, the mind, dwelling still on the idea of being as seen in
contrast with its opposite, judges with inevitable and absolute
certitude that these opposites are different, thus: "That which is
is not that which is not; nor can that which is not be identified
with that which is." This is "The Principle of Difference."
Thus the mind, studying the idea of being and contrasting it with
the idea of non-being, sees these self-evident truths: that a thing
cannot be both of the opposites simultaneously; that the opposites
exhaust the possibilities leaving no middle ground which is neither;
that each is what it is; that either is not the other. These
self-evident truths are primal, basic, fundamental (and, we dare to
say, RADICAL) to all thinking; they are the root of every proof, of
every sound thinking process and its fruitage.
They are called first principles, that is, first intellectual
principles, first guiding truths. Their names, to review them, are
the principle of contradiction, the principle of the excluded
middle, the principle of identity, and the principle of difference.
Of these, the very first is the principle of contradiction.
c) Determinants of Being
There are no specific kinds of being as such. For anything is a
thing. But there are specific kinds of beings, of things, on other
bases that the basis of their character as things simply. We shall
speak of such a classification of things when we come to consider
the categories. But here, considering being in its most general
aspect, we have certain points which we may call determinants. Of
these we now speak.
1. Real Being -- Logical Being
Anything that is existible in the world of realities independently
of the creatural mind is real being. Anything that depends for its
existence on the creatural mind is logical being. These types of
being are very often called by their Latin names: real being is
ens reale; logical being is either ens logicum or ens rationis.
Examples of real being: man, hill, fire, soul, spirit, cat, tree.
Examples of logical being: vacancy, darkness, blindness, death
(which are not things but the absence or cessation of things, and
are regarded as things by the mind, thus having their sole
objectiveness in and from the mind); fictions of mind like "a
square circle"; modes and relations of mental processes, like
genus, species, subject, predicate.
2. Actual Being -- Potential Being
Here we have determinants of real being. A real being that exists
is actual being. A real being that can exist but does not, is
potential being. In so far as anything exists, it is actual; hence
actuality is a perfection. Insofar as anything existible does not
exist, it is potential; hence, potentiality is imperfection; it is
unfulfillment. This is why Aristotle defines God, the Infinite
Being, as Pure Actuality.
The transit from potentiality to actuality is called becoming or
motion or change. There are four chief types of change: change of
substance or substantial change (as from living body to dead body;
as from lifeless food to living flesh); change of quantity (as
growth or diminution); change of quality (as from hot to cold,
from ignorant to learned); change of place or local change or
local movement.
In point of change we see illustrated the axiomatic truth that
nothing becomes, nothing passes from potential to actual, except
under the influence of what is already actual. Quidquid movetur ab
alio movetur.
Under the head of actual being we must consider some types of
actuality:
(a) First Actuality -- Second Actuality
A thing is said to be actual by first actuality or in actu primo
when it is present in basic fact or in fundamental equipment. Thus
a newborn baby is a rational creature and a walking creature. The
baby cannot, in fact, use its reason or its freewill, nor can it
use its feet to walk with. But it has reason and it has feet. Its
fundamental equipment for reasoning, willing, and walking is
present, is actual. But, owing to immaturity and inexperience,
this equipment is not yet operative. So we say that the baby is a
reasoning, willing, walking creature in actu primo or in first
actuality. Later, the baby will exercise the powers of reasoning,
willing, and walking. In such exercise it will be a reasoning,
willing, and walking creature in actu secundo or in second
actuality.
(b) Actuality of Essence -- Actuality of Existence
About an existing (that is, an actual) thing, there are two points
of actuality. The thing is what it is in its basic constitution;
and, secondly, the thing is here. The first point indicates the
actuality of essence; the second point indicates the actuality of
existence. There is disagreement among philosophers about the
distinction between the actual essence and the actual existence of
an existing creature. There is no question about the separability
of these two things, but only about their distinction.
Some hold that the distinction is real, and that the essence of an
existing creature is one thing, while its existence is another
thing, although these two things are inseparably united in the
existing creature. Others hold that these two things -- essence
and existence in a creature -- are only one thing looked at in two
distinct ways; they maintain, therefore, that the distinction is
not real but logical.
Under the head of potential being we must consider some types of
potentiality:
(a) Objective Potentiality -- Subjective Potentiality
A thing looked at as sheerly possible is said to be objectively
potential. A thing regarded in the causes that may produce it is
said to reside in these causes as in its subject, and so is called
subjectively potential.
An open meadow is potentially a field of ripe corn; the thing is
possible; corn could be planted there and come to ripeness; this
is objective potentiality. But a field just planted in corn is
potentially a field of ripe corn; it is more than sheerly
possible, for the causes that tend to produce ripe corn are there
and at work; the corn is not yet actual, it is only potential, but
the potentiality resides in a subject; here we have subjective
potentiality.
(b) Active Potentiality -- Passive Potentiality
Active potentiality is a capacity for doing. It is a fully active
potentiality if it is a capacity for laying hold of something and
changing it, as, for example, the digestive power or potentiality
which lays hold of food and changes it into flesh and blood. It is
an operative potentiality if it involves doing without essentially
changing what it affects. Passive potentiality is a capacity for
receiving, as, for example, the capacity for marble to be shaped
into a statue.
Sometimes our knowing-powers are called passive potentialities, for
they receive the impression of their objects. But the knowing-powers
are also active inasmuch as they take in the impression; they re-act
to the impression. It seems more accurate to call the knowing-powers
operative rather than passive.
Summary of the Section
In this Section we have learned the meaning of the term metaphysics,
and have clearly determined the parts of philosophy which properly
belong under this heading.
We have studied the nature of being.
We have learned that being is a transcendental concept and term, and
that it is predicable of its inferiors in a manner analogous to that
of a genus.
We have studied the principles which are immediately derived from
the idea of being as seen against the background of its opposite,
non-being.
We have learned that these principles are four:
The Principle of Contradiction;
The Principle of the Excluded Middle;
The Principle of Identity;
The Principle of Difference.
We have noted that the first principle of all is the Principle of
Contradiction. These first principles are self-evident truths which
are fundamental to all thinking and to all certitude in knowledge.
We have noted certain determinants of being: real, logical; actual,
potential.
We have seen that actuality is either first actuality or second
actuality (actus primus; actus secundus); that it is actuality of
essence, actuality of existence.
We have also learned that potentiality is objective or subjective;
active or passive.
[ Mini-Course Index ] [ Next Section ]
Philosophy Resource Center Main Page
Ontology: The philosophic science of the nature of being "in general"
Epistemology: The philosophic science dealing with the problem of knowledge
Psychology: Really "rational" or "philosophical" psychology, dealing with man as a "being"
Theodicy: The philosophic science of God, First Cause, Creator - sometimes "natural theology"
Logic: The philosophic science of correct thinking
Ethics: The philosophic science dealing with human acts - sometimes "moral philosophy"
Politics: The philosophic science of man's social end, including the form of state organization
Axiology: The philosophic science which studies the general nature of "value"
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[1] Mulla Shadra juga menyertakan dalam definisi filsafatnya kata-kata Tasyabuh bil-bari ta’ala dan kemudian menambahkan, Taasiyan bil anbiya, al-falsafah hiya tasyabuh bi ilah. Seperti yang tertera dalam hadis, Takhalaqu bi akhlaqi llah, Yaitu menguasai ma’lumat wa tajarud anil jismaniyat.
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