Kamis, 13 Desember 2007

avicena, mantiq gazali, ibnu arabi

Keywords, :avicena,shahiba, falsafah arab, menimbang mantif, gazali, taymiyah transmisi kebudayaan yunani, filsafa akhlak miskawaih, kernel of kernel ibnu arabi

13-12-2007

Mengapa paper tidak berkualitas? Kurang pemahaman yang akurat?

Kurang konsentrasi, tidak mengulangi lagi, review kurang?

Apakah

12-12-2007

Murysid, Cendekiawan dan Pengusaha Internasional

Karakter mursid, cendekiawan dan pengusaha internasional

Tentu saja muridnya adlaah husen, mulyadi, muhsin thabatabai, ari ginajar, haidar, arifin ilham, arzyumardi azra, Jalalludin, komunitas ab dan komunitasn ahlu sunah, orang barat, ekspatrian, timur dan barat. Dunia dan eperpa amerika.

Kenapa tersinggun dengan kata-kata tajam??

Salam. Undangan Peluncuran dan Diskusi Buku “Seruan Azan dari Puing WTC: Dakwah Islam di Jantung Amerika Pasca 9/11” (dalam rangka 25 Tahun Penerbit Mizan)

Pembicara: FEISAL ABDUL RAUF, Imam Masjid Al Farah New York City

Pembahas: Prof. Mochtar Pabottingi, Moderator: Dr. Haidar Bagir

waktu: Jumat 14 Desember 2007, pkl. 15.30 - selesai

tempat: MP BOOK POINT, Jl. Puri Mutiara Raya 72 Cipete-Jaksel

11-12-2007

Yang penting bisa jadi musuh yang terpenting, jadi waktuku sekarang ini,hanya nulis papers, menyiapkan examinations, menyiapkan tesis, dan presentasi serta kehadiran dan berdoa dan beramal salih.

Celoteh hati

Bagaimana menajdi being pengusaha dan menjadi being investor??

Selain dinamis, menjaga penampilan, keyakinan, aura, wibawa, dan ketegasan , ketegaran,serta keberania, dan kekuatan untuk melakukan investasi besar-besaran , lompatan dan kreaatifitas serta ketegaan dan kekuatan merundingkan, ???

Tafakur

Fase kedua dari kegiatan baru aadlah mempertahankan citra dan ego?

Mengapa tidak ada keakraban dengan sebagianumat yang berbeda pandangan?

Mengapa manusaiat tidak tahan dengan kelebihan, keglamouran,kepopuleran?

Mengapa manusia belum siap melakukan cita-cita besar, being thought and actioan

Vibrasi??

Ya harus menjadi being dulu???

Ketika masuka ke dalam lingkungran profesi baru maka ditemukan tantangan baru juga

Dan lebih beratr lagi, itulah konsekuensi dari sebuah profesi, jadi setiap ambisi ada bahaya atau ada konsekuensi lain tepatnya, jangan dikiran bahwa kita hrus menjadi being dulu, sebelum thougt and action

Sekarang aku memiirkan untuk menjadi pengusaha multinasional, investor internasional, dan raja bisnis kampiun dunia baik dalam investasi, teknologi atau apartemen, atau properti, retails, sumber enegeri, minyak bumi, jasa, konglomerat, pabrik kerajiankraft, industri, pabrik, pemiliki peneidkan dari sed – s2 yang memiliki kredibltias internasional,

Musik, studio, presiden, menteri, dpr, profesor, wali kota, gubernur,

Pengusaha internasional di bidang apa saja

Dalam usia 55 tahun aku harus sukses

15 tahun lagi?????

IBN Sina—Al-Biruni correspondence

Rafik Berjak

In this first installment of the translation of the correspondence between Ibn Sina and al-Biruni, al-As'ilah wa'l-Ajwibah, Ibn Sina responds to the first question posed to him by al-Biruni who criticizes reasons given by Aristotle for denying levity or gravity to the celestial spheres and the Aristotelian notion of circular motion being an innate property of the heavenly bodies.

Keywords: Ibn Sina-al-Biruni correspondence; criticism of Aristotelian natural philosophy; De Caelo; levity and gravity; heavenly bodies, circular motion; al-Ma'sumi; celestial bodies; Islamic scientific tradition.

Translators' Introduction

Writing from Khwarazm, the modern Khiva and ancient Chorasmia, Abu Rayhan Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Biruni (362-442/973-1050) posed eighteen questions to Abu 'Ali al-Husayn b. 'Abd Allah ibn Sina (370-428/980-1037). Ten questions were related to various concepts and ideas in Artistotle's al-Sama' wa'l-'Alam (De Caelo).

Ibn Sina responded, answering each question one by one in his characteristic manner. Not satisfied by some of the answers, al-Biruni wrote back, commenting on the first eight answers from the first set and on the seven from the second. This time, the response came from Abu Sa'id Ahmad ibn 'Ali al-Ma'sumi, whose honorific title, Faqih, is indicative of his high status among the students of Ibn Sina. He wrote on behalf of his master, who was the most representative scholar of Islamic Peripatetic natural philosophy. "His long response thus brings to a conclusion this most challenging and remarkable set of exchanges between two of the greatest masters of Islamic thought, al-Biruni and Ibn Sina aided by his pupil," wrote Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "an encounter which in its rigour and significance of the questions involved marks one of the highlights of Islamic intellectual history and in fact medieval natural philosophy and science in general." (1) Based on a critical edition of the text published in 1995, (2) this first English translation of Questions and Answers will be serialized in Islam & Science.

In the name of Allah the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate.

1. The Grand Master, Abu 'Ali Al-Hussein Abu 'Abdullah Ibn Sina--may Allah grant him mercy--said, All Praise is for Allah, the Sustainer of the worlds, He suffices and He is the best Disposer of affairs, the Granter of victory, the Supporter. And Allah's blessings be upon our master Muhammad and upon his family and all his companions, and now to begin:

2. This letter is in response to the questions sent to him by Abu Rayhan al-Biruni from Khawarazm. May Allah surround you with all you wish for, and may He grant you all you hope for and bestow on you the happiness in this life, and hereafter, and save you from all you dislike in both lives. You requested--may Allah prolong your safety--a clarification about matters some of which you consider worthy to be traced back to Aristotle, of which he spoke in his book, al-Sama' wa'l-'Alam, (3) and some of which you have found to be problematic. I began to explain and clarify these briefly and concisely, but some pressing matters inhibited me from elaborating on each topic as it deserves. Further, the sending of the response to you was delayed, awaiting al-Ma'sumi's dispatch of letter to you. Now, I would restate your questions in your own words, and then follow each question with a brief answer.

3. The first question: You asked--may Allah keep you happy--why Aristotle asserted that the heavenly bodies have neither levity nor gravity and why did he deny absence of motion from and to the center. We can assume that since the heaven is among the heaviest bodies--and that is an assumption, not a certainty--it does not require a movement to the center because of a universal law that applies to all its parts judged as similar. If every part had a natural movement toward the center, and the parts were all connected, then it would result in a cessation (wuquf) [of all motion] at the center. Likewise, we can assume that the heaven is among the lightest of all bodies, this would not necessitate (i) a movement from the center until its parts have separated and (ii) the existence of vacuum outside the heaven. And if the nonexistence of vacuum outside the heaven is an established fact, then the heaven will be a composite body like fire. [And you also say] that the circular movement of the heaven, though possible, might not be natural like the natural movement of the planets to the east [which] is countered by a necessary and forceful movement to the west. If it is said that this movement is not encountered because there is no contradiction between the circular movements and there is no dispute about their directions, then it is just deception and argument for the sake of argument, because it cannot be imagined that one thing has two natural movements, one to the east and one to the west. And this is nothing but a semantic dispute with agreement on the meaning, because you cannot name the movement toward the west as opposite of the movement to the east. And this is a given; even if we do not agree on the semantics, let us deal with the meaning.

4. The answer: May Allah keep you happy, you have saved me the trouble of proving that heaven has neither levity nor gravity, because in your prelude you have accepted that there is no place above the heaven to where it can move, and it cannot, likewise, move below because all its parts are connected. I say it is also not possible for it to move down, nor is there a natural place below it to where it can move, and even if it were separated--and we can make the assumption that it is separated--it would result in the movement of all the elements from their natural positions and this is not permissible, neither by the divine nor by the natural laws. And that would also establish vacuum which is not permissible in the natural laws. Therefore, the heaven does not have a natural position below or above to which it can move in actuality (bi'l fi'l) or in being, neither is it in the realm of possibility (bi'l-imkan) or imagination (bi'l-wahm) because that would lead to unacceptable impossibilities we have mentioned, I mean the movement of all the elements from their natural positions or the existence of vacuum.

5. There is nothing more absurd than what cannot be proved to exist either by actuality or by possibility or imagination. If we accept this, it follows that heaven does not have a natural position, neither at the top nor at the bottom. But every body has a natural position. And to this, we add a minor term and that is our saying: "heaven is a body", and hence, it will follow from the first kind of syllogism (shakl) that heaven has a natural position. And if we could transfer the conclusion to the disjunctive positional syllogism, we could then say: its natural position is above or below or where it is. And if we hypothesize the negation of its being either above or below, we could say: it is neither up nor down; hence the conclusion is: it is where it is.

6. Everything in its natural position is neither dense or light in actuality and since heaven is in its natural position, it is, therefore, neither light nor dense in actuality. The proof of this is that whatever is in its natural position and is light, it will be moved upward because it is light and its natural position is upward but it cannot be said that whatever is light, is in its natural position in actuality because this will contradict what I have just said: it will be "in its natural position" as well as "not in its natural position" at the same time; and that is self-contradictory. And likewise for the dense. Because the dense is what naturally moves downwards and its natural position is down because anything that moves naturally, its movement takes it toward its natural position. And from the first premise, it is clear that the thing in its natural position is not dense in actuality, so when we add the results of the two premises, the sum of this will be that whatever is in its natural position, is neither dense nor light in actuality. And it was established in the second minor term that the heaven is truly in its natural position, therefore, the correct logical conclusion is that the heaven is neither light nor dense in actuality and it is not so potentially (bi'l-quwwa) or contingently.

7. The proof of this is that the light and dense in potentia can be so in two situations: (i) It can be so either as a whole, like the parts of the fixed elements in their natural position, so if they were neither dense nor light in actuality, then they are so potentially, for the possibility of their movement by a compulsory motion which can cause them to move from and to their natural position either by an ascending or descending natural movement; and (ii) by considering the parts as opposed to the whole in the fixed elements. These parts are neither light nor dense in their totalities, because if it would move upward, some of the parts would move downward because they are spherical in their shapes and have many dimensions, but indeed, the levity and density are in their parts, so if the heaven is light or heavy potentially, that is in its totality--and we have proved that by nature, the upward or downward movement of the heaven is negated (maslub) to its totality, and to prove that we depended on some of your premises. So it was made clear to us that the heaven in its totality is neither light nor dense. And I say that it is neither heavy nor light potentially in its parts because the levity and the density of the heavy and the light parts appear in their natural movement to their natural position. And the parts which are moving to their natural position move in two cases: (i) they might be moving from their natural position by force, [in which case] they would move back to their natural position by nature or (ii) they are being created and moving to their natural position like the fire that emerges from the oil and is moving up. It is not possible for a part of the heaven to move from its natural position by force because that requires an outside mover, a corporeal or non-corporeal mover that is not from itself.

8. The non-corporeal movers, like what the philosophers call nature and the active intellect (al-caql al-facal), and the First Cause (al-'illatul ula), are not supposed to create forced movement (harakah qasriyyah); as for nature, it is self-evident, and as for the intellect and the First Cause, their inability [to do so] is left to the Divine knowledge. As for the physical cause, it should be, if possible, one of the [four] elements or composed of them because there is no corporeal body other than these five--the four simple elements and [the fifth being] their combination.

9. And every body that moves by itself and not by accident, moves when it is touched by an active mover. And this has been explained in detail in the first chapter in the book of Generation and Corruption (Kitab al-kawn wa'l-fasad). Thus, it is not possible for a part of the heaven to move without being touched by the mover during its movement toward it either by force (bi'l-qasr), or by nature (bi'l-tab'). The outside mover that moves it by force has to be connected to another mover, which in turn, has to be connected to the first mover of all. And if it was moving by nature, it will be either the non-composite fire or a combination in which the fire-parts are dominant. The non-composite fire does not affect the heaven because it engulfs it from all sides and the impact of bodies on bodies is by touch and there is no part in the heaven which is more passive than the other, unless one of the parts is weaker in its nature. However, the weakness of the substance does not come from itself but through an outside factor.

10. Thus, the question now returns to the beginning, to that of a compound mover in which the fire-part is dominant. It will not have impact until it reaches the sphere of the heaven and when it reaches the airy zone, then it will turn into pure fire and burst into a flame as seen in the case of comets. And if it is too slow to reach that transforming stage, it would not touch the heaven, [it may be so] because in it are dense parts, earthly and others, which have gravity. Thus, it is not possible for anything to touch the heaven except pure fire. It is possible for pure or non-pure fire--and the compound is not pure fire--and for the one that is not pure fire it is possible for it to be in the neighborhood of the three elements but it is not possible for it to touch the heaven by nature.

11. As for the other elements, it is not possible for them to touch the heaven in their totality because they do not move in their totality from their natural position, neither in their compound form nor in their parts, thus, they cannot have any impact on the heaven because they are unable to touch it because when they reach the ether (al-athir), they will burn and turn into fire and the fire does not touch heaven, as we have proved. But ether changes and disjoins everything that occurs in its [realm] because it is hot in actuality and one of the properties of the hotness in actuality is that it brings together similar genera and separates dissimilar genera--it is the separator of dissimilar and gatherer of similar genera. And when the fire takes over a body that is being affected by it, if it were a compound body made from different parts, the fire will return it to its nature; this shows that [the body] did not change into something that is contrary to its essence by mixing with the affective element. As for the cold, it is not like this. And there is no doubt that the hot is most effective and powerful of all things; and the thing that is in its natural position, strengthens its genus; and the whole is stronger than its parts. So what do you think of something that is hot in its natural position and it is whole, and it allows a part to enter into its sphere and it does not produce any effect [on this part], neither changes it back to its nature, nor separates it, if it were compound?

12. From these premises, it is clear that it is not possible for any part or compound from the elements to reach the heaven. Since they do not reach it, they do not touch it, and if they do not touch it, they do not produce any effect on it. None of the parts or the compounds has any effect on parts of the heaven and if nothing is able to affect it, other than it, from whole or parts, simple or compound bodies, it is not going to be affected and moved potentially by itself. And if we would set aside our premise--and that is our saying, "and it is not possible [for the heaven] to be affected by anything other than by itself", which is true--the result is our saying: "it is not possible that it will be affected and moved by force"; and this is also true. So the heaven is neither light, nor dense potentially, neither as a whole or in its parts. And we have proved that it is not so in actuality. It is neither light, nor dense in general or absolutely. And that is what we wanted to clarify. But you can call the heaven light from the perspective in which people call a floating body, on top of another body, lighter than the latter by nature. So, from this perspective, it is possible that the heaven is the lightest of all things.

13. Now, as to your saying that the circular motion [of the heaven] is natural to it, and your saying, "if it is said that this is not accidentally" et cetera, there is no one among the scholars who has proven the natural circular motion of the heaven, who has ascertained what you have said. I would have explained the reasons, had it not been a separate issue, taking too long [to explain].

14. As for your demonstration that the movement of the stars and the planets is opposite, it is not so. It is only different. Because the opposite movements are opposite in the directions and the ends, and if it was not that the high is opposite of low, then we would not have said that the movement from the center is opposite of the movement to the center; and this has been explained in detail in the fifth chapter of Kitab al-Sama' al-tabi'i. As for the directions of the two circular motions and their ends, they are, in our assumption, positional, not natural. Because in nature, there is no end to the circular movement of the heaven, hence it is not opposite; hence the two different circular motions are not opposite and this is what we wanted to clarify.

(1.) Nasr, Seyyed Hossein and Mohaghegh, Mehdi (1995), Al-As'ilah wa'l-Ajwibah (Questions and Answers), International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Kuala Lumpur.

(2.) Ibid. For a detailed note on "Questions and Answers" as a technique used extensively in the Islamic intellectual tradition, see Daiber, H., "Masa'il wa-Adjwiba" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, (new edition), vi, pp. 636-9, where Daiber mentions that "the oldest Islamic question-answer literature endeavours to solve philological and textual problems of the Kurban text." He cites the correspondence between Ibn Sina and al-Biruni on the basis of 1974 Turkish edition of the correspondence, ed. Ulken, Ibn Sina risaleleri, ii, 2-9; ed. M. Turker, in Beyruni'ye armagan, Ankara 1974, 103-12. Daiber also cites numerous other examples of correspondence literature. It is also relevant to note that at the time when this correspondence took place, the technique of reduction ad absurdum used by Ibn Sina in his response to al-Biruni had already become a refined tool in this literature.

(3.) De Caelo.

Rafik Berjak is a scholar of Arabic language and literature; 9120152A Ave, Edmonton, AB T8E 5W1, Canada; Email: rberjak@shaw.ca. Muzaffar Iqbal is President, Center for Islam and Science, 349-52252 Range Road 215, Sherwood Park, AB T8E 1B7 Canada; Email: Muzaffar@cis-ca.org.

COPYRIGHT 2003 Center for Islam & Science
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

4. The answer: May Allah keep you happy, you have saved me the trouble of proving that heaven has neither levity nor gravity, because in your prelude you have accepted that there is no place above the heaven to where it can move, and it cannot, likewise, move below because all its parts are connected. I say it is also not possible for it to move down, nor is there a natural place below it to where it can move, and even if it were separated--and we can make the assumption that it is separated--it would result in the movement of all the elements from their natural positions and this is not permissible, neither by the divine nor by the natural laws. And that would also establish vacuum which is not permissible in the natural laws. Therefore, the heaven does not have a natural position below or above to which it can move in actuality (bi'l fi'l) or in being, neither is it in the realm of possibility (bi'l-imkan) or imagination (bi'l-wahm) because that would lead to unacceptable impossibilities we have mentioned, I mean the movement of all the elements from their natural positions or the existence of vacuum.

5. There is nothing more absurd than what cannot be proved to exist either by actuality or by possibility or imagination. If we accept this, it follows that heaven does not have a natural position, neither at the top nor at the bottom. But every body has a natural position. And to this, we add a minor term and that is our saying: "heaven is a body", and hence, it will follow from the first kind of syllogism (shakl) that heaven has a natural position. And if we could transfer the conclusion to the disjunctive positional syllogism, we could then say: its natural position is above or below or where it is. And if we hypothesize the negation of its being either above or below, we could say: it is neither up nor down; hence the conclusion is: it is where it is.

6. Everything in its natural position is neither dense or light in actuality and since heaven is in its natural position, it is, therefore, neither light nor dense in actuality. The proof of this is that whatever is in its natural position and is light, it will be moved upward because it is light and its natural position is upward but it cannot be said that whatever is light, is in its natural position in actuality because this will contradict what I have just said: it will be "in its natural position" as well as "not in its natural position" at the same time; and that is self-contradictory. And likewise for the dense. Because the dense is what naturally moves downwards and its natural position is down because anything that moves naturally, its movement takes it toward its natural position. And from the first premise, it is clear that the thing in its natural position is not dense in actuality, so when we add the results of the two premises, the sum of this will be that whatever is in its natural position, is neither dense nor light in actuality. And it was established in the second minor term that the heaven is truly in its natural position, therefore, the correct logical conclusion is that the heaven is neither light nor dense in actuality and it is not so potentially (bi'l-quwwa) or contingently.

10. Thus, the question now returns to the beginning, to that of a compound mover in which the fire-part is dominant. It will not have impact until it reaches the sphere of the heaven and when it reaches the airy zone, then it will turn into pure fire and burst into a flame as seen in the case of comets. And if it is too slow to reach that transforming stage, it would not touch the heaven, [it may be so] because in it are dense parts, earthly and others, which have gravity. Thus, it is not possible for anything to touch the heaven except pure fire. It is possible for pure or non-pure fire--and the compound is not pure fire--and for the one that is not pure fire it is possible for it to be in the neighborhood of the three elements but it is not possible for it to touch the heaven by nature.

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11. As for the other elements, it is not possible for them to touch the heaven in their totality because they do not move in their totality from their natural position, neither in their compound form nor in their parts, thus, they cannot have any impact on the heaven because they are unable to touch it because when they reach the ether (al-athir), they will burn and turn into fire and the fire does not touch heaven, as we have proved. But ether changes and disjoins everything that occurs in its [realm] because it is hot in actuality and one of the properties of the hotness in actuality is that it brings together similar genera and separates dissimilar genera--it is the separator of dissimilar and gatherer of similar genera. And when the fire takes over a body that is being affected by it, if it were a compound body made from different parts, the fire will return it to its nature; this shows that [the body] did not change into something that is contrary to its essence by mixing with the affective element. As for the cold, it is not like this. And there is no doubt that the hot is most effective and powerful of all things; and the thing that is in its natural position, strengthens its genus; and the whole is stronger than its parts. So what do you think of something that is hot in its natural position and it is whole, and it allows a part to enter into its sphere and it does not produce any effect [on this part], neither changes it back to its nature, nor separates it, if it were compound?

12. From these premises, it is clear that it is not possible for any part or compound from the elements to reach the heaven. Since they do not reach it, they do not touch it, and if they do not touch it, they do not produce any effect on it. None of the parts or the compounds has any effect on parts of the heaven and if nothing is able to affect it, other than it, from whole or parts, simple or compound bodies, it is not going to be affected and moved potentially by itself. And if we would set aside our premise--and that is our saying, "and it is not possible [for the heaven] to be affected by anything other than by itself", which is true--the result is our saying: "it is not possible that it will be affected and moved by force"; and this is also true. So the heaven is neither light, nor dense potentially, neither as a whole or in its parts. And we have proved that it is not so in actuality. It is neither light, nor dense in general or absolutely. And that is what we wanted to clarify. But you can call the heaven light from the perspective in which people call a floating body, on top of another body, lighter than the latter by nature. So, from this perspective, it is possible that the heaven is the lightest of all things.

3. Now, as to your saying that the circular motion [of the heaven] is natural to it, and your saying, "if it is said that this is not accidentally" et cetera, there is no one among the scholars who has proven the natural circular motion of the heaven, who has ascertained what you have said. I would have explained the reasons, had it not been a separate issue, taking too long [to explain].

14. As for your demonstration that the movement of the stars and the planets is opposite, it is not so. It is only different. Because the opposite movements are opposite in the directions and the ends, and if it was not that the high is opposite of low, then we would not have said that the movement from the center is opposite of the movement to the center; and this has been explained in detail in the fifth chapter of Kitab al-Sama' al-tabi'i. As for the directions of the two circular motions and their ends, they are, in our assumption, positional, not natural. Because in nature, there is no end to the circular movement of the heaven, hence it is not opposite; hence the two different circular motions are not opposite and this is what we wanted to clarify.

(1.) Nasr, Seyyed Hossein and Mohaghegh, Mehdi (1995), Al-As'ilah wa'l-Ajwibah (Questions and Answers), International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Kuala Lumpur.

2.) Ibid. For a detailed note on "Questions and Answers" as a technique used extensively in the Islamic intellectual tradition, see Daiber, H., "Masa'il wa-Adjwiba" in Encyclopaedia of Islam, (new edition), vi, pp. 636-9, where Daiber mentions that "the oldest Islamic question-answer literature endeavours to solve philological and textual problems of the Kurban text." He cites the correspondence between Ibn Sina and al-Biruni on the basis of 1974 Turkish edition of the correspondence, ed. Ulken, Ibn Sina risaleleri, ii, 2-9; ed. M. Turker, in Beyruni'ye armagan, Ankara 1974, 103-12. Daiber also cites numerous other examples of correspondence literature. It is also relevant to note that at the time when this correspondence took place, the technique of reduction ad absurdum used by Ibn Sina in his response to al-Biruni had already become a refined tool in this literature.

(3.) De Caelo.

Rafik Berjak is a scholar of Arabic language and literature; 9120152A Ave, Edmonton, AB T8E 5W1, Canada; Email: rberjak@shaw.ca. Muzaffar Iqbal is President, Center for Islam and Science, 349-52252 Range Road 215, Sherwood Park, AB T8E 1B7 Canada; Email: Muzaffar@cis-ca.org.

Between physics and metaphysics: Mulla Sadra on nature and motion

Islam & Science, June, 2003 by Ibrahim Kalin

Mulla Sadra's concept of nature and substantial motion treats many aspects of traditional philosophy and cosmology in a new light. By allowing change in the category of substance (jawhar), Sadra goes beyond the Aristotelian framework followed by the Peripatetics and Suhrawardi, turning substance into a 'structure of events' and motion into a 'process of change'. Sadra's reworking of classical cosmology through his elaborate ontology and natural philosophy leads to a new vocabulary of 'relations' and fluid structures as opposed to 'things' and solidified entities. In his attempt to make change an intrinsic quality of the substantial transformation of things, Sadra posits nature (tabi'ah) as the principle of both change and permanence, thus granting it relative autonomy as a self-subsisting reality. What underlies Sadra's considerations of change and nature, however, is his concept of being (al-wujud) and its modalities. Change as a mode of being and the de-solidification of the physical world goes beyond locomotive and positional movement, and underscores the dynamism of the world-picture envisaged by Sadra's gradational ontology.

Mulla Sadra's concept of substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah) represents a major departure from the Peripatetic concept of change, and lends itself to a set of new possibilities in traditional Islamic philosophy and cosmology. By defining all change as substantial-existential alterity in the nature of things, Sadra moves away from change as a doctrine of external relations, as Greek and Islamic atomism had proposed, to a process of existential transformation whereby things become ontologically 'more' or 'less' when undergoing change. In his considerations of quantitative and qualitative change, Sadra takes a thoroughly ontological approach and places his world-picture within the larger context of his gradational ontology. Substantial motion and the dynamic view of the universe that it espouses can thus be seen as a logical extension of the primacy (asalah) and gradation of being (tashkik al-wujud)--two key terms of Sadrean ontology. Sadra relegates all reality, physical or otherwise, to the infinitely variegated and all-encompassing reality of being, and this enables him to see all change in terms of being and its modalities (anha' al-wujud). Although Sadra accepts a good part of the Aristotelian view of motion and its types, it is this ontological framework that distinguishes his highly original theory of substantial motion from the traditional Peripatetic discussions of motion.

In what follows, I shall give a detailed analysis of substantial motion and the ways in which Sadra incorporates and reformulates the traditional notions of qualitative and quantitative change in his natural philosophy. It should be emphasized at the outset that Sadra's views on nature and motion are not an isolated set of philosophical reflections but are rather closely related to his ontology and cosmology on the one hand, and psychology and epistemology, on the other. This is borne out by the fact that many of Sadra's novel contributions to Islamic philosophy are predicated upon substantial motion, among which we may mention his celebrated doctrine that the soul is "bodily in its origination, spiritual in its subsistence" (jismaniyyat al-huduth ruhaniyyat al-baqa') and the unification of the intellect and the intelligible (ittihad al-caqil wabl-macqul). In this essay, I shall limit my discussion to Sadra's attempt to move away from a framework of external relations and positional motion to a framework of existential transformation whereby the cosmos is projected as marching towards a universal telos.

The Aristotelian Framework: Motion as the Actualization of Potentiality

Following the scheme of Aristotelian physics, Sadra begins his discussion of motion by explaining the meaning of potentiality. The word potentiality (al-quwwah)(1) is defined in several ways. The most common meaning is the ability to execute certain actions. In this sense, al-quwwah as potency is synonymous with power (al-qudrah), which renders the motion or action of physical bodies possible. Ibn Sina gives a similar definition when he says that "potentiality is the principle of changing into something else". (2) All beings that undergo quantitative or positional change use this potential power. Such corporeal bodies, however, need an active agent to actualize their dormant potentiality. For Sadra, this proves that a thing cannot be the source of change by itself, and there must be an outside factor to induce it to change. If the source of a quality or 'meaning' (ma'na) in an entity were to be the thing itself, this would amount to an unchanging nature in that thing. The real nature of possible beings, however, displays a different structure. With Aristotle (3) and Ibn Sina (4), Sadra takes this to mean that "a thing cannot have its principle of change in itself" and that "for every moving body, there is a mover outside itself". (5)

Mulla Sadra's concept of substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah) represents a major departure from the Peripatetic concept of change, and lends itself to a set of new possibilities in traditional Islamic philosophy and cosmology. By defining all change as substantial-existential alterity in the nature of things, Sadra moves away from change as a doctrine of external relations, as Greek and Islamic atomism had proposed, to a process of existential transformation whereby things become ontologically 'more' or 'less' when undergoing change. In his considerations of quantitative and qualitative change, Sadra takes a thoroughly ontological approach and places his world-picture within the larger context of his gradational ontology. Substantial motion and the dynamic view of the universe that it espouses can thus be seen as a logical extension of the primacy (asalah) and gradation of being (tashkik al-wujud)--two key terms of Sadrean ontology. Sadra relegates all reality, physical or otherwise, to the infinitely variegated and all-encompassing reality of being, and this enables him to see all change in terms of being and its modalities (anha' al-wujud). Although Sadra accepts a good part of the Aristotelian view of motion and its types, it is this ontological framework that distinguishes his highly original theory of substantial motion from the traditional Peripatetic discussions of motion.

In what follows, I shall give a detailed analysis of substantial motion and the ways in which Sadra incorporates and reformulates the traditional notions of qualitative and quantitative change in his natural philosophy. It should be emphasized at the outset that Sadra's views on nature and motion are not an isolated set of philosophical reflections but are rather closely related to his ontology and cosmology on the one hand, and psychology and epistemology, on the other. This is borne out by the fact that many of Sadra's novel contributions to Islamic philosophy are predicated upon substantial motion, among which we may mention his celebrated doctrine that the soul is "bodily in its origination, spiritual in its subsistence" (jismaniyyat al-huduth ruhaniyyat al-baqa') and the unification of the intellect and the intelligible (ittihad al-caqil wabl-macqul). In this essay, I shall limit my discussion to Sadra's attempt to move away from a framework of external relations and positional motion to a framework of existential transformation whereby the cosmos is projected as marching towards a universal telos.

The Aristotelian Framework: Motion as the Actualization of Potentiality

Following the scheme of Aristotelian physics, Sadra begins his discussion of motion by explaining the meaning of potentiality. The word potentiality (al-quwwah)(1) is defined in several ways. The most common meaning is the ability to execute certain actions. In this sense, al-quwwah as potency is synonymous with power (al-qudrah), which renders the motion or action of physical bodies possible. Ibn Sina gives a similar definition when he says that "potentiality is the principle of changing into something else". (2) All beings that undergo quantitative or positional change use this potential power. Such corporeal bodies, however, need an active agent to actualize their dormant potentiality. For Sadra, this proves that a thing cannot be the source of change by itself, and there must be an outside factor to induce it to change. If the source of a quality or 'meaning' (ma'na) in an entity were to be the thing itself, this would amount to an unchanging nature in that thing. The real nature of possible beings, however, displays a different structure. With Aristotle (3) and Ibn Sina (4), Sadra takes this to mean that "a thing cannot have its principle of change in itself" and that "for every moving body, there is a mover outside itself". (5)

Abu Ali al-Hussain Ibn Abdallah Ibn Sina(Avesina) was born in 980 A.D. at Afshana near Bukhara, the part of Iran. The young Bu Ali received his early education in Bukhara, and by the age of ten had become well versed in the study of the Qur'an and various sciences. He started studying philosophy by reading various Greek, Muslim and other books on this subject and learnt logic and some other subjects from Abu Abdallah Natili, a famous philosopher of the time. While still young, he attained such a degree of expertise in medicine that his fame spread far and wide. At the age of 17, he was fortunate in curing Nooh Ibn Mansoor, the King of Bukhhara, of an illness in which all the well-known physicians had given up hope. On his recovery, the King wished to reward him, but the young physician only desired permission to use his uniquely stocked library.

On his father's death, Bu Ali left Bukhara and traveled to Jurjan where Khawarizm Shah welcomed him. There, he met his famous contemporary Abu Raihan al-Biruni. Later he moved to Ray and then to Hamadan, where he wrote his famous book Al-Qanun fi al-Tibb. Here he treated Shams al-Daulah, the King of Hamadan, for severe colic. From Hamadan, he moved to Isfahn, where he completed many of his monumental writings. Nevertheless, he continued traveling and the excessive mental exertion as well as political turmoil spoilt his health. Finally, he returned to Hamadan where he died in 1037 A.D.
He was the most famous physician, philosopher, encyclopaedist, mathematician and astronomer of his time. His major contribution to medical science was his famous book al-Qanun, known as the "Canon" in the West. The Qanun fi al-Tibb is an immense encyclopedia of medicine extending over a million words. It surveyed the entire medical knowledge available from ancient and Muslim sources. Due to its systematic approach, "formal perfection as well as its intrinsic value, the Qanun superseded Razi's Hawi, Ali Ibn Abbas's Maliki, and even the works of Galen, and remained supreme for six centuries". In addition to bringing together the then available knowledge, the book is rich with the author's original contribution. His important original contribution includes such advances as recognition of the contagious nature of phthisis and tuberculosis; distribution of diseases by water and soil, and interaction between psychology and health. In addition to describing pharmacological methods, the book described 760 drugs and became the most authentic materia medica of the era. He was also the first to describe meningitis and made rich contributions to anatomy, gynecology and child health.
His philosophical encyclopaedia Kitab al-Shifa was a monumental work, embodying a vast field of knowledge from philosophy to science. He classified the entire field as follows: theoretical knowledge: physics, mathematics and metaphysics; and practical knowledge: ethics, economics and politics. His philosophy synthesizes Aristotelian tradition, Neoplatonic influences and Muslim theology.

Ibn Sina also contributed to mathematics, physics, music and other fields. He explained the "casting out of nines" and its application to the verification of squares and cubes. He made several astronomical observations, and devised a contrivance similar to the venire, to increase the precision of instrumental readings. In physics, his contribution comprised the study of different forms of energy, heat, light and mechanical, and such concepts as force, vacuum and infinity. He made the important observation that if the perception of light is due to the emission of some sort of particles by the luminous source, the speed of light must be finite. He propounded an interconnection between time and motion, and also made investigations on specific gravity and used an air thermometer.

he philosophical subjects of metaphysics and epistemology would be substantially different than they are today if there had been no David Hume (1711-1776). Hume challenged traditional philosophical beliefs in ways that shocked the readers of his day and have demanded the attention of philosophers ever since. Several classic philosophical problems are now permanently associated with his name: the analysis of causality, the problem of personal identity, and the problem of induction. Hume is also a permanent voice in ongoing disputes about knowledge of the external world, free will and determinism, and meaning and verification. The aspects of Hume's metaphysical and epistemological theories that we find interesting today were largely the same issues that captivated Hume's early critics. Although most of Hume's philosophy in some way touches on issues of metaphysics and epistemology, this article is largely restricted to portions of three of Hume's writings: (1) Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise of Human Nature (1739); (2) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748); and (3) the "Dissertation on the Passions" (1757). For additional articles on Hume in this encyclopedia see the following: David Hume: Life and Writings, David Hume: Moral Th

1. Hume’s Influences

In a 1737 letter, Hume himself lists his philosophical influences, which include Nicolas Malebranche, George Berkeley, Pierre Bayle, and René Descartes:

I shall submit all my Performances to your Examination, & to make you enter into them more easily, I desire of you, if you have Leizure, to read once over le Recherche de la Verité of Pere Malebranche, the Principles of Human Knowledge by Dr Berkeley, some of the more metaphysical Articles of Baile’s Dictionary; such as those of Zeno, & Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations wou’d also be useful, but I don’t know if you will find it easily among your Acquaintances. These Books will make you easily comprehend the metaphysical Parts of my Reasoning. And as to the rest, they have so little Dependence on on [sic] all former Systems of Philosophy, that your natural Good Sense will afford you Light enough to judge of their Force & Solidity. [Hume to Michael Ramsay, August 26, 1737]

Chronologically, the first philosopher on Hume’s list is René Descartes (1596–1650). In his Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641), Descartes combats sceptics who doubt the existence of the external world and the reliability of our senses. To accomplish his task, Descartes himself provisionally plays the role of a sceptic and doubts everything that can possibly be doubted. Descartes then arrives at one absolute truth – his own existence – and uses this as a foundation for demonstrating all knowledge. Hume was probably influenced by Descartes’s provisional doubting process, as Hume himself doubted the sources of human knowledge. Throughout Hume’s philosophical writings, though, he also reacted against the more speculative metaphysical views that Descartes developed.

The remaining three philosophers listed in Hume’s letter – Malebranche, Bayle, and Berkeley – were controversial figures when their writings first appeared, and they share the conviction that the true nature of the world is not as evident as we ordinarily think. French Catholic philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) was a follower of Descartes and is most remembered for his Search After Truth (1674–1675). Two themes stand out in that work, both of which influenced Hume. First, Malebranche wrestled with how our minds receive perceptual images from external objects. For example, as I stand in front of a tree, I have a visual image of that tree. How does the tree itself cause that image in my mind? For Malebranche, the tree is physical in nature, yet my perceptual image is spiritual in nature, and, so, something like a miracle must take place to convert the one to the other. After rejecting various theories of perception, Malebranche concludes that God possesses mental/spiritual images of all external things, and that he implants these ideas in our minds at the appropriate time – when I stand before the tree, for example. In short, according to Malebranche, we see external objects by viewing their images as they reside in God. Hume did not adopt Malebranche’s theological solution to this problem, but perhaps Hume learned from Malebranche that there is a great gulf between external objects and our perceptions of them, and that it is exceedingly difficult to explain the connection between the two.

The second major theme in Malebranche concerns the nature of causality, or, more specifically, how two events (such as the motion of a stick that strikes and moves a ball) are causally connected. Malebranche argues that physical objects by themselves simply cannot be the cause of motion in other objects; only spirits can do that. So, when a stick strikes a ball, some spiritual force must intervene and actually cause the ball to move. Malebranche concludes that God is the true cause of the ball’s motion, and that the movement of the stick is only the occasion, the occasional cause, of the ball’s motion. Malebranche pushes this theory further and argues that God is also the true cause behind human bodily motion. For example, when I wilfully pick up a book, my will is only the occasional cause, and God is the true cause. Again, Hume did not adopt Malebranche’s theological solution to the problem of causality, but it was perhaps through Malebranche that Hume became aware of the difficulty of explaining the nature of causal connections.

Although Malebranche raised questions about our knowledge of external objects and causality, he was nevertheless optimistic about the ability of our human reason to unravel these philosophical mysteries. However, influenced by the ancient Greek sceptical traditions, French philosopher Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) was much more pessimistic about our rational abilities. A philosophy and history professor, Bayle made a lasting mark in philosophy with his monumental Historical and Critical Dictionary (Dictionaire historique et critique, 1692). The Dictionary contains hundreds of articles on notable figures from ancient through modern times, and in lengthy footnotes to these articles Bayle presents his own original and often radical views. In the letter cited above, Hume mentions “the more metaphysical Articles of Baile’s Dictionary” and cites two particular articles: Zeno of Elea and Spinoza.

Zeno (c. 450 BCE) was a follower of Greek philosopher Parmenides and, like his teacher, Zeno argued that our ordinary notions of the world are illusions. Zeno presents a series of logical paradoxes that show the inherently contradictory nature of motion and space. Bayle comments extensively on Zeno’s paradoxes and suggests that space is composed of one of three possible things: mathematical points, indivisible physical points, or infinitely divisible parts. Bayle sceptically concludes that all three of these views are absurd, and, so, no adequate explanation of space is possible. Drawing on Bayle’s discussion, Hume concludes with an almost equally sceptical assessment regarding our notions of space and time. Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) – another controversial modern philosopher – argued that God is the single substance of the entire universe. What appear to be individual objects, such as rocks and trees, are in fact only modifications of God’s single-substance. Bayle treats Spinoza contemptuously and argues that it is counterintuitive to see all physical things as modifications of a single substance. In the Treatise Hume extends Bayle’s critique further and argues that theologians are equally counterintuitive when they say, for example, that my diverse mental images are really unified in my single spirit-mind.

A third metaphysical article in Bayle that certainly had an impact on Hume is that on Pyrrho (c. 365–c. 275 BCE). Pyrrho was the founder of one of the Greek sceptical traditions, which survives principally in the writings of Sextus Empiricus (. c. 200 CE). In his article on Pyrrho, Bayle discusses the Pyrrhonian assault on both perceptual knowledge and knowledge of self-evident truths. Bayle largely agrees with Pyrrho and argues further that human reason collapses under the weight of its own inherent paradoxes. Ultimately, for Bayle, we must reject reason as a guide for truth and rely instead on religious faith. It is probably from Bayle that Hume learned to use faith as a shield to protect him from accusations of atheism or any other negative consequence of sceptical philosophy. In the same article Bayle discusses the common philosophical distinction between what Locke later dubbed primary and secondary qualities; Bayle argues that they are both ultimately spectator-dependent. This is a line of reasoning that Hume also offers.

The last philosopher that Hume mentions in the letter is Anglican Bishop George Berkeley (1685–1753), published two of his key works while in his tewnties, namely A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713). In both of these works Berkeley argues against the existence of an external material world. For Berkeley, our experience of external reality is nothing more than a continuing stream of perceptions, nor can we say anything intelligible about any physical substance that supposedly causes these perceptions. Berkeley concludes that we must reject the theory of physical reality and instead recognise that God directly feeds us perceptions of external things. Although rejecting Berkeley’s theological solution, Hume adopts Berkeley’s arguments showing our inability to access some external world behind our perceptions. Berkeley also critically discusses the view that there is no reality to our individual minds beyond the stream of perceptions that we experience. Berkeley rejects this view and instead argues that individual minds do exist; however, Hume seems to advance a similar problem, while denying Berkeley’s solution.

In addition to the writings of Descartes, Malebranche, Bayle, and Berkeley, there were undoubtedly other philosophers that directly influenced Hume’s metaphysical views. An avid admirer of the Roman philosopher Cicero (106–43 BCE), Hume was familiar with Cicero’s Academica, a dialogue on the nature and possibility of acquiring knowledge. Perhaps most importantly, Hume was influenced by An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) of John Locke (1632–1704). In this work Locke argues that the root of all knowledge lies in experience; Hume shares this view with Locke.

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2. Summary of Treatise Book 1

In his short autobiography, “My Own Life,” Hume notes that he composed his Treatise in his mid-twenties while on retreat for three years in France. It is a long and complex book that systematically re-thinks a wide range of philosophical issues. The first two books of the Treatise appeared simultaneously in 1739. We will briefly look at some of the major themes in both books.

Book 1, titled “Of the Understanding,” opens analysing various categories of mental events, which roughly follow this scheme:

Perceptions

A. Ideas

1. From memory
2. From imagination

a. From fancy
b. From understanding

(1) Involving relations of ideas
(2) Involving matters of fact

B. Impressions

1. Of sensation (external)
2. Of reflection (internal)

He first divides all mental perceptions between ideas (thoughts) and impressions (sensations and feelings), and then makes two central claims about the relation between ideas and impressions. First, adopting what is commonly called Hume’s copy thesis, he argues that all ideas are ultimately copied from impressions. That is, for any idea we select, we can trace the component parts of that idea to some external sensation or internal feeling. This claim places Hume squarely in the empiricist tradition, and throughout Book 1 he uses this principle as a test for determining the content of an idea under consideration. Second, adopting what we may call Hume’s liveliness thesis, he argues that ideas and impressions differ only in terms of liveliness. For example, my impression of a tree is simply more vivid than my idea of that tree. His early critics pointed out an important implication of the liveliness thesis, which Hume himself presumably hides. Most modern philosophers held that ideas reside in our spiritual minds, whereas impressions originate in our physical bodies. So, when Hume blurs the distinction between ideas and impressions, he is ultimately denying the spiritual nature of ideas and instead grounding them in our physical nature. In short, these critics argue that, for Hume, all of our mental operations – including our most rational ideas – are physical in nature.

Hume next notes that there are several mental faculties that are responsible for producing our various ideas. He initially divides ideas between those produced by the memory, and those produced by the imagination. The memory is a faculty that conjures up ideas based on experiences as they happened. For example, the memory I have of my drive to the store is a comparatively accurate copy of my previous sense impressions of that experience. The imagination, by contrast, is a faculty that breaks apart and combines ideas, thus forming new ones. He uses the familiar example of a golden mountain: this idea is a combination of an idea of gold and an idea of a mountain. As our imagination chops up and forms new ideas, it is directed by three principles of association, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. For example, by virtue of resemblance, the sketch of a person leads me to an idea of that actual person. The ideas of the imagination are further divided between two categories. Some imaginative ideas represent flights of the fancy, such as the idea of a golden mountain; other imaginative ideas, though, represent solid reasoning, such as predicting the trajectory of a thrown ball. The fanciful ideas are derived from the faculty of the fancy, and are the source of fantasies, superstitions, and bad philosophy. By contrast, the good ideas are derived from the faculty of the understanding – or reason – and roughly involve either mathematical demonstration or factual predictions. Hume notes that, when we imaginatively exercise our understanding, our minds are guided by seven philosophical or “reasoning” relations, which are divided as follows:

Principles of reasoning concerning relations of ideas (yielding demonstration): (1) resemblance, (2) contrariety, (3) degrees in quality, and (4) proportions in quantity or number

Principles of reasoning concerning matters of fact (yielding judgments of probability): (5) identity, (6) relations in time and place, and (7) causation

Armed with the above conceptual distinctions, he turns his attention to an array of standard philosophical problems. As he examines them one by one, he repeatedly does three things. First, he sceptically argues that we are unable to gain complete knowledge of some important philosophical notion under consideration. Second, he shows more positively how the understanding gives us a very limited idea of the notion under consideration. Third, he explains how some erroneous views of that notion are grounded in the fancy, and he accordingly recommends that we reject those ideas. For convenience, we will follow this three-part scheme as we consider Hume’s discussions.

Space. (1) On the topic of space, Hume argues that we have no ideas of infinitely divisible space (1.2.2.2). (2) When accounting for the idea we do have of space, he argues that “the idea of space is convey’d to the mind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor does any thing ever appear extended, that is not either visible or tangible” (1.2.3.15). Further, he argues that these objects – which are either visible or tangible – are composed of finite atoms or corpuscles, which are themselves “endow’d with colour and solidity.” These impressions are then “comprehended” or conceived by the imagination; it is from the structuring of these impressions that we obtain our idea of space. (3) In contrast to this idea of space, Hume argues that we frequently presume to have an idea of space that lacks visibility or solidity. He accounts for this erroneous notion in terms of a mistaken association that people naturally make between visual and tactile space (1.2.5.21).

Time. (1) Hume’s treatment of our idea of time is like his treatment of the idea of space. He first maintains that we have no idea of infinitely divisible time (1.2.4.1). (2) He then notes Locke’s point that our minds operate at a range of speeds that are “fix’d by the original nature and constitution of the mind, and beyond which no influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought” (1.2.3.7). The idea of time, then, is not a simple idea derived from a simple impression; instead, it is a copy of impressions as they are perceived by the mind at its fixed speed (1.2.3.10). (3) In contrast to this account of time, he argues that we frequently entertain a faulty notion of time that does not involve change or succession. The psychological account of this erroneous view is that we mistake time for the cause of succession instead of seeing it as the effect (1.2.5.29).

Necessary connection between causes and effects. (1) Hume sceptically argues that we cannot get an idea of necessary connection through abstraction or by observing it through sensory experiences (1.3.14.12 ff.). (2) The idea we have of necessary connection arises as follows: we experience a constant conjunction of events A and B – that is, repeated sense experiences where events resembling A are always followed by events resembling B. This produces a habit such that upon any further appearance of A, we expect B to follow. This, in turn, produces an internal feeling “to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant,” which is the impression from which the idea of necessary connection is copied (1.3.14.20). (3) A common but mistaken notion on this topic is that necessity resides within the objects themselves. He explains this mistaken belief by the natural tendency we have to impute subjectively perceived qualities to objects (1.3.14.24).

External objects. (1) Hume’s sceptical claim here is that we have no conception of the existence of external objects (1.2.6.9). (2) Nevertheless, he argues, we do have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for. His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following features. Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity of themselves (1.4.2.29). In an effort to organize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called “vulgar” view of perception). We then conflate all ideas (of perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (1.4.2.33); that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes. Consequently, we naturally feign the continued and external existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (1.4.2.35). Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas (1.4.2.36). Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3) In contrast to the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence – the so-called philosophical view – which distinguishes between perceptions and external objects that cause perceptions. The psychological motivation for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted. Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects (1.4.2.52).

Personal identity. (1) Hume’s sceptical claim on this issue is that we have no experience of a simple, individual impression that we can call the self (1.4.6.2) – where the “self” is the totality of a person’s conscious life. (2) Nevertheless, we do have an idea of personal identity that must be accounted for. He begins his explanation of this idea by noting that our perceptions are fleeting, and he concludes from this that all we are is a bundle of different perceptions (1.4.6.4). Because of the associative principles, though, the resemblance or causal connection within the chain of our perceptions gives rise to an idea of oneself, and memory extends this idea past our immediate perceptions (1.4.6.18 ff.). (3) A common abuse of the notion of personal identity occurs when the idea of a soul or unchanging substance is added to give us a stronger or more unified concept of the self (1.4.6.6).

In all of these discussions, Hume performs an interesting balancing act between making sceptical attacks (step 1) and offering positive theories (step 2). In the conclusion to Book 1, though, he appears to elevate his scepticism to a higher level and exposes the inherent contradictions in even his best philosophical theories. He notes three such contradictions. One centres around what we call induction. Our judgments based on past experience all contain elements of doubt; we are then impelled to make a judgment about that doubt, and – since this too is based on past experience – this in turn will produce a new doubt. Once again, though, we are impelled to make a judgment about this second doubt, and the cycle continues. He concludes that “no finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated in infinitum.” A second contradiction involves a conflict between two theories of external perception – our natural inclination to direct realism vs. the copy theory of perception of philosophers. The third contradiction involves a conflict between causal reasoning and belief in the continued existence of matter. After listing these contradictions, Hume despairs over the failure of his metaphysical reasoning:

The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. [1.4.7.8]

He then subdues his despair by recognizing that nature forces him to set aside his philosophical speculations and return to the normal activities of common life. He recognizes, though, that in time he will be drawn back into philosophical speculation in order to attack superstition and educate the world.

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3. Summary of the Treatise Book 2

Book 2 of the Treatise is a study of impressions of reflection, in contrast with impressions of sensation. Locke had discussed ideas of reflection as “being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself” (Essay 2.2.4). For Locke, these are introspective experiences of our mental faculties such as remembering, willing, discerning, reasoning, and judging. Immediately parting company with Locke, reflective impressions for Hume are passions – that is, emotions – and not introspective experiences of our mental faculties. Book 2 is largely a study of the various passions.

Hume opens Book 2 offering a taxonomy of types of passions, which we may outline here:

Reflective Impressions

1. Calm (reflective pleasures and pains)
2. Violent

a. Direct (desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, fear)
b. Indirect (love, hate, pride, humility)

Hume initially divides passions between the calm and the violent. He concedes that this distinction is somewhat fuzzy, but he explains that people commonly distinguish between types of passions in terms of their degrees of forcefulness. Adding more precision to this common distinction, for Hume calm passions are emotional feelings of pleasure and pain associated with moral and aesthetic judgments. For example, according to Hume, when I see a person commit a horrible deed, I will experience a feeling of pain. When I view a good work of art, I will experience a feeling of pleasure.

In contrast to the calm passions, violent ones constitute the bulk of our emotions, and violent passions divide between direct and indirect passions. For Hume, “direct passions” are so called because they arise immediately – without complex reflection on our part – whenever we see something good or bad. For example, if I consider an unpleasant thing, such as being burglarised, then I will feel the passion of aversion. The key direct passions are desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, and fear. He suggests that sometimes these passions are sparked instinctively – as by, for example, my desire for food when I am hungry. Others, though, are not connected with instinct and are more the result of social conditioning. There is an interesting logic to the six direct passions, which Hume borrowed from a tradition that can be traced to ancient Greek Stoicism. We can diagram the relation between the six with this chart:

When good/bad objects are considered abstractly

desire (towards good objects)
aversion (towards evil objects)

When good/bad objects are actually present

joy (towards good objects)
grief (towards evil objects)

When good/bad objects are only anticipated

hope (towards good objects)
fear (towards evil objects)

Compare, for example, the passions that I will experience regarding winning the lottery vs. having my house burglarized. Suppose that I consider them purely in the abstract – or “consider’d simply” as Hume says (2.3.9.6). I will then desire to win the lottery and have an aversion towards being burglarized. Suppose that both situations are actually before me; I will then experience joy over winning the lottery and sorrow over being burglarized. Suppose, finally, that I know that at some unknown time in the future I will win the lottery and be burglarized. I will then experience hope regarding the lottery and fear of being burglarized.

Hume devotes most of Book 2 to an analysis of the indirect passions, and this analysis is his unique contribution to theories of the passions. The four principal passions are love, hate, pride, and humility. These passions are called “indirect” since they are the secondary effects of a previous feeling of pleasure and pain. Suppose, for example, that I paint a picture, which gives me a feeling of pleasure. Since I am the artist, I will then experience an additional feeling of pride. Hume explains in great detail the psychological process that triggers indirect passions such as pride. Specifically, he notes that these passions arise from a double relation between ideas and impressions, which we can illustrate here with the passion of pride:

(1) I have an initial idea of some possession (or "subject"), such as my painting, and this idea gives me pleasure.
(2) Through the associative principle of resemblance, I then immediately associate this feeling of pleasure with a resembling feeling of pride; this association constitutes the first relation in the double relation.
(3) This feeling of pride then causes me to have an idea of myself (as the "object" of pride).
(4) Through some associative principle such as causality, I then associate the idea of myself with the idea of my painting (which is the "subject" of my pride); this association constitutes the second relation in the double relation.

According to Hume, the three other principal indirect passions arise in parallel ways. For example, if my painting is ugly and causes me pain, then I will experience the secondary passion of “humility” – perhaps more accurately expressed as humiliation. By contrast, if someone else paints a pleasing picture, then this will trigger in me a feeling of “love” for that artist – perhaps more accurately expressed as esteem, which is another term that Hume uses. If the artist paints a painfully ugly picture, then this will trigger in me a feeling of “hatred” towards the artist – perhaps more accurately expressed as disesteem.

The most lasting contribution of Book 2 of the Treatise is Hume’s argument that human actions must be prompted by passion, and never can be motivated by reason. Thus, Hume concludes that “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” (2.3.3.4). Looking more closely at the motivations behind our actions, he the issue of liberty and necessity, and he comes down strongly on the side of necessity. Hume’s discussion here follows the three-step scheme that he used in Book 1. (1) He rejects the notion of liberty that denies necessity and causes (2.3.1.18). (2) He then argues that all mental or physical actions produced by the will arise from antecedent motives, tempers, and circumstances (2.3.1.5 ff.). Making use of his definitions of causality, he argues that these motives produce actions (mental or physical) that have the same causal necessity that we observe in external objects. (3) Lastly, he explains why people commonly believe in an uncaused will (2.3.2.1 ff.). Among other causes of this mistaken belief is the fact that people erroneously believe that they have an experience of liberty owing to a mistaken association: first, people have an idea of liberty (or lack of determination); next, when performing actions they experience a “looseness” which resembles their idea of liberty.

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4. Summary of the Enquiry, and the “Dissertation on the Passions.”

In “My Own Life,” Hume states his opinion that the Treatise failed largely because of its style, rather than its content:

I had always entertained a notion, that my want of success in publishing the Treatise of Human Nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter, and that I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion, in going to the press too early. I, therefore, cast the first part of that work anew in the Enquiry concerning Human Under-standing, which was published while I was at Turin.

Accordingly, Hume reworked some of the contents of Books 1 and 2 into his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding – although he included much additional material that does not appear in the Treatise. Hume’s Enquiry was first published anonymously in 1748 under the title Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding. The title page ascribes the work to “the author of the Essays moral and political;” Hume’s authorship, though, was no secret since the 1748 edition of the Essays includes his name. We do not know precisely when Hume began this book, although we know from a correspondence that he was working on it in 1745. Prior to publication, he circulated a manuscript of the book among his friends for comments. A close friend Henry Home, later Lord Kames (1696–1782), tried to talk Hume out of publishing the work because of its sceptical content and the controversy that it would provoke. Hume ignored the advice and in a letter to Home wrote that he did not care about the consequences:

The other work [soon to be published] is the Philosophical Essays [i.e., the Enquiry], which you dissuaded me from printing. I won’t justify the prudence of this step, any other way than by expressing my indifference about all the consequences that may follow. [Hume to Henry Home, February 9, 1748]

The style of the Enquiry is in fact quite different than that of the Treatise. It is much shorter, more informal, and does not aim to present a comprehensive theory of human nature. Its original title – Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding – reflects its place within the 18th century genre of essay writing. That is, it is a collection of twelve loosely related philosophical essays. The underlying theme that ties the twelve essays together is the importance of experience and causal inference in establishing our ideas. Briefly, these are the central themes of the Enquiry’s twelve sections.

1. Of the Different Species of Philosophy: Hume describes two styles of philosophical writing: an easy-reading philosophy grounded in common life, and a difficult-reading philosophy grounded in abstract concepts. He explains the value of both and proposes to mix elements of the two styles in his Enquiry.

2. Of the Origin of Ideas: Hume argues that ideas differ from impressions only by being less lively, and that all ideas are copied from impressions. He concisely states his test for meaning: to see if “a philosophical term is employed without any meaning ... we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?”

3. Of the Association of Ideas: Hume argues that the only three principles of association of ideas are resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Unlike in the Treatise, which describes these as principles of the imagination, here Hume states more generally that they apply in the operations of both the memory and imagination. All editions of the Enquiry except that of 1777 – containing Hume’s final revisions – include a lengthy discussion of the use of associative principles in epic poetry writing and history writing.

4. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding: Hume notes that the objects of the faculty of understanding (or reason) are either relations of ideas or matters of fact. He devotes this section to uncovering the foundations of our reasoning concerning matters of fact. Such reasoning is based on cause and effect relations, which in turn are based on experience, without the aid of reason or our imagination (that is, the fancy). This in turn raises the question of how we make inductive generalizations in experience.

5. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts: Hume goes on to argue that inductive generalizations in experience result from the principle of “custom or habit.” He next examines how belief arises. For Hume, belief is a more vivid conception of an object than we would otherwise have through the imagination (that is, the fancy) alone. The ideas in which we believe become more “intense and steady” through habit and custom. He concludes showing how the principles of association can intensify an idea and thus produce belief.

6. Of Probability: Hume explains the difference between chances and probability. Chances involve situations in which there are at least two possible outcomes, each of which may occur equally. Probability, on the other hand, entails that we have experienced one event to occur more frequently than another. He then shows how belief arises with both chance and probability.

7. Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion: Hume explains the origin of our idea of causal power using his copy thesis. He first argues that necessary connection does not arise from an outward sense impression. Neither does it arise from an internal impression – from, that is, a “reflection on the operations of our own minds;” (Hume here follows Locke’s notion of reflective impressions rather than the notion found in the Treatise). Specifically, it does not arise from reflecting on willed bodily motions encountering a resistive physical force, the willed creation of thoughts, or the experience of God as the true cause (as the Occasionalists claim). Ultimately, the idea of causal power is based on the “customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual [i.e., constantly conjoined] attendant.” He concludes by offering two definitions of causality based on his notion of causal power.

8. Of Liberty and Necessity: Hume defends the necessitarian point of view by arguing that all human actions are caused by antecedent motives. He offers several illustrations of the connection between motives and actions that fit his two definitions of causality. He reconciles necessity with liberty by defining liberty as “a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will” – which is similar to Locke’s definition. Hume notes the criticism that necessity undermines morality since it eliminates moral choice. In response he argues that we rely on necessity to link a person’s actions with his motives and thus pass moral judgment on that person’s actions. He also notes the criticism that necessity forces us to trace all evil human actions back through a causal chain to God. He suggests possible solutions to this problem, but concludes that it is a mystery that human reason is not fit to handle.

9. Of the Reason of Animals: Hume argues that what he has said about cause and effect, induction, habit and belief is confirmed by observing the same processes in animals. In a footnote he lists nine points that distinguish degrees of human intelligence from animal intelligence and that also distinguish the degrees of the reasoning ability of intelligent humans and not-so-intelligent humans.

10. Of Miracles: Hume argues that empirical judgments – including those based on testimony – involve weighing evidence for and against a given claim. According to Hume, the empirical testimony of uniform laws of nature will always outweigh the testimony of any alleged miracle. Hume notes four factors that count against the credibility of most miracle testimonies: the witnesses lack integrity; we have a propensity to sensationalize; miracle testimonies abound in barbarous nations; and miracles support rival religious systems. However, he continues, even the most credible miracle testimonies (which presumably are not decisively weakened by these four factors) are still outweighed by the evidence of consistent laws of nature. Although people typically see miracles as the foundation of their religion, Hume argues that this is unreasonable. He suggests that Christianity in particular is better founded on faith, rather than on miracle testimony. Christianity indeed requires belief in miracles, but such belief should involve an act of faith and not reason.

11. Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State: Originally titled “Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion,” this section presents a fictional conversation in which two characters examine some of the traditional philosophical arguments about the nature and existence of God. The sceptical character principally attacks the design argument and the argument that God rewards or punishes human actions either in this life or the next.

12. Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy: Hume describes different kinds of scepticism, defending some types and rejecting others. He associates Pyrrhonian scepticism with blanket attacks on all reasoning about the external world, abstract reasoning about space and time, or causal reasoning about matters of fact. He argues, though, that we must reject such scepticism since “no durable good can ever result from it.” Instead, Hume recommends a more moderate or Academic scepticism that tempers Pyrrhonism by, first, exercising caution and modesty, and, second, restricting our speculations to abstract reasoning and matters of fact.

In 1757 Hume published a work titled Four Dissertations, the second item in which was titled “Of the Passions.” Hume later incorporated this piece into his Essays and Treatises, and, paralleling the arrangement of the three Books of the Treatise, he placed it between the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. This brief work – titled “Dissertation on the Passions” – is an abbreviated version of much of Book 2 of the Treatise, and many parts of it are taken word for word from that earlier work.

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5. Overview of Early Responses

When Books 1 and 2 of the Treatise appeared in 1739, little immediate interest was shown in it. Hume reflects on this unfortunate fact in “My Own Life”: “Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur among the zealots.” Indeed, it did not generate a flurry of critical responses by pamphleteers or offended clergymen. However, within a year of publication, four reviews of the Treatise did in fact appear in scholarly review journals. All of the reviews were restricted to the contents of Book 1 of the Treatise, with no discussion of Hume’s theory of the passions from Book 2. Only one of these – in The History of the Works of the Learned – was in English, and this was executed by a reviewer who himself admits that he was not philosophically up to the task of grasping a work as complex as the Treatise. The reviewer was severely critical and, among his comments, he argued that the causal proofs for God’s existence are “utterly demolished” by Hume’s rejection of the principle that “whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence.” The reviewer’s point is a recurring theme among Hume’s early critics, and even today some philosophers discuss the extent to which the causal proofs for God’s existence are affected by Hume’s notion of causality. The short review from the German Göttingische Zeitungen was also critical. The French review journal Bibliothèque raisonnée published a generally positive review heavily dependent on Hume’s own Abstract of the Treatise. The French review journal Nouvelle bibliothèque published a neutral review that consisted mainly of a translation of passages from the Treatise.

Aside from review journals, the first early response to Hume’s metaphysical views was a brief article, in 1740, in Common Sense: or the Englishman’s Journal. The anonymous author criticized Hume’s view of necessity for its dangerous implication that our behaviour is beyond our control. In 1745 Hume’s sceptical and antireligious views in the Treatise came under fire when Hume became a candidate for the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. A list of charges drawn up by William Wishart was circulated. These were incorporated into Hume’s response and published as A Letter from a Gentleman by Henry Home in 1745.

The Enquiry first appeared in 1748 and, in “My Own Life,” Hume notes that, like the Treatise, the Enquiry did not at first draw critical attention:

But this piece was at first little more successful than the Treatise of Human Nature. On my return from Italy, I had the mortification to find all England in a ferment, on account of Dr. Middleton’s Free Enquiry, while my performance was entirely overlooked and neglected.

Not only were there no immediate critical responses to the Enquiry, but the work does not appear to have even been reviewed in any British periodical. The absence of such reviews is not surprising since there were no scholarly review journals in Great Britain at the time, and more popular periodicals only sporadically included reviews. Within two years, though, critical responses to “Of Miracles” appeared, and these soon brought notoriety to the Enquiry as a whole. Although the Enquiry was not reviewed in Great Britain, it was in fact reviewed twice in the German Göttingische Zeitungen. The first of these reviews, which appeared in 1749, was favourable, but a review appearing in 1753 was mixed, with especially critical comments on “Of Miracles.”

In 1751 Hume wrote in a letter that he rejected the Treatise as an immature work:

I believe the philosophical Essays [i.e., the Enquiry] contain every thing of Consequence relating to the Understanding, which you woud meet with in the Treatise; & I give you my Advice against reading the latter. By shortening & simplifying the Questions, I really render them much more complete. Addo dum minuo. The philosophical Principles are the same in both: But I was carry’d away by the Heat of Youth & Invention to publish too precipitately. So vast an Undertaking, plan’d before I was one and twenty, & compos’d before twenty five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, & a hundred times. [Hume to Gilbert Eliot, March or April 1751]

Contrary to Hume’s wishes, critical discussions of the Treatise continued to appear with more frequency. One of these was in Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1751) by Henry Home. Although respecting Hume’s philosophical abilities, in this work Home critically discusses Hume’s theory of belief and personal identity.

Around this time Hume became one of the secretaries of the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh, first founded in 1731. He held this post probably until 1763 and during that time was coeditor with Alexander Monro of two volumes of Essays and Observations that were read at the Society’s meetings. The first volume appeared in 1754 and opened with an essay by Henry Home titled “Of the Laws of Motion” (pp. 1–69). The second item in the collection is a critical and somewhat abusive discussion of Home’s essay by John Stewart (d. 1766) titled “Some Remarks on the Laws of Motion, and the Inertia of Matter.” In this essay, Stewart includes a brief paragraph criticizing Hume’s view of causality and personal identity:

That something may begin to exist, or start into being without a cause, hath indeed been advanced in a very ingenious and profound system of the sceptical philosophy; but hath not yet been adopted by any of the societies for the improvement of knowledge. Such sublime conceptions are far above the reach of an ordinary genius; and could not have entered into the head of the greatest physiologist on earth. The man who believes that a perception may subsist without a percipient mind or a perceiver, may well comprehend, that an action may be performed without an agent, or a thing produced without any Cause of the production. And the author of this new and wonderful doctrine informs the world, that, when he looked into his own mind, he could discover nothing but a series of fleeting perceptions; and that from thence he concluded, that he himself was nothing but a bundle of such perceptions. [Pages 70–140]

A note to this paragraph states, “Treatise on Human Nature, 3 vols. octavo. This is the system at large, a work suited only to the comprehension of Adepts. An excellent compend or sum whereof, for the benefit of vulgar capacities, we of this nation enjoy in the Philosophical Essays, and the Essays Moral and Political.”Prior to its publication, Hume read Stewart’s essay and was bothered by Stewart’s contemptuous tone towards both Home and Hume himself. In a letter to Stewart, Hume suggests – and probably bluffs – that as editor of the volume Hume could have equally abused Stewart in the Preface to the work. However, Hume states “I am so great a Lover of Peace, that I am resolv’d to drop this Matter altogether, & not to insert a Syllable in the Preface, which can have a Reference to your Essay.” Hume continues in the letter objecting on philosophical grounds to Stewart’s distortion of Hume’s actual views:

But allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only maintain’d, that our Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source. That Caesar existed, that there is such an Island as Sicily; for these Propositions, I affirm, we have no demonstrative nor intuitive Proof. Woud you infer that I deny their Truth, or even their Certainty? There are many different kinds of Certainty; and some of them as satisfactory to the Mind, tho perhaps not so regular, as the demonstrative kind.

Where a man of Sense mistakes my Meaning, I own I am angry: But it is only at myself: For having exprest my Meaning so ill as to have given Occasion to the Mistake.

In a tone similar to his letter to Elliot above, Hume next tells Stewart that he regrets publishing his Treatise at all:

That you may see I wou’d no way scruple of owning my Mistakes in Argument, I shall acknowledge (what is infinitely more material) a very great Mistake in Conduct, viz my publishing at all the Treatise of human Nature, a Book, which pretended to innovate in all the sublimest Parts of Philosophy, & which I compos’d before I was five & twenty. Above all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book, & which may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth, so much displeases me, that I have not Patience to review it. [Hume to John Stewart, c. February 1754]

Two years after the conflict with Stewart, the Philosophical Society published their second volume of Essays and Observations, which included an essay by Thomas Melvill (1726–1753) titled “Observations on Light and Colours,” which includes a criticism of Hume’s view of the indivisibility of extension. Around the same time John Leland criticized Hume’s view of causality in his A View of the Principal Deistical Writers (1755–1756).

In 1757 Hume’s Four Dissertations appeared; this included his “Dissertation on the Passions.” Although none of the earlier reviews of the Treatise discussed Book 2, three reviews of Four Dissertations discuss “Of the Passions.” Two of the reviews are not very enthusiastic. The Literary Magazine states “The second essay is on the passions, in which, as in the former case, we do not perceive any thing new. This we should not mention if we were not talking of an author fond of novelty.” The Critical Review similarly concludes its discussion by saying, “This whole dissertation, to say the truth, appears to us very trite and superficial; and unworthy of so eminent a writer. But no authors are always equal to themselves.” William Rose’s review in the Monthly Review states more positively that what Hume “says upon the subject, is extremely ingenious, and deserves the philosophical reader’s attentive perusal.”

The publication of Thomas Reid’s An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764) marks a turning point in early discussions of Hume’s metaphysics. Although no less critical of Hume than earlier respondents, Reid nevertheless had deep respect for Hume’s philosophical abilities and saw him as “the greatest Metaphysician of the Age.” According to Reid, Hume’s ruthlessly sceptical philosophy is the logical outcome of a philosophical stance that began with Descartes, and which Reid calls the “theory of ideas.” According to this theory, we do not perceive external things directly, but instead we only experience perceptual images – or “ideas” – of external things. The sceptical consequence of this is that we must question the existence of everything except these perceptual images

– including external objects and even the human mind, which allegedlyhouses these perceptions. And, according to Reid, this is what Hume did. As Reid himself became an important philosophical figure throughout Europe and America, many writers perpetuated his interpretation of Hume. We find, for example, a condensed statement of Reid’s view in the following by George L. Scott:

Locke had admitted matter, spirit, and ideas. By many passages, one would be apt to thing that he saw no absurdity in material Spirit, or in spiritual Matter. Berkeley comes, sees the difficulty, and strikes out matter. Then comes a Paresian Egoist, who strikes out all spirit, but his own. And, lastly, our friend Hume, strikes out even his own spirit, and leaves nothing but Ideas! [George L. Scott to Lord Monboddo, April 3, 1773]

Aside from Reid, in the final two decades of Hume’s life, a variety of other philosophers wrote in reaction to his metaphysical views. Richard Price, in his Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals (1758) criticizes Hume’s discussion of induction in the Treatise. Joseph Highmore published a brief essay against Hume’s view of necessity in his Essays, Moral, Religious, and Miscellaneous (1766). Scottish philosophers were particularly interested in responding to Hume. James Balfour’s Philosophical Essays (1768) criticizes Hume’s view of academic scepticism and necessary connection. In his Appeal to Common Sense (1766–1772), James Oswald attacks a variety of sceptical and anti-religious themes within Hume’s writings. The most prominent critic of this period was James Beattie who devoted a large portion of his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770) to refuting many of Hume’s philosophical views. In the first volume of his Origin and Progress of Language (1773) James Burnett, Lord Monboddo criticized Hume’s distinction between ideas and impressions.

Although Hume’s Enquiry was the most common target of attack by these philosophers, some also pointed their guns at offending portions of the Treatise. Near the close of his life in 1775, Hume composed an advertisement to the second half of his collected philosophical works, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, in which he officially denounced his Treatise, and expressed his wish to be remembered on the basis of his Essays and Treatises:

Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, were published in a work in three volumes, called A Treatise of Human Nature: A work which the Author had projected before he left College, and which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it successful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces, where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected. Yet several writers who have honoured the Author’s Philosophy with answers, have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work, which the author never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair-dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical artifices which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorised to employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles.

Hume offers here an inaccurate chronology as to when he projected the Treatise. Hume “left college” at around age 14, and, according to his letter to Elliot, he began his work on the Treatise at age 21. The change in chronology is apparently in effort to distance himself from the Treatise into an increasingly remote past. Hume here refers to “several writers” who attacked the views found in the Treatise. Of the early critics listed so far, Reid and Beattie come the closest to matching Hume’s description of writers who have directed “all their batteries against that juvenile work.” In spite of Hume’s public disavowal, philosophers continued to challenge the views of the Treatise. In the first two volumes of his Ancient Metaphysics (1779, 1782), Monboddo continued his attack on Hume. Reid similarly developed his criticisms of Hume in his two great works, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788). Joseph Priestley, who throughout his voluminous writings regularly comments on Hume, had mixed views of Hume’s metaphysics. In his Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever (1780), Priestley attacked the Enquiry section by section, hoping to put Hume’s unjustified fame in proper perspective. On the other hand, in his Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (1777), Priestley largely endorsed Hume’s view of necessity and in the preface to that work recommends to readers “some things very well written on it by Mr. Hume, and Lord Kaims.” Priestley’s defence of necessity was so successful that it overshadowed Hume’s view in the free will and determinism debate in the late 18th century. An exception to this, though, was James Gregory’s Philosophical and Literary Essays (1792), which, in a 300 page introductory essay, attacks Hume’s account of necessity. In his Illustrations of Mr. Hume’s Essay Concerning Liberty and Necessity (1795), John Allen defends Hume against Gregory.

As the 19th century approached, philosophers narrowed their interest in Hume’s metaphysics largely to his notion of causality. We see this in George Gleig’s article on “Metaphysics” in the third edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica (1797), Henry James Richter’s article “Hume’s View of Necessary Connection” in the Monthly Magazine (1797), and Richard Kirwan’s Remarks (1801). Two events around this time drew further interest to Hume’s view of causality. The first is Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which by 1800 was gaining notice in Great Britain. In the Critique and later in the Prolegomena (1783), Kant describes his metaphysical system as an attempt to answer the problem that Hume raised about causality. This sparked immediate interest in Hume’s theory within Germany. Although it was some time before Kant’s writings were translated into English, a few primers on Kant appeared in English and these drew attention to Kant’s intellectual debt to Hume. One of these was A.F.M. Willich’s Elements of the Critical Philosophy (1798), which translates Kant’s discussion of Hume in the Prolegomena.

The second event surrounding interest in Hume’s theory of causality was political in nature. In 1805, Scottish scientist John Leslie was a candidate for the chair of Mathematics at the University of Edinburgh. Several local clergy who opposed Leslie’s appointment exploited the fact that he endorsed Hume’s view of causality, a view which they believed undermined the causal proof for God’s existence. Two prominent Scottish philosophers came to Leslie’s rescue and published works defending Hume’s view of causality. Dugald Stewart published a pamphlet titled A Short Statement of Some Important Facts, Relative to the Late Election of a Mathematical Professor in the Univ. of Edinburgh (1805). In this Stewart lists respected scholars who adopted Hume’s view of causality and notes that “I found that the passage [on causality] objected to contained nothing… but what I myself, and many others much wiser and better than me, had openly avowed as their opinions.” Thomas Brown also published several pamphlets during the controversy, and compiled a two-volume collection titled Tracts, Historical and Philosophical... Respecting the Election of Mr. Leslie to the Professorship of Mathematics (1806). A year later, Brown greatly expanded one of his pamphlets as Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume (1806). Brown’s work is an insightful and sophisticated early discussion of Hume’s view of causality, of great merit even by contemporary standards. Brown’s Humean view of causality was adopted by physician William Lawrence in his Lectures on physiology (1817).

Amidst the dominant focus on his view of causality, occasional discussions of other topics in Hume appeared. Thomas Cogan, in his Treatise on the Passions (1807), criticized different aspects of Hume’s theory of the passions. Cogan also published a section-by-section critical commentary of Hume’s Enquiry in his Ethical Questions (1817). Dugald Stewart discussed Hume’s account of why we venerate the past in Philosophical Essays (1810) and Hume’s scepticism in Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy (1821). In Biographia Literaria (1817), Samuel Taylor Coleridge drew attention to the similarities between the views of Aquinas and Hume on the association of ideas, and thereby sparked a discussion in Blackwood’s Magazine (1818). Thomas Brown also discussed Hume’s principles of association in Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1820).

By the middle of the 19th century, two short books devoted to Hume’s theory of causality had appeared, namely, Mary Shepherd’s Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824) and George Tucker’s Essay on Cause and Effect (1850). Although both of these works are critical of Hume’s theory, the Humean view of causality became more widely adopted in other metaphysical discussions of causality. For example, although Mill does not mention Hume by name, he nevertheless clearly espouses a Humean conception of causality in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy:

And how, or by what evidence does experience testify to it [the causation hypothesis]? Not by disclosing any nexus between the cause and effect, any sufficient reason in the cause itself why the effect should follow it. No philosopher now makes this supposition, and Sir W. Hamilton positively disclaims it. What experience makes known is the fact of an invariable sequence between every event and some special combination of antecedent conditions, in such sort that wherever and whenever that union of antecedents exists the event does not fail to occur. [Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, 26]

The Humean view of causality received an additional boost from Auguste Comte (1798-1857) in his six-volume Cours de philosophie positive (The Positive Philosophy) (1830–1842). At the outset of that work, Comte acknowledges Hume as one of his precursors. In an 1868 discussion of Comte’s work, the Edinburgh Review explains more precisely how Hume fully anticipated Comte’s positivism:

This is the method of Positive inquiry now universally recognised in every department of science, although as yet imperfectly carried out in some. It was formally announced by Bacon, and is commonly associated with his name, although in truth it was but imperfectly understood and applied by that great teacher of Method. It received definite impulse from the speculations of Hume, who, carrying to their legitimate conclusions the philosophy of his day, showed that we could get nothing from nature, or sense-experience, but ideas of coexistence and a succession; or, in other words, of facts, and the sequences which connect them; and who attempted to prove that this was equally true of the world of mind as of matter. From the one realm as well as the other he cast out all ideas of substance and cause, and left nothing but phenomena and their relations of association. Hume is, therefore, the principal precursor of Comte, as he himself acknowledges. He anticipated to the full the fundamental principle of the Comtean philosophy. He did more than this. For he saw clearly the use that could be made of it polemically; the sceptical or negative bearings of the principle are equally to be found in his writings. So far, therefore, there is nothing original in Positivism. The Scottish sceptic had already anticipated the nature of its attacks against theological philosophy. [Edinburgh Review, April 1868, Vol. 127, p. 322]

As history of philosophy survey books appeared in the second half of the 19th century, Hume found a place in the development of metaphysics, typically standing between the great figures of Berkeley and Kant. An example of this is George Henry Lewes’s Biographical History of Philosophy (1873), which devotes a lengthy chapter to Hume. Discussions of Hume also appeared in more specialized histories of philosophy, such as James McCosh’s The Scottish Philosophy (1875) and Leslie Stephen’s History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (1876).

Towards the end of the 19th century, academic writings in the history of philosophy became more “scholarly” in the sense that we understand that term today. T.H. Green wrote a detailed, 400-page study of Hume’s Treatise, which was published as an introduction to the edition of Hume’s Works (1874), edited by Green and Thomas Grose. Shortly after, three introductory books on Hume’s philosophy appeared that contained chapters on Hume’s metaphysics, namely, Thomas Huxley’s Hume (1879), William Knight’s Hume (1886), and Henry Calderwood’s David Hume (1898). As academic philosophy journals emerged, scholarly articles on Hume appeared, such as those by J.A. Cain (1885) and William W. Carlile (1896).

2. Summary of Treatise Book 1

In his short autobiography, “My Own Life,” Hume notes that he composed his Treatise in his mid-twenties while on retreat for three years in France. It is a long and complex book that systematically re-thinks a wide range of philosophical issues. The first two books of the Treatise appeared simultaneously in 1739. We will briefly look at some of the major themes in both books.

Book 1, titled “Of the Understanding,” opens analysing various categories of mental events, which roughly follow this scheme:

Perceptions

A. Ideas

1. From memory
2. From imagination

a. From fancy
b. From understanding

(1) Involving relations of ideas
(2) Involving matters of fact

B. Impressions

1. Of sensation (external)
2. Of reflection (internal)

He first divides all mental perceptions between ideas (thoughts) and impressions (sensations and feelings), and then makes two central claims about the relation between ideas and impressions. First, adopting what is commonly called Hume’s copy thesis, he argues that all ideas are ultimately copied from impressions. That is, for any idea we select, we can trace the component parts of that idea to some external sensation or internal feeling. This claim places Hume squarely in the empiricist tradition, and throughout Book 1 he uses this principle as a test for determining the content of an idea under consideration. Second, adopting what we may call Hume’s liveliness thesis, he argues that ideas and impressions differ only in terms of liveliness. For example, my impression of a tree is simply more vivid than my idea of that tree. His early critics pointed out an important implication of the liveliness thesis, which Hume himself presumably hides. Most modern philosophers held that ideas reside in our spiritual minds, whereas impressions originate in our physical bodies. So, when Hume blurs the distinction between ideas and impressions, he is ultimately denying the spiritual nature of ideas and instead grounding them in our physical nature. In short, these critics argue that, for Hume, all of our mental operations – including our most rational ideas – are physical in nature.

Hume next notes that there are several mental faculties that are responsible for producing our various ideas. He initially divides ideas between those produced by the memory, and those produced by the imagination. The memory is a faculty that conjures up ideas based on experiences as they happened. For example, the memory I have of my drive to the store is a comparatively accurate copy of my previous sense impressions of that experience. The imagination, by contrast, is a faculty that breaks apart and combines ideas, thus forming new ones. He uses the familiar example of a golden mountain: this idea is a combination of an idea of gold and an idea of a mountain. As our imagination chops up and forms new ideas, it is directed by three principles of association, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. For example, by virtue of resemblance, the sketch of a person leads me to an idea of that actual person. The ideas of the imagination are further divided between two categories. Some imaginative ideas represent flights of the fancy, such as the idea of a golden mountain; other imaginative ideas, though, represent solid reasoning, such as predicting the trajectory of a thrown ball. The fanciful ideas are derived from the faculty of the fancy, and are the source of fantasies, superstitions, and bad philosophy. By contrast, the good ideas are derived from the faculty of the understanding – or reason – and roughly involve either mathematical demonstration or factual predictions. Hume notes that, when we imaginatively exercise our understanding, our minds are guided by seven philosophical or “reasoning” relations, which are divided as follows:

Principles of reasoning concerning relations of ideas (yielding demonstration): (1) resemblance, (2) contrariety, (3) degrees in quality, and (4) proportions in quantity or number

Principles of reasoning concerning matters of fact (yielding judgments of probability): (5) identity, (6) relations in time and place, and (7) causation

Armed with the above conceptual distinctions, he turns his attention to an array of standard philosophical problems. As he examines them one by one, he repeatedly does three things. First, he sceptically argues that we are unable to gain complete knowledge of some important philosophical notion under consideration. Second, he shows more positively how the understanding gives us a very limited idea of the notion under consideration. Third, he explains how some erroneous views of that notion are grounded in the fancy, and he accordingly recommends that we reject those ideas. For convenience, we will follow this three-part scheme as we consider Hume’s discussions.

Space. (1) On the topic of space, Hume argues that we have no ideas of infinitely divisible space (1.2.2.2). (2) When accounting for the idea we do have of space, he argues that “the idea of space is convey’d to the mind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor does any thing ever appear extended, that is not either visible or tangible” (1.2.3.15). Further, he argues that these objects – which are either visible or tangible – are composed of finite atoms or corpuscles, which are themselves “endow’d with colour and solidity.” These impressions are then “comprehended” or conceived by the imagination; it is from the structuring of these impressions that we obtain our idea of space. (3) In contrast to this idea of space, Hume argues that we frequently presume to have an idea of space that lacks visibility or solidity. He accounts for this erroneous notion in terms of a mistaken association that people naturally make between visual and tactile space (1.2.5.21).

Time. (1) Hume’s treatment of our idea of time is like his treatment of the idea of space. He first maintains that we have no idea of infinitely divisible time (1.2.4.1). (2) He then notes Locke’s point that our minds operate at a range of speeds that are “fix’d by the original nature and constitution of the mind, and beyond which no influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought” (1.2.3.7). The idea of time, then, is not a simple idea derived from a simple impression; instead, it is a copy of impressions as they are perceived by the mind at its fixed speed (1.2.3.10). (3) In contrast to this account of time, he argues that we frequently entertain a faulty notion of time that does not involve change or succession. The psychological account of this erroneous view is that we mistake time for the cause of succession instead of seeing it as the effect (1.2.5.29).

Necessary connection between causes and effects. (1) Hume sceptically argues that we cannot get an idea of necessary connection through abstraction or by observing it through sensory experiences (1.3.14.12 ff.). (2) The idea we have of necessary connection arises as follows: we experience a constant conjunction of events A and B – that is, repeated sense experiences where events resembling A are always followed by events resembling B. This produces a habit such that upon any further appearance of A, we expect B to follow. This, in turn, produces an internal feeling “to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant,” which is the impression from which the idea of necessary connection is copied (1.3.14.20). (3) A common but mistaken notion on this topic is that necessity resides within the objects themselves. He explains this mistaken belief by the natural tendency we have to impute subjectively perceived qualities to objects (1.3.14.24).

External objects. (1) Hume’s sceptical claim here is that we have no conception of the existence of external objects (1.2.6.9). (2) Nevertheless, he argues, we do have an unavoidable “vulgar” or common belief in the continued existence of objects, and this idea he accounts for. His explanation is lengthy, but involves the following features. Perceptions of objects are disjointed and have no unity of themselves (1.4.2.29). In an effort to organize our perceptions, we first naturally assume that there is no distinction between our perceptions and the objects that are perceived (this is the so-called “vulgar” view of perception). We then conflate all ideas (of perceptions), which put our minds in similar dispositions (1.4.2.33); that is, we associate resembling ideas and attribute identity to their causes. Consequently, we naturally feign the continued and external existence of the objects (or perceptions) that produced these ideas (1.4.2.35). Lastly, we go on to believe in the existence of these objects because of the force of the resemblance between ideas (1.4.2.36). Although this belief is philosophically unjustified, Hume feels he has given an accurate account of how we inevitably arrive at the idea of external existence. (3) In contrast to the previous explanation of this idea, he recommends that we doubt a more sophisticated but erroneous notion of existence – the so-called philosophical view – which distinguishes between perceptions and external objects that cause perceptions. The psychological motivation for accepting this view is this: our imagination tells us that resembling perceptions have a continued existence, yet our reflection tells us that they are interrupted. Appealing to both forces, we ascribe interruption to perceptions and continuance to objects (1.4.2.52).

Personal identity. (1) Hume’s sceptical claim on this issue is that we have no experience of a simple, individual impression that we can call the self (1.4.6.2) – where the “self” is the totality of a person’s conscious life. (2) Nevertheless, we do have an idea of personal identity that must be accounted for. He begins his explanation of this idea by noting that our perceptions are fleeting, and he concludes from this that all we are is a bundle of different perceptions (1.4.6.4). Because of the associative principles, though, the resemblance or causal connection within the chain of our perceptions gives rise to an idea of oneself, and memory extends this idea past our immediate perceptions (1.4.6.18 ff.). (3) A common abuse of the notion of personal identity occurs when the idea of a soul or unchanging substance is added to give us a stronger or more unified concept of the self (1.4.6.6).

In all of these discussions, Hume performs an interesting balancing act between making sceptical attacks (step 1) and offering positive theories (step 2). In the conclusion to Book 1, though, he appears to elevate his scepticism to a higher level and exposes the inherent contradictions in even his best philosophical theories. He notes three such contradictions. One centres around what we call induction. Our judgments based on past experience all contain elements of doubt; we are then impelled to make a judgment about that doubt, and – since this too is based on past experience – this in turn will produce a new doubt. Once again, though, we are impelled to make a judgment about this second doubt, and the cycle continues. He concludes that “no finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated in infinitum.” A second contradiction involves a conflict between two theories of external perception – our natural inclination to direct realism vs. the copy theory of perception of philosophers. The third contradiction involves a conflict between causal reasoning and belief in the continued existence of matter. After listing these contradictions, Hume despairs over the failure of his metaphysical reasoning:

The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. [1.4.7.8]

He then subdues his despair by recognizing that nature forces him to set aside his philosophical speculations and return to the normal activities of common life. He recognizes, though, that in time he will be drawn back into philosophical speculation in order to attack superstition and educate the world.


3. Summary of the Treatise Book 2

Book 2 of the Treatise is a study of impressions of reflection, in contrast with impressions of sensation. Locke had discussed ideas of reflection as “being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself” (Essay 2.2.4). For Locke, these are introspective experiences of our mental faculties such as remembering, willing, discerning, reasoning, and judging. Immediately parting company with Locke, reflective impressions for Hume are passions – that is, emotions – and not introspective experiences of our mental faculties. Book 2 is largely a study of the various passions.

Hume opens Book 2 offering a taxonomy of types of passions, which we may outline here:

Reflective Impressions

1. Calm (reflective pleasures and pains)
2. Violent

a. Direct (desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, fear)
b. Indirect (love, hate, pride, humility)

Hume initially divides passions between the calm and the violent. He concedes that this distinction is somewhat fuzzy, but he explains that people commonly distinguish between types of passions in terms of their degrees of forcefulness. Adding more precision to this common distinction, for Hume calm passions are emotional feelings of pleasure and pain associated with moral and aesthetic judgments. For example, according to Hume, when I see a person commit a horrible deed, I will experience a feeling of pain. When I view a good work of art, I will experience a feeling of pleasure.

In contrast to the calm passions, violent ones constitute the bulk of our emotions, and violent passions divide between direct and indirect passions. For Hume, “direct passions” are so called because they arise immediately – without complex reflection on our part – whenever we see something good or bad. For example, if I consider an unpleasant thing, such as being burglarised, then I will feel the passion of aversion. The key direct passions are desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, and fear. He suggests that sometimes these passions are sparked instinctively – as by, for example, my desire for food when I am hungry. Others, though, are not connected with instinct and are more the result of social conditioning. There is an interesting logic to the six direct passions, which Hume borrowed from a tradition that can be traced to ancient Greek Stoicism. We can diagram the relation between the six with this chart:

When good/bad objects are considered abstractly

desire (towards good objects)
aversion (towards evil objects)

When good/bad objects are actually present

joy (towards good objects)
grief (towards evil objects)

When good/bad objects are only anticipated

hope (towards good objects)
fear (towards evil objects)

Compare, for example, the passions that I will experience regarding winning the lottery vs. having my house burglarized. Suppose that I consider them purely in the abstract – or “consider’d simply” as Hume says (2.3.9.6). I will then desire to win the lottery and have an aversion towards being burglarized. Suppose that both situations are actually before me; I will then experience joy over winning the lottery and sorrow over being burglarized. Suppose, finally, that I know that at some unknown time in the future I will win the lottery and be burglarized. I will then experience hope regarding the lottery and fear of being burglarized.

Hume devotes most of Book 2 to an analysis of the indirect passions, and this analysis is his unique contribution to theories of the passions. The four principal passions are love, hate, pride, and humility. These passions are called “indirect” since they are the secondary effects of a previous feeling of pleasure and pain. Suppose, for example, that I paint a picture, which gives me a feeling of pleasure. Since I am the artist, I will then experience an additional feeling of pride. Hume explains in great detail the psychological process that triggers indirect passions such as pride. Specifically, he notes that these passions arise from a double relation between ideas and impressions, which we can illustrate here with the passion of pride:

(1) I have an initial idea of some possession (or "subject"), such as my painting, and this idea gives me pleasure.
(2) Through the associative principle of resemblance, I then immediately associate this feeling of pleasure with a resembling feeling of pride; this association constitutes the first relation in the double relation.
(3) This feeling of pride then causes me to have an idea of myself (as the "object" of pride).
(4) Through some associative principle such as causality, I then associate the idea of myself with the idea of my painting (which is the "subject" of my pride); this association constitutes the second relation in the double relation.

According to Hume, the three other principal indirect passions arise in parallel ways. For example, if my painting is ugly and causes me pain, then I will experience the secondary passion of “humility” – perhaps more accurately expressed as humiliation. By contrast, if someone else paints a pleasing picture, then this will trigger in me a feeling of “love” for that artist – perhaps more accurately expressed as esteem, which is another term that Hume uses. If the artist paints a painfully ugly picture, then this will trigger in me a feeling of “hatred” towards the artist – perhaps more accurately expressed as disesteem.

The most lasting contribution of Book 2 of the Treatise is Hume’s argument that human actions must be prompted by passion, and never can be motivated by reason. Thus, Hume concludes that “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” (2.3.3.4). Looking more closely at the motivations behind our actions, he the issue of liberty and necessity, and he comes down strongly on the side of necessity. Hume’s discussion here follows the three-step scheme that he used in Book 1. (1) He rejects the notion of liberty that denies necessity and causes (2.3.1.18). (2) He then argues that all mental or physical actions produced by the will arise from antecedent motives, tempers, and circumstances (2.3.1.5 ff.). Making use of his definitions of causality, he argues that these motives produce actions (mental or physical) that have the same causal necessity that we observe in external objects. (3) Lastly, he explains why people commonly believe in an uncaused will (2.3.2.1 ff.). Among other causes of this mistaken belief is the fact that people erroneously believe that they have an experience of liberty owing to a mistaken association: first, people have an idea of liberty (or lack of determination); next, when performing actions they experience a “looseness” which resembles their idea of liberty.

Pada sub judulnya, bahkan dikatakan kurang lebih begini,

"Ini semua adalah tentang bagaimana dan mengapa, nyaris segala yang Anda terima sebagai bahan pelajaran, di sepanjang hidup Anda, di sekolah, di rumah, dan di manapun, dari guru manapun, justru membangun tembok besar yang makin tinggi dan tebal, yang menjadi penghalang utama Anda mencapai kesuksesan."

Bapak dan Ibu sekalian yang budiman, ulasan berikut ini bisa memperjelas berbagai fenomena di atas. Dan seperti yang sudah Saya ingatkan, semua ini sangat mungkin bisa membuat Anda mengalami shock
berat.

KESALAHAN MENDASAR TENTANG ACTION

Kesalahan itu adalah, Anda sudah terlanjur meyakini - di sepanjang hidup Anda - bahwa Anda akan mencapai apapun yang Anda inginkan dengan melakukan tindakan. Alias, Anda meyakini bahwa untuk mencapai sukses, Anda harus bertindak.

Inilah kenyataannya:

Keyakinan Anda itu justru menciptakan yang sebaliknya.

Dalam konteks ini, Anda telah menomorduakan kekuatan pikiran. 90% orang, ternyata bertindak dalam rangka mengkompensasi berbagai bentuk pemikiran yang tidak tepat.

Maksudnya, nyaris setiap tindakan yang Anda lakukan selama ini, adalah didorong oleh motivasi untuk struggle. Untuk selamat dan untuk survive.

Artinya:

Nyaris setiap tindakan yang Anda lakukan, sumbernya adalah ketakutan, kekhawatiran, dan keragu-raguan.

Dalam hal ini, Anda telah memaksa pikiran untuk terealisasikan dalam
bentuk nyata melalui berbagai tindakan. Jika keputusan Anda untuk bertindak lebih dominan, maka apa yang akan menjadi fokus Anda adalah doing. Dan Anda menjadi lupa akan satu hal, yaitu being.

Apa yang akan tercipta dari pemikiran seperti itu, adalah sesuatu yang menyimpang dari tujuan awalnya. Anda merasa akan berbahagia dengan menjadi kaya. Tapi yang tercipta adalah; Anda memang menjadi kaya, tapi tidak berbahagia.

Being, adalah syarat pertama dan paling penting di dalam proses penciptaan.

Ketahuilah bahwa segala sesuatu diciptakan dua kali. Pertama dalam bentuk blue print, dan kedua saat direalisasi menjadi nyata.

Sebuah bangunan diciptakan dua kali, pertama saat di atas kertas dan kedua saat pembangunan fisik. Di atas kertas, arsitek bangunan itu tidak akan pernah menggambarkan proyeksi bangunan, dengan asumsi bahwa bangunan itu akan segera roboh.

Saat Anda menggambar
"blue print" di dalam kepala, Anda bisa menggambarkan diri Anda sebagai orang yang super kaya misalnya. Tentunya, Anda tidak akan pernah menggambarkan bahwa di samping kekayaan itu, diri Anda juga tidak berbahagia.

Jadi, semuanya harus dimulai dengan being pada saat ini juga. Mulailah dengan berbahagia. Peganglah itu dengan kuat. Setelah itu, barulah Anda mulai melangkah untuk memanifestasikan bahagia dalam bentuk "menjadi orang kaya". Bukan sebaliknya, "pokoknya Saya mau kaya!" dan menomorduakan bahagia.

Bukankah urutannya adalah being, doing, baru kemudian having?

Ingatlah bahwa kaya tidak sama dengan bahagia. Untuk keduanya, Anda akan mengejar "having". Kaya sekaligus bahagia. Kaya boleh nanti, tapi bahagia? Rugi besar jika Anda menundanya. Dan jika Anda menundanya, maka ia akan segera terlepas dari Anda seumur hidup. Anda akan kaya, tapi Anda tak akan pernah berbahagia. Mengapa demikian?


INILAH RAHASIANYA

Bukanlah tindakan Anda yang menciptakan sesuatu, tapi niat Anda.

Anda akan bisa meminimalisir tindakan Anda (sehingga Anda lebih santai dan rileks), dengan berfokus pada semangat dan cita-cita - yang dibentuk oleh niat, sampai Anda merasa sudah waktunya untuk bertindak. Sehingga, tindakan itu nantinya tidak dilakukan dengan drive rasa takut, kekhawatiran, dan keragu-raguan. Saya pribadi menyebut ini dengan konsep "TUNGGULAH GONGNYA".

Bagaimana supaya kita bertindak setelah bunyi "gong" dan tidak mendahuluinya?

Fokuslah pada apa yang Anda inginkan, dan bukan pada apa yang tidak Anda inginkan.

Dengan fokus itu, Anda akan tahu kapan harus bertindak. Dan saat tindakan itu dieksekusi, maka semuanya akan terasa ringan dan tidak menjadi beban.

Di titik itulah, Anda akan berangkat dari titik departure yang benar, yaitu bertindak
bukan dengan dasar rasa takut, khawatir, ragu, atau bahkan hanya sekedar ingin cari selamat alias struggle, melainkan dengan dasar semangat, cita-cita, dan enjoyment. Maka, seluruh alam semesta akan mulai mendukung Anda, dan memberi jalan yang mulus di hadapan Anda.

UJI KELAYAKAN SEBELUM BERTINDAK

Jika Anda sudah fokus pada semangat dan cita-cita, tapi Anda masih merasa grogi dan tidak percaya diri, Anda belum siap bertindak.

Jika Anda paksakan, semua tindakan Anda akan berubah menjadi beban. Padahal, Anda bisa bertindak tanpa beban, tanpa penghalang, dan tanpa rasa sakit. Sesungguhnyalah, Anda bisa bertindak nothing to lose. Alias Ikhlas. And that's fun of course.

Mendasarkan diri semata-mata pada tindakan, adalah tidak tepat. Tindakan Anda harus dibarengi dengan rasa tanpa beban. Menyenangkan dan nothing to lose. Hanya itulah yang akan membuat lingkungan dan alam semesta mendukung
Anda.

Anda harus memperbaiki konsepsi tentang "no pain, no gain". Mengapa? Karena "pain" Anda semestinya berproporsi benar. Memang harus ada "pain", tapi itu tidak berarti bahwa semua bentuk "pain" harus Anda alami terlebih dahulu. "Pain" Anda haruslah worthed dengan "gain" yang Anda cita-citakan.

Jika Anda salah memahami konsep "no pain, no gain" ini, maka tindakan Anda hanya akan berbentuk struggle dan cari selamat saja.
Dan:

Anytime You are struggling, You are miscreating.

Jika Anda bertindak untuk struggle dan cari selamat saja, maka Anda akan sangat fokus pada "menghindari sesuatu". Ketahuilah, "sesuatu" yang Anda hindari itulah yang justru akan Anda dapatkan!

Ini menjelaskan fenomena masyarakat miskin di berbagai belahan dunia, yang terus bekerja keras siang dan malam, tapi nasibnya tidak berubah. Mereka, sebenarnya bisa merubah nasib dengan "hanya" merubah niatnya.


Bukankah Anda juga melihat, mereka yang tadinya di bawah, memang terbukti berubah nasibnya dengan merubah niatnya? Lihatlah perubahan nasib pengrajin, yang tercipta karena pergeseran niat dari "mencari sesuap nasi" menjadi "berbagi keindahan". Lihatlah pemenang Kalpataru. Lihatlah penerima penghargaan UKM. Lihatlah fenomena Grameen Bank. Mereka, telah merubah nasibnya dengan merubah niatnya.

Apa berikutnya?

Tindakan itu perlu, tapi ketahuilah bahwa tindakan adalah komponen terakhir di dalam proses penciptaan.

Tindakan tidak dapat dijadikan sebagai inisiator dari hasil. Inisiasi adalah fungsi dari being, thought, baru kemudian action. Dengan kata lain, inisiatif-lah yang menentukan hasil. Maka, di sini Anda mungkin perlu memperbaiki konsep tentang inisiatif. Inisiatif bukan hanya ide. Inisiatif adalah paket lengkap dari being, thought, dan action. Inisiatif akan menciptakan vibrasi.

Alam
semesta ini adalah vibrasi. Setiap atom dan molekul alam semesta bervibrasi. Atom dan molekul di tubuh Anda juga. Pikiran Anda juga. Pikiran Anda punya frekuensi listrik seperti juga gelombang radio. Dan teori modern telah membuktikan bahwa gelombang itu termanifestasi secara fisik sebagai atom, molekul, dan partikel. Alias, punya bentuk materi juga.

Di dalam alam semesta ini, segala sesuatu diciptakan untuk bisa saling harmoni sehingga seimbang dan tidak hancur. Dengan harmonisasi vibrasi itu, alam semesta bergerak dan berubah. Dengan harmonisasi itu berbagai proses penciptaan lanjutan berlangsung. Termasuk, apapun yang menjadi cita-cita Anda, baik fisik maupun non fisik.

Maka sebelum bertindak, bertanyalah terlebih dahulu pada diri Anda sendiri:

"Bagaimana Saya bervibrasi, harmoniskah dengan vibrasi alam semesta?"

"Sesuaikah dengan tujuan dari penciptaan diri Saya?"

"Sesuaikah dengan tujuan dari penciptaan alam
semesta?"


Bagaimana Anda bisa mengetahui dan mengatakannya? Anda bisa mengetahui dan mengatakannya dengan bertanya pada perasaan Anda. Lebih tinggi lagi, bertanyalah kepada nurani dan kalbu Anda.

Apa yang Anda rasakan, akan menentukan apa yang akan Anda tarik.

Dengan hanya berfokus pada apa yang Anda inginkan sesuai perasaan, nurani, dan kalbu Anda, maka alam semesta akan menciptakan satu set situasi dan keadaan khusus, di mana Anda akan bisa bertindak dengan ringan dan tanpa beban, dengan sebuah jaminan akan kesuksesan.

Setting situasi dan keadaan khusus itu, pasti tercipta bersama dengan apapun yang menjadi niat Anda. Alias, setting itu netral sifatnya. Begitulah hukum universalnya.

Dengan kata lain, semudah Anda jatuh, gagal, dan tidak sukses, semudah itu pula sebenarnya, Anda bisa bangkit, berhasil, dan menuai sukses, tanpa perlu terlalu ngoyo dan tergopoh-gopoh, apalagi kemaruk.


KESIMPULAN

Hasil Anda tidak ditentukan oleh tindakan Anda. Hasil Anda, ditentukan oleh niat Anda.

Saya Ingin Anda Sukses,
Saya Harus Membuat Anda Sukses.
(Ini niat Saya.)

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Landmarks in the History of Ontology

Ibn-Sina (Avicenna) on the Subject and the Object of Metaphysics

INTRODUCTION

"Ibn Sina (Arabic), also known as Avicenna (Latin) and Abu Ali Sina (Persian) was the most original and systematic Muslim philosopher. In this light he is mentioned by two celebrated historians of medieval western philosophy: A. Maurer states, "...his [ibn Sina's] philosophy is a highly personal achievement, ranking among the greatest in the history of philosophy;" and F. Copleston holds, "The greatest Muslim philosopher of the eastern group without doubt is Avicenna or ibn Sina (980-1037), the real creator of a scholastic system in the Islamic world." (1) Y. Mahdavi lists 244 texts attributed to him and G. A. Anawati lists 270. (2) These works envelop a multiplicity of topics such as metaphysics, poetics, animal physiology, minerals, rhetoric, mechanics of solids, Arabic syntax, meteorology, mystical treatises, and a medical treatise, and are translated into more than nineteen languages. The crown of his philosophical corpus is a set of encyclopedic collections of treatises, especially al-Shif , al-Najàt, al-Isharatwa al-Tanbihàt and the Danish Nameh; each collection contains elaborate philosophical treatises on metaphysics, physics, psychology, and logic. A standard edition of the logical texts of al-Shifa' alone comprises more than one sixteen hundred double size (1600) pages. (3)

(...)

Contemporary philosophies of logical syntax of a language distinguish between two types of primitives-one, designative types of sign, the other, rules for transformation, designation, and interpretation, and these distinctions can be applied to ibn Sina's system.

Ibn Sina's two primordial notions of the soul are `being' (hasti, wujûd) and the modalities [of necessity (wajib), contingency (mumkin) and impossibility (mumtani )]. The notion of being is the core of his system, while the modalities specify the subset of beings that are existents. The notion of `being' concatenated with `necessity' point to `the necessary being;' using the second version of the ontological argument, `necessary being' results in `the Necessary Existent.' The notion of `being' concatenated with `contingency' has two possible results: (a) if there is a cause for the case in question, then the contingency is an actual existent-for example, in the case of `being a human,' persons are existents because they have parents; (b) in the case of absence of the cause, the results are non-actual contingencies such as unicorns. `Impossibility' and `being' lead to no existent, as illustrated by `round squares,' and `the largest number.' The key notions of ibn Sina's system are very clear:'Being-qua-being' (hasti, wujûd) corresponds to Aristotle's notion of `being-qua -being' in Metaphysica 1002a 20 (τ ν ν) and E. Moody's r eading of Ockham's use of `ens' in Summa Totius Logicae. (4) It signifies the most determinable concept. 'Non-being' is meaningless. We should note that all mental concepts (actual or not actual) signify a being. For this reason `being' is different from `existent'.

`Existent' (mawjûd) signifies actual entities, Aristotle's notion of first substance (προτε οσια). There are no impossible existents. For ibn Sina there is only one Necessary existent, which is the ultimate cause of generation of other existents. `Existence' itself is not an existent, but signifies those entities which are neither uncaused 'contingent beings' nor `impossible entities.'`Essence,' (mahyya) is used by ibn Sina in the sense of "ti esti" and in the secondary sense of "ousia" employed by Aristotle. (5) An existent partakes of an essence; for example, the feature of a basket-hall can be discussed in terms of the formal properties of a sphere. An unrealized entity such as a unicorn may have an essence but no existence."

(1) A. Maurer - Medieval philosophy - New York, 1962, p. 94; F. Copleston - A history of philosophy - New York, 1962, vol. II pt. 1 p. 215.

(2) Y. Mahdavi - Bibliographie d'ibn Sina - Tehran, 1954; G. C. Anawati - Essai de bibliographie avicennienne - Cairo, 1950 [these bibliographies are in Arabic]

(3) Al-Shifa'Al-Mantiq - ed. I. Madkour, et al. 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960).

(4) See A. Moody - The logic of William of Ockham - New York, 1965 p. 137

(5) See P. Morewedge - The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sina) - p. 313.

From: Parviz Morewedge - The mystical philosophy of Avicenna - Binghamton, Global Publications, 2001 pp. 1-2 and 20-21.

An introduction to Ibn Sina's thougth can be found in the article AVICENNA in the Encyclopedia Iranica (45 pages - PDF format - 4.2 MB)


THE SUBJECT AND THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS ACCORDING AVICENNA

AVICENNA' KNOWLEDGE OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

"The inspection of the llahiyyat reveals not only the importance of Metaph. α, 1-2 and Λ, 6-10, but also the particular way in which Avicenna reproduces these two loci of the Metaphysics in his work: first, the doctrines of α, 1-2 and Λ, 6-10 are somehow interconnected in the final section of the Ilahiyyat, the one dealing with philosophical theology (VIII, 1–X, 3); second, within this section the doctrine of α, 1-2 is placed before that of Λ, 6-10, and constitutes a sort of introduction to philosophical theology. It is possible that Avicenna read α, 1-2 and Λ, 6-10 during his secondary education according to this same pattern. (...)

In sum, Avicenna's approach to the Metaphysics at the time of his secondary instruction had three main features: (i) it was not an extensive reading of this work in its entirety, but only of the essential parts of it, namely—on the basis of the evidence at our disposal— α, 1-2 and Λ, 6-10; (ii) these two loci were read in connection with one another, as elements of the theological part of the Metaphysics, in disregard of the ontological part of it; (iii) a was read as an introduction to Λ, 6-10 whereas books A, B-K of Aristotle's work were probably neglected." pp. 57-58

"The first specific endeavour of clarifying the relationship between ontology and theology within the [Aristotle's] Metaphysics took place, as far as we know, in Arabic philosophy. In post-Aristotelian Greek philosophy, this relationship was not perceived as problematic: it appears as a crucial issue neither in an independent "aporetic" treatise on metaphysics like Theophrastus' Metaphysics, nor in a reworking of the Metaphysics such as parts II and III of Nicholas of Damascus' Philosophy of Aristotle (at least judging from the extant portions of this latter work), nor in the commentaries on the Metaphysics by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Syrianus and Ammonius/Asclepius. In Arabic philosophy the problem was determined by the "theologizing" interpretation of the Metaphysics offered by philosophers like al-Kindi, which derives proximately from the classifications of sciences of Late Antiquity and depends ultimately on Aristotle's perspective (iii) taken in isolation from the others. (*) Al-Farabi's reacted to al-Kindi's one-sided view of the Metaphysics: connecting himself with the commentatorial tradition of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Ammonius/Asclepius, he had a broader view of the Metaphysics and in the Fi Agrad he clarified that Aristotle's work contains not only a theology, but also an ontology. (**) The background of the entire discussion is the relationship of falsafa and Islam: whereas al-Kindi emphasizes the theological part of the Metaphysics in order to assimilate Aristotelian metaphysics (and Greek metaphysics in general) and Islamic theology, al-Farabi stresses the distinction of metaphysics and philosophical theology and assigns a broader scope (and, implicitly, a higher rank) to the former with regard to the latter. Avicenna further develops al-Farabi's point of view, somehow incorporating in it al-Kindi's perspective, and presents the fullest and most articulated account of the relationship of ontology and theology within metaphysics in the history of Medieval philosophy.

Avicenna regards as very important to determine the subject-matter of metaphysics: he starts the Ilahiyyat addressing this issue and adding the "subject-matter" (mawud), as we will see in Chapter 5, to the preliminary questions traditionally discussed by Aristotelian commentators at the beginning of their exegesis of Aristotle's works. He appears to be the first in the history of philosophy to have devoted to this issue a separate and articulated treatment, and his contribution in the first two chapters of Ilahiyyat (I, 1-2) has rightly attracted the attention of scholars. (***) In Avicenna's powerful synthesis, Aristotle's different perspectives on the issue are elucidated and harmonized. As we are going to see in the first part of the present chapter, the main elements of Avicenna's discourse are five. First, he starts with a notion of metaphysics that gathers points (iii) and (i), namely the idea that metaphysics deals with immaterial things and with the first causes and the absolute Prime Cause, i.e. God. Second, he adds point (ii) to point (i) by means of the distinction between the "subject-matter" of metaphysics and the "things searched" in it: according to Avicenna, "existent qua existent", rather than God or the first causes, is the subject-matter of metaphysics. God and the first causes are things searched in metaphysics, and can be taken into account by this discipline just because they are not its subject-matter, for the subject-matter of a discipline is something that is common to all the things searched by the discipline in question, without being itself one of them. Third, he brings to unity perspective (iii) and perspective (ii) by means of a peculiar notion of "existent", according to which this concept is immaterial in as much as it is not restricted to the sphere of material things. Conceived as immaterial, "existent" can be common to all the objects of research of metaphysics. Fourth, he reaches a synthesis between perspective (i) and perspective (ii) by stressing that the first causes and God are a part of "existent" and the principles of the "existent" that is caused. Fifth, he stresses that the first causes and God, despite not being the subject-matter of metaphysics, have nonetheless a fundamental function within this discipline: among the things searched by metaphysics, they are its "goal", namely the things whose knowledge is ultimately pursued." pp. 113-114.

(*) See Chapter 2, §§6-7.

(**) See Chapter 3, §2.

(***) See Fakhry [1984]; Davidson [1987], pp. 284-288; Hasnawi [1991]; Roccaro [1994]; Ramon Guerrero [1996]; Bertolacci [2001b] pp. 230-232, 259-261.

From: Amos Bertolacci - The reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitab al-Sifa'. A milestone of Western metaphysical thought. Leiden: Brill 2006.

"Martin Heidegger claims that the history of metaphysics is a history of the oblivion of being while propounding that his "fundamental ontology" presents a "genuine" account of the question of being that attempts to overcome metaphysics and its oblivion of being. Yet, it is perhaps doubtful that, for more than two thousand years (from Aristotle to Edmund Husserl), no philosopher was able to come up with a "genuine" approach to the question of being, and that no philosopher attempted to overcome the metaphysical history of the oblivion of being. This issue becomes more polemical and problematic, given that it is unlikely the case that in the global intellectual history of Chinese, Jewish, or Islamic philosophy, no philosopher or philosophical tradition has successfully attempted to overcome the history of the oblivion of being. In the case of Islamic philosophy, it is well documented that the Near Eastern Muslim world of the Middle ages has had an impact on the intellectual history of Western science and metaphysics. However, it is not yet well documented that the same Near Eastern Islamic philosophical tradition does indeed testify to the development of a phenomenological philosophical tradition that took the question of being to be the most central question of philosophical investigations. Considering the particular case of the physician, philosopher, and poet: Avicenna ([Ibn Sina] 980-1037), it is known that his influential al-Qanun fi al-tib (Book on medicine) was translated into Latin (Liber Canonis) and many other languages, and was in currency since the late Middle ages and early Renaissance in Europe. It is also known that Avicenna's philosophical works have had a strong impact on Thomism and on the works of Maimonides among others. Moreover, Avicenna's philosophical contributions constituted the milestones of a phenomenological mode of investigation in ontology that impacted subsequent philosophical developments in the Near East, up to the recent modem times, and some investigators have already depicted some of the phenomenological dimensions that characterize his views."

From: Nader El-Bizri - The phenomenological quest between Avicenna and Heidegger - Binghamton, Global Publications, 2000 pp. XIII-XIV.


AVICENNA'S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS AS THE "SCIENCE OF BEING QUA BEING"

"For Ibn Sina, metaphysics is basically the study of "being qua being", but he immediately adds that its most noble, although not its first object is God, the Necessary Being by virtue of itself. (3) All this implies that the existence of God is not self-evident, but has to be proven. In order to do so, Ibn Sina develops his theory of the essence/existence distinction. In God, His essence is His existence, while in all other Beings one has to sharply distinguish their existence from their essence. (4) In the latter case, he qualifies the existence as being not identical with, but "accidental" to essence. Ibn Rushd saw in it a simple affirmation of the pure accidentality of existence, and therefore vehemently criticized Ibn Sina on this point. (5) Till recent times, this latter interpretation remained the standard one in the West. F. Rahman seems to have been the first contemporary commentator to have seriously put into question such an understanding of Ibn Sina's affirmation. (6) However, it deserves to be stated that already Henry of Ghent, in the late thirteenth century, was aware of the fact that the restricted Aristotelian notion of "accidentality" was surely not involved here, but a larger one. (7)

Among the vast majority of the Latin scholastics who followed Ibn Rushd's line of interpretation, was Thomas Aquinas. However, he accepted as most valid Ibn Sina's distinction between essence and existence, (8) a fact already evident from the very title of his famous early work De ente et essentia. Thomas Aquinas uses Ibn Sina's theory in order to explain the composite nature of all creatures, especially the immaterial ones, i.e., the angels. He obviously rejects any kind of hylemorphic composition in them. Although he does not mention the Avicennian vocabulary of "necessary in virtue of itself', "necessary in virtue of another", and "possible", he clearly derived his view from Ibn Sina, and not from Aristotle, Boethius, or the Liber de Causis as he suggests. (9) But, on the other hand, Thomas wants to distance himself from what he considers to be Ibn Sina's "essentialism". For him, there is not only identity in God between essence and existence, but God is above all "esse subsistens", which clearly means that the priority is on the side of the existence. Thomas certainly believed that he thus was radically opposing Ibn Sina's view. Even if he misunderstood the accidentality of existence in the latter's thought, he was right in his opinion that Ibn Sina had not fully appreciated existence as a part of the integral ontological dimension of Beings.

(...)

I have already stressed that for Ibn Sina, metaphysics was essentially the study of being qua being, i.e., an ontology, but that its most noble object of investigation is God, in other words it also includes theodicy. One may add that for Ibn Sina metaphysics is moreover the science that has to demonstrate the principles of the other sciences, which means that it also deals with the "archaeology" of the sciences. Although Aristotle's metaphysics entails elements of all three of these views, it never linked them together within a substantial unity. Based on the important preparatory work of his predecessor al-Farabi, for the first time in the history of philosophy Ibn Sina had worked out a metaphysical "system" as "system". In this respect this latter rightly deserves to be qualified as a kind of onto-theology even if it does not completely match Heidegger's – inspired by Duns Scotus – conception. In view of all this, metaphysics is certainly the highest and most valuable of all sciences, a fact particularly underlined by Ibn Sina when he discusses, in his Danesh-Nameh, metaphysics immediately after the "instrumental" science of logic, but before "physics", and such contrary to the customary habit, a habit he himself respects in his Arabic encyclopaedias, of presenting it as the latest of all sciences. While it is commonly designated as "meta-physics", i.e., the science of what comes after physics, an appellation sometimes used by Ibn Sina as well, he does not hesitate to call it Ilahiyyat, i.e. "(science) of the Divine Things" as well, and indeed prefers to do so."

(3) This is a common doctrine in his writings, clearly expressed in his major writing al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, vol. I, eds. G.C. Anawati and S. Zayed, Cairo, OGIG, 1960, book I, chapters 1-2. This text is also available in a mediaeval Latin translation, see S. Van Riet (ed.), Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, I–IV , Louvain, Peeters; Leiden, Brill, 1977, Tractatus primus, capitula 1-2.

(4 )This idea is omnipresent in Ibn Sina's metaphysical works too. Again, I refer only to al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, but now vol. II, eds. M.Y. Musa, S. Dunya and S. Zayed, Cairo, OGIG, 1960, book VIII, chapter 4; for the Latin translation, see S. Van Riet (ed.), Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina V-X, Louvain, Peeters; Leiden, Brill, 1980, Tractatus octavos, capitulum 4.

(5) See e.g., Ibn Rushd, Tafsir ma ba'd al-Tabia, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, 1938. Repr. Tehran, Int. Hikma, 1377 H.S., vol. I, commentary on book Gamma, C 3, p. 313; there exists a medieval Latin translation, see Averroes, Opera omnia, Venetiis, Junta, 1562, vol. VIII, f. 67 B.

(6) F. Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna", Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958), pp. 1-14; see also ID., "Essence and Existence in Ibn Sina. The Myth and the Reality", Hamdard Islamicus 41 (1981), pp. 3-14.

(7) See P. Porro, "Possibility ed esse essentiae in Enrico di Gand", in W. Vanhamel (ed.), Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293) (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Ser. I, vol. XV), Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1996, pp. 211-53, especially p. 215.

(8) There exists ample literature on this subject. For references, see my An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sina (1970-1989) (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Ser. I, vol. XIII), Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1991, pp. 244-250 and my An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sina. First Supplement (1990-1994) (FIDEM, Textes et études du moyen age, 12). Louvain-la-Neuve, FIDEM, 1999, pp. 137-161.

(9) See Thomas d'Aquin. Dietrich de Freiberg, L'être et l'essence. Le vocabulaire médiéval de l'ontologie. Traduction et commentaires par A. de Libera et C. Michon (Points. Essais, 339), Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1996, pp. 27-36.

From: Jules Janssens - Ibn Sina and his influence on the Arabic and Latin world - Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006 - I, 1-2 and 6-7.


SELECTED TEXTS BY IBN SINA (AVICENNA)

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

"...it behooves us to commence making known the ides of metaphysics. (...)

The philosophical sciences, as has been pointed out elsewhere in [our] books, are divided into the theoretical and the practical. The difference between the two has [also] been indicated. It has been mentioned that the theoretical are those wherein we seek the perfecting of the theoretical faculty of the soul through the attainment of the intellect in act — this by the attainment of conceptual and verifiable knowledge through things that are [the things] they are, without [reference to their] being our [own] actions and states. Thus, the aim in these [things] is to attain an opinion and belief which is not an opinion and belief pertaining to the manner of an action, or to the manner of a principle of an action inasmuch as it is a principle of action. And [it has also been stated] that practical [philosophy] is that wherein one first seeks the perfection of the theoretical faculty by attaining conceptual and verifiable knowledge involving things that are [the things] they are in being our own actions — thereby attaining, secondly, the perfection of the practical faculty through morals.

It was stated that theoretical knowledge is confined to three divisions — namely, the natural, the mathematical, and the divine.

[It was also stated] that the subject matter of the natural is bodies, with respect to their being in motion and at rest, and [that] its investigation pertains to the occurrences that happen to them essentially in this respect.

[It was also stated] that the subject matter of mathematics is either that which is quantity essentially abstracted from matter, or that which has quantity — the thing investigated therein being states that occur to quantity inasmuch as it is quantity and where one includes in its definition neither a species of matter nor a motive power.

[Finally, it was stated] that the divine science investigates the things that are separable from matter in subsistence and definition.

You have also heard that the divine science is the one in which the first causes of natural and mathematical existence and what relates to them are investigated; and [so also is] the Cause of Causes and Principle of Principles — namely, God, exalted be His greatness.

This much is what you would have come to know from the books that have previously come to you. But from this it would not have become evident to you what the subject matter of metaphysics really is (except for a remark in the Book of Demonstration, if you remember it). This is because in the other sciences you would have something which is a subject; things that are searched after; and principles, [universally] admitted, from which demonstrations are constructed. But now you still have not truly ascertained what is the subject matter of this science — whether it is the essence of the First Cause, so that what one seeks here is knowledge of His attributes and acts, or whether the subject matter is some other notion." pp. 2-3 (Book One, Chapter One).

"Hence, we must enascapably indicate the subject matter of this science so that the purpose that lies in this science becomes evident for us. (...)" p. 7

"Moreover, [the subject matter of metaphysics] cannot be specifically confined to any one category, nor can it be the attributes of any one thing except the existent inasmuch as it is an existent.

It is thus clear to you from this totality [of what has been said] that the existent inasmuch as it is an existent is something common to all these things and that it must be made the subject matter of this are for the reasons we have stated. And, moreover, because it is above the need either for its quiddity to be learned or for itself to be established so as to require another science to undertake to clarify [such] a state of affairs therein ([this] because of the impossibility of establishing the subject matter of a science and ascertaining its quiddity in the very science that has that subject), [it thus needs] only the admission of its existences and quiddity. The primary subject matter of this science is, hence, the existent inasmuch as it is an existent; and the things sought after in [this science] are those that accompany [the existent,] inasmuch as it is an existent, unconditionally." pp. 9-10 (Book One, Chapter Two).

THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

"What adheres necessarily to this science [therefore] is that it is necessarily divided into parts. Some of these will investigate the ultimate causes, for these are the causes of every caused existent with respect to its existence. [This science] will [also] investigate the First Cause, from which emanates every caused existent inasmuch as it is a caused existent, not only inasmuch as it is an existent in motion or [only inasmuch as it is] quantified. Some [of the parts of this science] will investigate the accidental occurrences to the existent, and some [will investigate] the principles of the particular sciences. And because the principles of each science that is more particular are things searched after in the higher science — as, for example, the principles of medicine [found] in natural [science] and of surveying [found] in geometry — it will so occur in this science that the principles of the particular sciences that investigate the states of the particular existents are clarified therein.

Thus, this science investigates the states of the existent — and the things that belong to it that are akin [to being] divisions and species — until it arrives at a specialization with which the subject of natural science begins, relinquishing to it this specialty; [and at a] specialization with which the subject matter of mathematics begins, relinquishing to it this specialty; and so on with the others. And [this science] investigates and determines the state of that which, prior to such specialization, is akin to a principle. Thus, [some of] the things sought after in this science are the causes of the existent inasmuch as it is a caused existent; some [of the things sought after] pertain to the accidental occurrences to the existent; and some [pertain] to the principles of the particular sciences.

This, then, is the science sought after in this art. It is first philosophy, because it is knowledge of the first thing in existence (namely, the First Cause) and the first thing in generality (namely, existence and unity).

It is also wisdom, which is the best knowledge of the best thing known. For, it is the best knowledge (that is, [knowledge that yields] certainty) of the best thing known (that is, God, exalted be He, and the causes after Him). It is also knowledge of the ultimate causes of the whole [of caused things]. Moreover, it is knowledge of God and has the definition of divine science, which consists of a knowledge of the things that are separable 5 from matter in definition and existence. For, as has become clear, the existent inasmuch as it is an existent, and its principles and the accidental occurrences [it undergoes] are all prior in existence to matter, and none of them is dependent for its existence on [matter's] existence."

pp. 11-12 (Book One, Chapter Two).

From: Avicenna - The Metaphysics of the Healing. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press 2005.


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Ancient Islamic (Arabic and Persian) Logic and Ontology

INTRODUCTION

A) LOGIC IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM

"It has long been recognized by historians of logic that the medieval Muslim philosophers and philosophical theologians (Mutakallimún: rendered variously as rationalist theologians, dialectical theologians, the "scholastics" of Islam) made some interesting contributions to the history of logic. When the Greek logical works were handed to the Muslim scholars in translation in and after the 9th century A.D., they studied them thoroughly and critically and wrote commentaries upon them. Prantl, (1) the 19th-century writer on the history of logic in the West, noted that Arabic literature on logic was one of the main sources for the terminist logic (i.e., the logic of terms) of the medieval Western logicians - a view upheld by 20th century scholars on medieval philosophy. (2) William and Martha Kneale (3) and David Knowles (4) have also noted the origin in Avicenna (Ibn Sina, d. A.D. 1037) of the doctrine of intentio, a doctrine which was of great importance in both Arabic and medieval Western philosophical logic. The secundae intentiones constituted the subject matter of logic. (I have shown elsewhere, however, that in Arabic logic itself the doctrine of the "intentions" is traceable to al-Farabi, d. A.D. 950). (5)Bochenski (6) was also aware that "Arabian logicians certainly exercised some influence" on medieval scholastic logic.

However, for a complete knowledge of the contributions to logic made by the Muslim philosophers we have to wait until a great number of the logical works in Arabic have been edited and studied. But we know so far that modal logic, the branch of logic which deals with the concepts of possibility and necessity, because of its relevance to the problem of determinism and divine foreknowledge, was of great concern to them; that the relationship between logic and grammar interested them; that conditional syllogisms, the problem of universals, the analysis of the concept of existence and predication, the theory of categorical propositions were some of the logical or logico-philosophical questions which the Muslims philosophers treated in interesting ways."

(1) C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik in Abendlande (Leipzig, 1855), 2: 263 f.

(2) See, e.g., L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum (Assen, 1962), 1: 18-19.

(3) William Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962), p. 229.

(4) David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1962), p. 197.

(5) Kwame Gyekye, "The Terms `prima intentio' and 'secunda intentio' in Arabic Logic," Speculum 46 (January 1971).

(6) I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic (Notre Dame, 1961), p. 150.

From: Kwame Gyekye - Arabic logic. Ibn al-Tayyb's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1979 pp. 1-2.

Whereas the study of medieval Western logic is now an established field of research, contributing both to modern philosophy of logic and to the intellectual history of the Middle Ages, the study of logic in the precolonial Islamic world is still barely in its infancy. That fact alone makes it difficult to write an introductory chapter on the field:we are as yet unclear what contributions of the logicians writing in Arabic are particularly noteworthy or novel. It is also a dangerous temptation in this state of relative underdevelopment to cast an eye too readily on the work of the Latin medievalist, and to import the methods, assumptions, and even the historical template that have worked so well in the cognate Western field.

This temptation must be resisted at all costs. There are many important differences between the scholarly ideals and options of the Latin West and the Muslim East; there are, also, many differences between the various fortunes encountered by rigorous logical activity in the two realms over the centuries. A glance at the historiographical preliminaries of Bochenski's History of Formal Logic prompts the following observations.(1) First and foremost, Aristotle ceases by the end of the twelfth century to be a significant coordinate for logicians writing in Arabic - that place is filled by Avicenna. The centrality of Avicenna's idiosyncratic system in post-Avicennian logical writings and the absence of Aristotelian logic in a narrowly textual sense meant that Arabic texts dealing with Avicenna's system were left to one side by the medieval Latin translators. Instead, other, less influential texts by Averroes and al-Fârâbi were translated because they did concentrate on Aristotle and spoke to thirteenth-century Western logical concerns. Even at the outset, then, the insignificance of Aristotle's logical system in the Avicennian tradition worked to distort Western appreciation of the relative importance of particular logicians writing in Arabic.

A second difference is that the whole range of Aristotelian logical texts were available in Arabic by about 900, and so the broad periodization of medieval Latin logic into logica vetus and logica nova is inappropriate as a way of periodizing logic written in Arabic; by the time serious logical work began, the complete Organon was available. Avicenna's work marks the watershed for any helpful periodization. Thirdly, Bochenski's analysis of what preconceptions and historical meanderings clutter the way to the proper study of medieval Western logic (the collapse of acute logical study with the demise of scholasticism, the ahistorical reductivism of post-Kantian logic, the institutionalization of a psychologistic logic in neoscholasticism) do not apply to the study of the logic of medieval Muslim scholars - even in the early twentieth century, it is clear that at least some scholars were still in contact with the acute work of the thirteenth century. There had been far less of a rupture in logical activity over the intervening centuries. On the other hand, there have been postcolonial efforts to find later Western logical achievements foreshadowed in early Arabic logic, and this has damaged the prospects for appraisal of the work by leading to a disproportionate focus on minor traditions.

Finally, only some of the characteristics Bochenski finds which distinguish medieval Western logic from the logic of late antiquity apply to the logic being written in Arabic at roughly the same time It too is highly formal and metalogical in its treatment, and pedagogically central; but no doctrine like supposition was developed, and there seems to have been far less concern with antinomies. One may say - nervously, given the current state of research - that Arabic logic is somewhat closer to the logic of late antiquity in its concerns and methods than medieval Latin logic. That said, one must guard against an obvious alternative assumption, which is that Arabic logic is by and large just one or other of the systems of late antiquity.9 We already have enough control over Avicenna's logic to know that is false."

(1) I. M.Bochenski, A history of formal logic, translated by I. Thomas, Notre Dame, Indiana University Press, 1961; see esp. "On the history of the history of logic" pp. 4-10.


B) ONTOLOGY IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM

"The problem of expressing the Greek concept of being in Arabic did not escape classical Islamic writers. But the discussion of this problem as an instance of the general question of the influence of grammar on the formation of philosophical concepts is to be found among some recent writers on Islam, although unfortunately there is hardly anything approaching a sustained treatment from this perspective.

A few quotations from two recent writers will bring into focus those distinctive features of the Arabic language which are said to be problem-causing, and at the same time they will provide our analysis with a point of departure.

In his useful book Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Soheil Afnan identifies the problem for the Arabic translator of Greek metaphysics in these words: "the translator can easily find himself helpless." (1) This is generalized to all semitic languages, which are said to be "still unable to express the thought adequately." (2) Afnan attributes this to what he calls "the complete absence of the copula." (3)Another writer, the linguist Angus Graham, in a stimulating article, (4) singles out another, but related, feature of Arabic, the sharp separation of the existential and predicative functions, a feature notably lacking in classical Greek. (5)These two features, the absence of the copula and the existential-predicative separation, are supposed to have stood in the way of expressing the Greek concept of being adequately or accurately. And what is meant by this, in the words of Afnan, is the failure to express "the precise concept of being as distinct from existence." (6) Graham puts it this way: "Because of the structure of the language, they [the Arabic translations of Aristotle] transform him at one stroke into a philosopher who talks sometimes about existence, sometimes about quiddity, never about being. " (7)

(1) Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, p. 29.

(2) Ibid., p. 30. It is not clear what the relevance of time is ("still").

(3) lbid., p. 29.

(4) Angus Graham, " `Being' in Linguistics and Philosophy," Foundations of Language 1 (1965): 223-31.

(5) lbid., p. 223. (6) Afnan, op. cit., p. 29.

(7) Graham, op. cit., p. 226; italics in the original.

From:Fadlou Shehadi - Metaphysics in Islamic philosophy - New York, Caravan Books, 1982 pp. 29-30.


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDES

A comprehensive bibliography of secondary literature on Islamic philosophy up to the year 2005 can be found in:

Hans Daiber. Bibliography of Islamic philosophy. Leiden: Brill 1999. (Two volumes).

Hans Daiber. Bibliography of Islamic philosophy. Supplement. Leiden: Brill 2007.

See also:

  • Georges C. Anawati. "Bibliographie de la philosophie médiévale en terre d'Islam pour les années 1959-1969" in: Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 10-12, 1968-70, pp. 343-344.
  • Georges C. Anawati. "Bibliographie Islamo-arabe. Livres et articles sur l'Islam et l'arabisme parus, en langues occidentales, durant la période 1960-1966" in: Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain des études orientales (MIDEO), 9, 1967, pp. 143-213.
  • Thérèse-Anne Druart and Michael L. Marmura. "Medieval Islamic philosophy and theology: Bibliographical Guide," in:
  • Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale (32) 1990 (1986-1989) pp. 106-135;
  • Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale (35) 1993 (1989-1992) pp. 181-219;
  • Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale (37) 1995 (1992-1994) pp. 193-232;
  • Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale (39) 1997 (1994-1996) pp. 175-202;
  • Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain des études orientales (MIDEO) (24) 2000 (1996-1998) pp. 381-414.
  • Thérèse-Anne Druart - Brief Bibliographical Guide in Medieval Islamic Philosophy and Theology (1998-2002)
  • Thérèse-Anne Druart - Brief Bibliographical Guide in Medieval Islamic Philosophy and Theology (2002-2004)


GENERAL INTRODUCTIONS TO ISLAMIC LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY

  1. History of Islamic philosophy. Edited by Nasr Seyyed Hossein and Leaman Oliver. London: Routledge 1996.
  2. An anthology of philosophy in Persia. Edited by Nasr Seyyed Hossein and Aminrazavi Mehdi. New York: Oxford University Press 1999.
    Volume I.
  3. Medieval philosophy and the classical tradition: in Islam, Judaism and Christianity. Edited by Inglis John. Richmond: Curzon 2002.
  4. Greek, Indian, and Arabic logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier North Holland 2004.
    Handbook of the history of logic - Vol. I.
    See the chapters: Arabic logic by Tony Street (pp. 523-596) and The translation of Arabic works on logic into Latin in the Middle Ages and Renaissance by Charles Burnett (pp. 597-605).
  5. The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy. Edited by Adamson Peter and Taylor Richard C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
    Contents: Notes on contributors: IX; Note on the text XIII; Chronology of major philosophers in the Arabic tradition XV;
    1. Introduction by Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor 1; 2. Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in translation by Cristina D'Ancona 10; 3. Al-Kindi and the reception of Greek philosophy by Peter Adamson 32; Al-Farabi and the philosophical curriculum by David C. Reisman 52; 5. The Isma'ilis by Paul E. Walker 72; 6. Avicenna and the Avicennian tradition 92; 7. Al-Ghazali by Michael E. Marmura 137; 8. Philosophy in Andalusia: Ibn Bajja and Ibn Tufayl by Josef Puig Montada 155; 9. Averroes: religious dialectic and Aristotelian philosophical thought by Richard C. Taylor; 10. Suhrawardi and Illuminationism 201; 11. Mysticism and philosophy: Ibn 'Arabi and Mulla Sadra by Sajjad H. Rizvi 224; 12. Logic by Tony Street 247; 13. Ethical and political philosophy 266; 14. Natural philosophy by Marwan Rashed 287; 15. Psychology: soul and intellect 308; 16. Metaphysics by Thérèse-Anne Druart 327; 17. Islamic philosophy and Jewish philosophy by Steven Harvey 349; 18. Arabic into Latin: the reception of Arabic philosophy into Western Europe by Charles Burnett 370; 19. Recent trends in Arabic and Persian philosophy by Hossein Ziai 405; Select bibliography and further readings 426; Index 442-448.
  6. Storia della filosofia nell'Islam medievale. Edited by D'Ancona Cristina. Torino: Einaudi 2005.
    Two volumes
  7. Badawi Abdurrahman. La transmission de la philosophie Grecque au monde Arabe. Paris: Vrin 1968.
    Second revised and augmented edition 1987.
  8. Badawi Abdurrahman. Histoire de la philosophie en Islam. Paris: Vrin 1972.
    Two volumes: Vol. I: Les philosophes théologiques, Vol.
    II: Les philosophes purs
  9. Burnett Charles. Arabic into Latin. The reception of Arabic philosophy into Western Europe. In The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy. Edited by Adamson Peter and Taylor Richard C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. pp. 370-404
  10. D'Ancona Costa Cristina. La casa della sapienza. La trasmissione della metafisica greca e la formazione della filosofia araba. Milano: Guerini e Associati 1996.
  11. D'Ancona Costa Cristina. Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in translation. In The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. pp. 10-31
  12. Daiber Hans, "Die autonomie der Philosophie im Islam," Acta Philosophica Fennica 48: 228-249 (1990).
    "The paper gives a survey of the concepts of philosophy hold by Islamic philosophers (Kindi, Abu Bakr Ar-Rrazi, Abu Hatim Ar-Razi, Farabi, Ibn Sina, Al-Gazzali, Ibn Bagga, Ibn Tufail, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Khaldun). The dominant concept of philosophy as an epistemological instrument and as a way to the knowledge of God started from Koranic-Islamic assumptions like the idea of a transcendent God, the emphasis of the search after knowledge and first rational methods arguing and thinking about God and world as developed by the Mutazilites of the 8th/9th century. For Kindi who followed Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas, philosophy is knowledge of the divine cause and does not contradict religion and its revelation. Abu Bakr Ar-Razi took over Kindi's conception of the autonomy of philosophy and even denied the necessity of revelation; all people are able to philosophy."
  13. Daiber Hans. What is the meaning of and to what end do we study the history of Islamic philosophy? In Bibliography of Islamic philosophy. Leiden: Brill 1999. pp. XII-XXXII
  14. Druart Thérèse-Anne. Metaphysics. In The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy. Edited by Adamson Peter and Taylor Richard C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 327-348
  15. Fakhry Majid. The subject-matter of Metaphysics. In Islamic theology and philosophy. Edited by Marmura Michael E. Albany: State University of New York Press 1984. pp. 137-147
  16. Gutas Dimitri. Greek thought, Arabic culture. The Graeco-Arabic translation movement in Baghdad and early Abbasid society (2nd-4th/8th-10th centuries). New York: Routledge 1998.
  17. Gutas Dimitri. Greek philosophers in the Arabic tradition. Aldershot: Ashgate, Variorum Reprints 2000.
    Reprint of the following essays:

    Foreword; Acknowledgements;
    Presocratics and Minor Schools.
    1. Pre-Plotinian philosophy in Arabic (Other than Platonism and Aristotelianism): A review of the sources; 2. Sayings by Diogenes preserved in Arabic; 3. Adrastus of Aphrodisias, (Pseudo-) Cebes, Democrates 'Gnomicus', and Diogenes the Cynic in Arabic sources;
    Plato.
    4. Plato's Symposium in the Arabic tradition; 5. Galen's Synopsis of Plato's Laws and Farabi's Talhis;
    Aristotle and the early Peripatos.
    6. The spurious and the authentic in the Arabic Lives of Aristotle; 7. The life, works,and sayings of Theophrastus in the Arabic tradition; 8. Eudemus in the Arabic tradition;
    Late Antiquity and the interface between Greek and Arabic.
    9. Paul the Persian on the classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy: a milestone between Alexandria and Baghdad; 10. The starting point of philosophical studies in Alexandrian and Arabic Aristotelianism; 11. Philoponus and Avicenna on the separability of the Intellect: a case of orthodox Christian-Muslim agreement; 12. The malady of love;
    Index
  18. Gutas Dimitri, "The study of Arabic philosophy in the Twentieth century. An essay on the historiography of Arabic philosophy," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 29: 5-25 (2002).
  19. Inati Shams. Logic. In History of Islamic Philosophy. Edited by Nasr Seyyed Hossein and Leaman Oliver. New York: Routledge 1996. pp. 802-823
  20. Leaman Oliver. A brief introduction to Islamic philosophy. Malden: Blackwell 1999.
  21. Madkour Ibrahim. L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe, ses traductions, son étude et ses applications. Analyse puisée principalement à un commentaire inédit d'Ibn Sina. Paris: Vrin 1934.
    Preface by Simon van den Bergh.
    Second edition 1969.
  22. Madkour Ibrahim, "La métaphysique en terre d'Islam," Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain des Études Orientales (MIDEO) 7: 21-34 (1963).
  23. Nasr Seyyed Hossein. An introduction to Islamic cosmological doctrines. Conceptions of nature and methods used for its study by the Ikhwan Al-Safa; Al-Biruni, and Ibn Sina. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1964.
    Forewrod by H. A. R. Gibb.
    Second revised edition: New York, State University of New York Press, 1993.
  24. Peters Francis E. Aristotle and the Arabs: the Aristotelian tradition in Islam. New York: State of New York University Press 1968.
    "The purpose of this book is to provide a reliable introduction to the history of the influence of Aristotelianism on Islamic intellectual life. After the ancient stage of Aristotelianism, the medieval transmission stage exhibits two separate movements: the passage of Aristotle into Western
    christianity and the absorption of Aristotelianism by the Oriental world of Islam."
  25. Peters Francis E. Aristoteles arabus. The Oriental translations and commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus. New York: State of New York University Press 1968.
    "This monograph is an attempt to say all that can be presently said about the fortunes of the individual Aristotelian texts and their exegetical outriders from circa a. D. 1250 when the last of Ibn Rushd's commentaries on Aristotle arrived at the university of Paris and this particular chapter in the Aristotelian tradition came to an end."
  26. Raybaud Natahlie, "La philosophie arabe: une philosophie du commentaire?," Philosophie 77: 85-110 (2003).
  27. Rescher Nicholas. The development of Arabic logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1964.
    "The book begins with a chapter on the "first century" of Arabic logic which is understood to be a period of transmission, translation and assimilation of mainly Alexandrian Aristotelianism. The author relates how toward the end of the development of Arabic logic the initial relationship which logic bore to medicine, mathematics and astronomy was replaced by a new kinship with the Islamic "sciences" of theology, law, philology and rhetoric."
  28. Rosenthal Franz. The Classical Heritage in Islam. New York: Routledge 1994.
    Translated from the German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein.
    Original edition: Das Fortleben der Antike im Islam - Zürich, Artemis, 1965.
  29. Shehadi Fadlou. Metaphysics in Islamic philosophy. New York: Caravan Books 1982.
  30. Street Tony. Logic. In The Cambridge Companion to Arabic philosophy. Edited by Adamson Peter and Taylor Richard C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 247-265
  31. Versteegh Kees. Grammar and logic in the Arabic grammatical tradition. In History of the language sciences. An international handbook on the evolution of the study of language from the Beginnings to the Present. Edited by Auroux Sylvain et al. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2000. pp. 300-306
    Vol. 1


MORE SPECIALIZED WORKS

1. Logic in classical Islamic culture. Edited by Von Grunebaum Gustav Edmund. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz 1970.
Giorgio Levi Della Vida Biennial Conference Proceedings.

2. Essays on Islamic philosophy and science. Edited by Hourani George Fadlo. Albany: State University of New York Press 1975.

3. Islamic theology and philosophy. Studies in honor of George F. Hourani. Edited by Marmura Michael E. Albany: State University of New York Press 1984.

4. Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici: Logica e ontologia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe. Edited by Celluprica Vincenza and D'Ancona Costa Cristina. Napoli: Bibliopolis 2004.
Atti del convegno internazionale, Roma, 19-20 ottobre 2001

5. Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter. Edited by Perler Dominik and Rudolph Ulrich. Leiden: Brill 2005.
Proceedings of a conference held October 3-5, 2002 in the Kartause Ittingen

6. Afnan Soheil M. Philosophical terminology in Arabic and Persian. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1964.

7. Anawati Georges C., "Philosophie médiévale en terre d'Islam," Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain des Études Orientales (MIDEO) 5: 175-236 (1958).

8. Anawati Georges C. Philosophie Arabe ou philosophie Musulmane? Plan pour une bibliographie de philosophie médiévale en Terre d'Islam. In Mélanges offerts a M.-D. Chenu, maitre en théologie. Edited by Duval André. Paris: Vrin 1967. pp. 51-71
Reprinted in: Georges C. Anawati - Études de philosophie musulmane - Paris, Vrin, 1974 pp. 69-89.

9. Bertolacci Amos, "On the Arabic translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15: 241-275 (2005).
"The starting-point and, at the same time, the foundation of recent scholarship on the Arabic translations of Aristotle's Metaphysics are Maurice Bouyges' excellent critical edition of the work in which the extant translations of the Metaphysics are preserved - i.e. Averroes' Tafsir (the so-called "Long Commentary") of the Metaphysics - and his comprehensive account of the Arabic translations and translators of the Metaphysics in the introductory volume. Relying on the texts made available by Bouyges and the impressive amount of philological information conveyed in his edition, subsequent scholars have been able to select and focus on more specific topics, providing, for example, a closer inspection of the Arabic translations of the single books of the Metaphysics (books A, a, and Lambda in particular), or a detailed comparison of some of these translations with the original text of the Metaphysics. A new trend of research in recent times has been the study of these versions as part of the wider context of the Graeco-Arabic translation movement."

10. Black Deborah L. Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in medieval Arabic philosophy. Leiden: E. J. Brill 1990.

11. Booth Edward. Aristotelian aporetic ontology in Islamic and Christian thinkers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983.

12. Elamrani-Jamal A. Logique aristotélicienne et grammaire arabe (Étude et documents). Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin 1983.

13. Endress Gerhard, "L'Aristote arabe: réception, autorité et transformation du Premier Maître," Medioevo 23: 1-42 (1997).

14. Feldman Seymour, "Rescher on Arabic logic," Journal of Philosophy 61: 724-733 (1964).
"After considerable discussion and criticism of Nicholas Rescher's two works on Arabic logic (largely on al-Farabi) Feldman notes that these are nevertheless valuable in that works on the history of logic, before Rescher, omitted any significant reference to the logical activities of the Arabic writing logicians."

15. Frank Richard M. Beings and their attributes: the teaching of the Basrian school of the Mu`tazila in the classical period. Albany: State University of New York Press 1978.

16. Frank Richard M., "M. Al-Ma'dum wal-Mawjud, the non-existent, the existent and the possible, in the teaching of Abu Hashim and his followers," Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain des Études Orientales (MIDEO) 14: 185-210 (1980).

17. Frank Richard M., "The Ash'arite ontology: I. Primary entities," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 9: 163-231 (1999).

18. Frank Richard M., "The non-existent and the possible in classical Ash'arite teaching," Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain des Études Orientales (MIDEO) 24: 1-37 (2000).

19. Gutas Dimitri. Aspects of literary form and genre in Arabic logical works. In Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian logical texts. The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin traditions. Edited by Burnett Charles. London: The Warburg Institute 1993. pp. 29-76

20. Gyekie Kwame, "The terms Prima intentio and Secunda intentio in Arabic logic," Speculum 46: 32-48 (1971).

21. Gyekie Kwame, "The term Istithna in Arabic logic," Journal of the American Oriental Society 27: 88-92 (1972).

22. Gyekie Kwame. Arabic logic. Ibn al-Tayyb's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge. Albany: State University of New York Press 1979.

23. Hallaq Wael B. Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek logicians. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993.

24. Hasnawi Ahmed. Topic and analysis: the Arabic tradition. In Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism? Edited by Sharples Robert W. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 28-62

25. Hugonnard-Roche Henri. La formation du vocabulaire de la logique en arabe. In La formation du vocabulaire scientifique et intellectuel dans le monde arabe. Edited by Jacquart Danielle. Turnhout: Brepols 1994. pp. 22-38

26. Hugonnard-Roche Henri, "Le traité de logique de Paul le Persan: une interprétation tardo-antique de la logique aristotélicienne en syriaque," Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 11: 59-82 (2000).

27. Hugonnard-Roche Henri. La constitution de la logique tardo-antique et l'élaboration d'une logique "matérielle" en syriaque. In Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici: Logica e ontologia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe. Edited by Celluprica Vincenza and D'Ancona Costa Cristina. Napoli: Bibliopolis 2004. pp. 55-83

28. Kennedy-Day Kiki. Books of definition in Islamic philosophy. The limits of words. New York: Routledge Curzon 2003.

29. Leaman Oliver, "Islamic philosophy and the attack on logic," Topoi 19: 17-24 (2000).

30. Margoliouth David Samuel, "The discussion between Abu Bishr Matta and Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi on the merits of logic and grammar," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society: 79-129 (1905).

31. Marmura Michael E., "The fortuna of the "Posterior Analytics" in the Arabic Middle Ages," Acta Philosophica Fennica 48: 85-103 (1990).
"The entry of the "Posterior Analytics" (translated to Arabic early in the 10th century) into medieval Islam marked a turning point in the development of Arabic philosophy. Its precepts became part of the texture of Arabic philosophical discourse as the world came to be perceived through the medium of logical connections, expressed in the language of middle terms. Al-Farabi (d. 950), developed his essentially Platonic political philosophy within the framework of Aristotle's demonstrative ideal. It had immense influence on Avicenna (d. 1037), who expanded on its precepts.
But it was also influenced by its new Islamic cultural environment. Avicenna included among the premises of demonstration, statements of individual historical events known through innumerable corroborative reports, deemed certain by the Islamic theologians; and the theologian Ghazali (d. 1111), sought to render its canons operative within his non-Aristotelian (occasionalist) world view."

32. Morewedge Parviz, "Contemporary scholarship on Near Eastern philosophy," The Philosophical Forum 2: 122-140 (1970).
"This article is a critical study of a widespread tendency in contemporary scholarship on Near Eastern philosophy to assume tacitly (1) that Near Eastern philosophy is basically Greek philosophy as modified by the Muslim religious tradition, and (2) that philosophizing terminated altogether in
the Near East after Ibn Rushd (Averroes). salient features of the philosophy of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) point on the one hand to the presence of many significant themes in Near Eastern philosophy which stand in direct conflict with the commonly held dogmata of the Islamic religion and on the other
hand to a departure in Ibn Sina's views from those of representative Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Plotinus."

33. Morewedge Parviz. Greek sources of some Islamic philosophies of being and existence. In Philosophies of existence. Edited by Morewedge Parviz. New York: Fordham University Press 1982. pp. 285-336
Reprinted in: Parviz Morewedge - Essays in Islamic philosophy, theology, and mysticism - Oneonta, : Oneonta Philosophy Studies, 1995, pp. 57.138

34. Nasr Seyyed Hossein, "Existence ('wujud') and Quiddity ('mahiyyah') in Islamic philosophy," International Philosophical Quarterly 29: 409-428 (1989).
"This paper deals with the meaning of "wujud" and "mahiyyah" in various schools of Islamic thought. It begins by turning attention to the significance of this subject for Islamic philosophy as well as theology and even certain schools of sufism. It traces the history of the subject from Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina to Suhrawardi, Fakhr al-din Al-Razi and later Islamic philosophers such as Mir Damad and Mulla Sadra. The essay then deals with the basic distinctions made by Ibn Sina between necessity, contingency and impossibility which forms the basis of the ontology of Islamic philosophers."

35. Rámon Guerrero Rafael, "El lenguaje del ser: de Ibn Sina a Mulla Sadra," Convivium 14: 113-127 (2001).

36. Rescher Nicholas. Studies in the history of Arabic logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1964.
"In the ten essays brought together in this volume, the author discusses different aspects and problems related to the intellectual history of Islam and centered around logical and philosophical issues. The guiding line is that Arabic logic is entirely Western and has nothing to do with "oriental philosophy." Six of the essays have appeared in different journals. The first essay, written especially for this volume, gives a brief account of the history of Arabic logic. The other essays deal with particular texts and problems related to the writings of such thinkers as al-Farabi, al-Kindi, Avicenna, Abu 'l-Salt of Denia, Averroes. The book contains extensive bibliographical references, documentary and critical notes."

37. Rescher Nicholas. Temporal modalities in Arabic logic. Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1967.

38. Rescher Nicholas. Studies in Arabic philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1968.

39. Street Tony, "Towards a history of syllogistic after Avicenna: notes on Rescher's studies on Arabic modal logic," Journal of Islamic Studies 11: 209-228 (2000).
"This article examines the works of Rescher on Arabic syllogistic, particularly his 1974 paper, 'The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy'. The article focuses in particular on the technical terms used by the logicians Rescher studies, and suggests some alternative translations. It also argues that the historical conclusions Rescher reaches need to be significantly qualified."

40. Taha Abderrahmane. Langage et philosophie. Essai sur le structure linguistiques de l'ontologie. Rabat: Imprimerie de Fédala 1979.
With the traduction of the discussion reported by Abu Hayyan at-Tawhidi within the logician Matta Ibn Yunus and the grammarian Abu Sa'id as-Strafi and two other texts.

41. Teixidor Javier. Aristote en Syriaque. Paul le Perse, logicien du VIe siècle. Paris: CNRS Éditions 2003.

42. Thillet Pierre. La formation du vocabulaire philosophique arabe. In La formation du vocabulaire scientifique et intellectuel dans le monde arabe. Edited by Jacquart Danielle. Turnhout: Brepols 1994. pp. 39-54

43. Thom Paul. Medieval modal systems. Aldershot: Ashgate 2003.

44. Troupeau Gérard. La terminologie grammaticale. In La formation du vocabulaire scientifique et intellectuel dans le monde arabe. Edited by Jacquart Danielle. Turnhout: Brepols 1994. pp. 11-21

45. Walbridge John, "Logic in the Islamic intellectual tradition: The recent centuries," Islamic Studies 39: 55-75 (2000).

46. Wolfson Harry Austryn. The terms Tasawwur and Tasdiq in Arabic philosophy and their Greek, Latin and Hebrew equivalents. In Studies in the history and philosophy of religion. (Vol. I). Edited by Twersky Isadore and Williams George H. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1973. pp. 478-492

Shaliba dan Semangat Filsafat Arab

Sunaryo

Apa yang anda rasakan ketika mengkaji filsafat Arab jika dibandingkan dengan filsafat Barat? Pada umumnya akan menjawab kurang menarik. Berangkat dari kenyataan ini, Jamil Shaliba, penulis buku al-Falsafah al-‘Arabiyyah (Filsafat Arab, 1970), berusaha menampilkan kajian filsafat Arab agar lebih menarik. Menurut Shaliba, ketaktertarikkan para pembaca terhadap filsafat Arab bukan karena pada filsafat Arab itu sendiri, melainkan pada masalah penyajian. Dalam pandangannya, kegagapan para pengajar dan penulis filsafat Arab dalam memahami maksud filsuf Arab dan kesulitan memaknai teks-teks arab menjadi kendala utama agar dapat menampilkan filsafat Arab secara menarik (h.11). Buku yang diberi judul al-Falsafah al-Arabiyyah berupaya mengatasi persoalan-persoalan teknis ini.

Jamil Shaliba menyajikan al-Falsafah al-Arabiyyah dengan bahasa yang lebih mengalir dan mudah dipahami bila dibandingkan dengan buku-buku sejenis, seperti al-Turats al-Yunani fi al-Hadarat al-Islamiyah Abdurrahman Badawi yang diterjemahkan dari bahasa Italia, atau buku ­al-Fikr al-Arabi karya De Lacy O 'Leary. Shaliba merangsang gairah pembaca agar tertarik mengkaji dan mendalami filsafat Arab dengan mengangkat kembali teks-teks asli para filsuf dan disertai dengan kemungkinan mengusung tema-tema baru dari filsuf tersebut. Menurutnya, pengaruh filsafat Arab terhadap filsafat Barat modern lebih besar bila dibandingkan dengan pengaruh filsafat Barat modern terhadap filsafat Arab kontemporer (h.12). Karenanya, kajian atas perkembangan filsafat dalam dunia Arab dan Islam bukanlah kajian yang remeh-temeh.

Tema-tema tentang Ada, yang satu (monistik), yang banyak (pluralistik), hubungan antara Tuhan dan makhluknya, ruang dan waktu, gerak dan diam serta jiwa dan akal adalah tema-tema yang kerap didiskusikan dan diperdebatkan oleh filsuf-filsuf Arab dan kemudian menjadi tema-tema filsafat di dunia Barat modern. Atas dasar pertautan pemikiran ini maka sulit sekali membayangkan perkembangan filsafat di Barat tanpa peran para filsuf-filsuf Arab sebelumnya. Hal yang sama juga dapat dialamatkan pada filsafat Arab klasik. Sulit membayangkan gairah filsafat di dunia Arab tanpa penerjemahan buku-buku filsafat yang berbahasa Yunani dan Suryani oleh para penerjemah Kristen Nestorian, Yahudi dan kaum Shabi’ yang kebetulan menguasai dua bahasa tersebut.

Shaliba mencatat ciri persamaan dan perbedaan antara filsafat Arab dan filsafat Yunani. Persamaan antara dua filsafat ini ada pada kepercayaan yang sangat besar terhadap peran rasio sebagai sumber pengetahuan dan sebagai metode. Keduanya percaya bahwa dengan rasio maka hakikat sesuatu dapat ditangkap (h.23). Filsuf seperti al-Farabi yang dijuluki guru kedua, di mana yang menjadi guru pertama adalah Aristoteles, dan Ibnu Rushd yang juga sangat tergila-gila pada filsafat Aristoteles adalah filsuf-filsuf yang sangat gigih memperjuangkan peran rasio sebagai sumber pengetahuan alat untuk memahami agama. Sementara titik perbedaanya ada pada tujuan dan maksud kaduanya dalam menggumuli filsafat. Bagi filsuf Yunani, filsafat semata-mata dipandang sebagai sesuatu yang estetis, sementara bagi filsuf Arab, filsafat dipandang dengan kerangka agama. Karenaya tema-tema yang sempat berkembang dan dikembangkan oleh filsuf Arab adalah tentang relevansi filsafat bagi agama, seperti harmonisasi hubungan agama dan filsafat serta pembuktian adanya Tuhan (24-25).

Dari judul yang dibuat oleh Shaliba, para pembaca akan tergelitik untuk bertanya, mengapa Shaliba memberi judul bukunya filsafat Arab bukan filsafat Islam? Bukankah para filsuf yang dibahas dalam buku ini lebih dikenal sebagai filsuf Islam bukan filsuf Arab. Dengan menyebut Arab, seharusnya ia mengekslusikan Ibnu Sina dan al-Ghazali yang berasal dari Persia dan al-Farabi yang berasal dari Turki. Dan bukankah juga motif para filsuf ini lebih didorong oleh motif dan semangat peradaban Islam dibandingkan semangat kearaban. Atas pertanyaan-pertanyaan ini, Shaliba memberikan jawabannya. Pertama, gairah filsafat di dunia Arab bukanlah jerih payah orang Islam saja. Sumbangan yang juga tidak boleh dilupakan adalah peran besar para penerjemah yang hampir sembilanpuluh persen bukan orang Islam. Mereka adalah orang-orang Kristen Nestorian, Yahudi dan kaum Shabi’. Kedua, karya-karya filsuf yang dibahas dalam buku ini ditulis dalam bahasa Arab. Ketiga, bahasa agama yang dianut oleh para filsuf ini, kitabnya dan nabinya adalah berbahasa Arab. Dan keempat, bila buku ini diberi judul filsafat Islam maka ada keharusan bagi penulis untuk memasukkan filsuf-filsuf Islam yang tidak menulis dalam bahasa Arab. Namun setelah memberikan jawabannya ini, Shaliba menyatakan bahwa sebenarnya ia tidak terlalu mempersoalkan judul bukunya ini. Filsafat Arab atau filsafat Islam menurutnya sama saja. Ia mengatakan, pemikiran filsafat yang ada dalam bukunya ini adalah filsafat Arab yang dibentuk oleh Islam atau filsafat Islam yang ditulis dalam bahasa Arab (10-11).

* * *

Tesis utama yang ingin disampaikan oleh Shaliba dalam bukunya adalah pertautan erat filsafat Yunani bagi filsafat Arab. Tesis ini ia sajikan dalam bentuk studi tokoh dengan menampilkan dua filsuf Yunani yang paling berpengaruh bagi dunia Arab atau Islam, Plato dan Aristoteles, empat filsuf Islam yang berasal dari wilayah timur dan dua dari wilayah barat. Filsuf yang berasal dari wilayah timur adalah al-Farabi, Ibnu Sina, Abu al-‘Ala al-Ma’arry dan al-Ghazali, sementara yang berasal dari wilayah barat adalah Ibnu Rushd dan Ibnu Khaldun.

Bila melihat tokoh-tokoh filsuf Islam yang dikaji, tampak ada sesuatu yang baru yang ingin ditampilkan oleh Shaliba. Kehadiran Abu al-‘Ala al-Ma’arry, al-Ghazali dan Ibnu Khladun sebagai filsuf memberikan makna bahwa yang dimaksud filsafat oleh Shaliba adalah pengertian filsafat dalam arti luas. Hal ini dikarenakan Abu al-‘Ala al-Ma’arry kurang dikenal sebagai tokoh filsuf, ia lebih dikenal sebagai penyair, Al-Ghazali sebagai teolog dan Ibnu Khaldun sebagai sejarawan Islam. Mereka bukanlah para tokoh seperti al-Farabi yang begitu giat mengomentari karya-karya klasik Yunani dan menghasilkan karya utama tentang filsafat politik, al-Madinah al-Fadilah (Negara Utama), atau Ibnu Sina yang asik dengan keruwetan membaca metafisika Aristoteles yang ia bacanya berpuluh-puluh kali, atau bahkan seperti Ibnu Rushd, Sang Rasionalis Islam, yang berupaya keras mengharmonisasikan hubungan filsafat dan agama.

Tentu saja tidak buruk bila Shaliba menampilkan Abu al-Ala al-Ma’arry, al-Ghazali dan Ibnu khaldun sebagai filsuf Arab, bahkan memang sudah selayaknya seperti itu. Dalam sebuah artikel tentang pemikiran Arab kontemporer, Luthfie Syaukani mencatat tiga gerakan utama yang dilakukan oleh intelektual Arab kontemporer untuk membangkitkan kembali gairah filsafat di dunia Arab. Pertama, penerjemahan karya-karya filsafat Islam ke bahasa non-Arab, menyunting dan menerbitkannya kembali. Kedua menerjemahkan karya-karya filsuf barat ke dalam bahasa Arab, dan ketiga adalah membuat tema-tema baru tentang filsafat. Dari tiga gerakan ini, Shaliba masuk dalam gerakan pertama yang berusaha keras memperkenalkan khazanah filsafat klasik Arab yang di antaranya adalah tiga tokoh tadi.

Abu al-‘Ala al-Ma’arry, adalah seorang penyair yang sangat pesimis terhadap dunia. Keyakinannya yang begitu kuat tentang dunia adalah “inna al-syarr fi al-dunya ghalibun ‘ala al-khair”, sesungguhnya keburukan akan selalu menang di dunia ini. Begitu banyak faktor yang melatarbelakangi paham pesimismenya ini. Pada umur tiga tahun ia terkena penyakit yang mengakibatkan penglihatan mata kirinya menjadi hilang, dan kematian ayahnya juga telah membuat ia terpuruk dalam derita kesedihan hilangnya orang yang paling ia cintai. Sementara faktor lainnya adalah pergolakan politik kotor yang memenuhi situasi sosial pada masanya. Sedemikian pesimisnya ia mengatakan tentang dirinya “aku bagaikan sayap yang patah, sehingga aku tak mampu bangkit…” Ungkapan ini menggambarkan ketakberdayaan al-Ma’arry karena kebutaanya. Bukan hanya itu yang membuatnya tak berdaya menghadapi dunia, karakternya yang lemah juga turut mempengaruhi pandangannya itu (295).

Kekecewaan al-Ma’arry terhadap dunia ia ekspresikan dengan anjuran untuk berzuhud, tidak memakan daging dan selibat (tidak menikah). Menurutnya, hidup ini adalah derita, bila seseorang menikah dengan lawan jenisnya dan kemudian melahirkan anak maka ia telah menambah derita hidup ini (298-300). Baginya, fitrah dunia adalah jahat dan derita. Apa yang kita idealkan tentang dunia selalu bertentangan dengan realitas yang ada. Pesimismenya menyimpulkan bahwa kematian lebih baik dari pada kehidupan dan kehancuran dibandingkan kekekalan. Hanya ada satu titik cahaya yang membuatnya tenang. Titik cahaya itu adalah imannya kepada Tuhan (301).

Selain itu, Shaliba juga memotret polemik antara al-Ghazali dengan Ibnu Rushd tentang tiga masalah filsafat yang menyebabkan filsuf seperti al-Farabi dan Ibnu Sina dianggap kafir. Al-Ghazali mempermasalahkan duapuluh masalah filsafat, tiga di antaranya dapat membuat orang yang meyakininya menjadi kafir dan tujuhbelas yang tersisa masuk dalam wilayah bid’ah. Tiga proposisi yang membuat filsuf kafir itu adalah tentang ke-qadim-an alam (keyakinan bahwa alam tidak memiliki awal dan tidak memiliki akhir), ketakpercayaan tehadap kebangkitan jasad (jasmani) beserta perhitungannya dan keyakinan bahwa Allah tidak mengetahui kejadian-kejadian yang pertikular (365).

Ada empat argumen yang dibangun oleh para filsuf (sebagian besar) untuk membuktikan ke-qadim-an alam. Pertama, kemustahilan munculnya sesuatu yang bukan qadim (ada awal dan akhir) dari yang qadim. Dari argumen pertama dilanjutkan pada argumen kedua. Menurut para filsuf, jika Sang Pencipta yang qadim hadir lebih dahulu dibandingkan dengan alam yang qadim, seperti lebih dahulunya satu atas dua atau gerak tangan atas bayangan tangan, maka tidak mungkin yang satu qadim sementara yang lainnya bukan qadim. Yang mungkin adalah kedua-duanya itu qadim atau kedua-duanya bukan qadim, namun kesimpulan yang terakhir ini mustahil bagi Tuhan, berarti yang benar adalah kesimpulan pertama (bahwa dua-duanya qadim). Argumen yang ketiga dan yang keempat menggunakan teori kemungkinan sebagai pembuktian atas qadimnya alam (365-369).

Al-Ghazali membantah semua argumen yang dibangun oleh para filsuf tadi dengan argumen yang filosofis dan cukup rigorus (ketat) juga. Sebagai contoh bagaimana al-Ghazali menanggapi argumen para filsuf ini adalah tanggapannya atas argumen yang pertama. Menurutnya “alam itu bukanlah qadim dan ia disebabkan oleh kehendak yang qadim. Dari kehendak yang qadim ini maka muncul alam yang bukan qadim. Jika adanya alam ini tidak bermula (qadim) maka tidak ada kehendak. Sedangkan adanya alam tidak bergantung pada kehendak yang bukan qadim melainkan pada kehendak yang qadim” (h.366). Semua perdebatan ini ditulis oleh al-Ghazali dalam bukunya Tahafut al-Falasifah (kerancuan para filsuf) yang kemudian dikritik oleh Ibnu Rushd, filsuf dari Andalusia (Spanyol saat ini), lewat buku Tahafut al-Tahafut (kerancuan buku Tahafut al-Ghazali).

Dan tak ketinggalan, Shaliba juga menguraikan metode sejarah Ibnu Khaldun. Menurutnya, Ibnu Khaldun sangat memperhatikan ilmu tentang sejarah dan kritik sejarah namun agak menghindar dari kajian metafisika dan filsafat peripatetik (564). Di antara metode sejarah Ibnu Khaldun yang diangkat adalah teorinya tentang perkembangan masyarakat dan ‘ashabiyah (fanatisme). Menurut Ibnu Khaldun, faktor-faktor yang melatarbelakangi adanya perkembangan adalah kondisi alam dan lingkungan, ekonomi serta faktor pribadi dan sosial (h.576).

Buku setebal 691 halaman ini membahas dengan cukup panjang lebar pemikiran filsafat tokoh-tokoh yang diangkat: Plato tentang dunia ide dan epistemologinya, Aristoteles dengan filsafat pertama, fisika dan konsepnya tentang jiwa; al-Farabi tentang hubungan Allah dengan alam, dan filsafat politiknya yang ditulis dalam buku utamanya, al-Madinah al-Fadilah (Negara Utama); Ibnu Sina tentang ontologi dan jiwa (psikologi). Karenanya dengan uraiannya yang cukup menyeluruh dalam membahas setiap tokoh, buku ini sangat layak dijadikan referensi untuk tema filsafat Islam dalam persinggungannya dengan pemikiran Yunani.

Dalam uraian yang cukup menyeluruh tentang pemikiran filsafat setiap tokoh yang dibahas, sayangnya Shaliba tidak menyertakan tokoh-tokoh lain yang juga mengisi peradaban baik di Yunani dan terlebih di dalam Islam secara menyeluruh pula. Sebut saja al-Kindi, filsuf Arab yang berasal dari wilayah timur tidak disajikan dengan menyeluruh, padahal sebagai filsuf pertama yang ada dalam Islam, perannya tidak kalah penting dengan filsuf seperti al-Farabi dan Ibnu Sina. Begitu juga Ibnu Tufail dan Ibnu Bajah yang berasal dari wilayah barat. Memang bila Shaliba menyajikan filsuf-filsuf ini seperti yang ia sajikan tentang al-Farabi dan lain-lain, maka hasilnya adalah buku yang berjilid-jilid. Namun, bukankah hasil itu yang ditunggu-tunggu untuk pengembangan filsafat Islam atau Arab dalam bidang filsafat. Catatan yang lain, Shaliba tidak mejelaskan dengan begitu detail bagaimana proses peralihan pemikiran Yunani ke dalam dunia Islam. Yang ia uraikan hanya proses penerjemahan besar-besaran pada awal abad ketujuh masehi hingga akhir abad kedelapan. Padahal selain uraian ini, pembaca juga mengharapkan uraian tentang peran para filsuf abad pertengahan seperti Agustinus dan Plotinus dengan neo-platonismenya. ‘Ala kulli hal, karya Shaliba ini patut disambut dengan sikap optimis bagi kebangkitan dan perkembangan filsafat dalam dunia Islam.

© Jurnal Pemikiran Islam Vol.1, No.3, September 2003

International Institute of Islamic Thought Indonesia

Menimbang Mantik:

Antara Al Ghazali dan Ibn Taymiah

Umar M. Noor

Abstract

Mantiq or Logics became polemic in history of Islamic intellectual. Two prominent figures in Mantiq debate were al-Ghazaly and ibn-Taymiya: the first as defender of Mantiq, while the second was trying to reject it. Both are have reasonable arguments. This article tries to describe briefly the debate history. Al-Ghazaly argues that Mantiq is to authorize ones knowledge; no knowledge without Mantiq. Meanwhile, ibn Taymiya argues that syllogisms gave nothing but confusing and difficulties.

Keywords: Mantiq, history of Mantiq, kind of Mantiq, jauhar, tashawwur, tashdiq, had, ta’rif, musallamah, nazhariah, syllogism, burhan, khithabi, jadali, syi’ri, sufusthah, critic on Mantiq

Menuju keharusan ijtihad guna mengiringi gerak zaman memaksa kita untuk mengkaji semua perangkat yang mendukung sahnya sebuah ijtihad. Sebab ijtihad, yang disebut ahli ushul sebagai pengerahan segenap upaya (bazlul majhud) untuk menyimpulkan hukum syara’ dari sumber-sumber aslinya, bukan perkara mudah. Paling tidak, upaya ini memaksa kita untuk mengkaji ulang furu’ dan ushul fiqih kita, bahkan pola pikir yang mendasari produk pemikiran ini. Salah satunya adalah pembahasan tentang mantik sebagai aturan-aturan berpikir yang, diakui atau tidak, berpengaruh sangat besar dalam proses penyimpulan hukum. Berikut ini diskusi antar generasi yang terpisahkan jarak ratusan tahun, dengan Al Ghazali dan Ibn Taymiah sebagai aktor pelakunya.

Mantik: Hakikat dan Sejarahnya

Salah satu perbedaan manusia dari binatang adalah kemampuannya untuk mengabstraksi sesuatu. Yakni, ketika inderanya mencerap suatu benda, akal bekerja melepaskan benda itu dari sifat-sifat material, lalu membandingkannya dengan benda-benda lain yang serupa dengannya dan memproduksi sebuah konsep bersama. Akal terus menerus mengabstraksi hingga mencapai sebuah konsepsi universal paling abstrak (basith) yang mewadahi semua wujud. Ketika ia melihat manusia, misalnya, imajinasinya mengabstraksi benda itu menjadi sebuah spiecies (nau’) yang menaungi semua manusia yang lain. Ia kemudian membandingkan konsep ini dengan konsep binatang, lalu mengabstraksinya menjadi sebuah genus (jenis) yang menaungi keduanya. Proses abstraksi ini berlanjut ketika ia membandingkannya dengan konsep tumbuhan, demikian seterusnya hingga mencapai genus tertinggi yang disebut substansi (jauhar). Pada saat itu, akal berhenti mengabstraksi.

Ahli mantik berkata bahwa pengetahuan yang dicapai manusia hanya dua macam, yakni tashawwur (pengetahuan konseptual), tanpa menetapkan hukum apa-apa atasnya, dan tashdiq (pengetahuan relasional) antara dua hal dengan menetapkan penilaian benar atau salah. Atas dasar ini, aktifitas berpikir manusia hanyalah menyusun satu persatu konsepsi universal (kulliyyat) di otaknya untuk menghasilkan konsepsi universal baru yang sesuai dengan realitas, atau menilai sesuatu dengan sesuatu lainnya. Aktifitas berpikir ini bisa keliru dan bisa juga benar. Maka dibutuhkan sebuah aturan-aturan berpikir tertentu untuk menjaga akal dari kekeliruan berpikir. Dan kumpulan aturan-aturan berpikir itu disebut mantik (logika).

Sebenarnya, Aristoteles bukan orang pertama yang menyusun aturan-aturan berpikir ini, sebab sebelumnya Socrates dan Plato pernah berbicara tentang hal ini. Namun karena Aristoteles adalah orang pertama yang mengumpulkan dan menyusunnya, menetapkannya sebagai kunci ilmu pengetahuan serta menulisnya dalam sebuah karya, ia digelari sebagai “guru pertama”. Organon, bukunya tentang mantik, terdiri dari delapan bagian: Categoria (membahas tentang genus dan bagian-bagiannya), Hermeneutika (tentang proposisi), Sylogisme (tentang qiyas), Demonstrasi (tentang qiyas yang menyimpulkan keyakinan), Dialektika (ilmu debat), Sofistika (qiyas yang menyesatkan), Retorika (seni agitasi massa) dan Poetica (seni menyusun kata-kata puitis).

Pada masa penerjemahan literatur asing atas perintah Khalifah Al Makmun (w. 218 H), buku-buku ini menarik perhatian banyak cendikiawan muslim pada saat itu hingga beberapa dekade setelahnya. Abu Nashr Al Farabi, Abu Ali Ibn Sina dan Ibn Rusyd menulis berbagai komentar dan penjelasan tentang cabang ilmu ini. Kemudian datang generasi selanjutnya yang menyempurnakan ilmu ini dengan memandangnya sebagai ilmu tersendiri, bukan hanya ilmu alat (organon), dengan menambah yang kurang dan membuang yang tidak perlu. Orang pertama yang melakukan ini adalah Imam Fajruddin bin Al Khatib lalu Afdhaluddin Khawanji. Proyek mereka sungguh sukses sehingga berhasil menenggelamkan karya tokoh-tokoh sebelumnya dan mengalahkan metode mereka.

Al Ghazali dan Mantik

Sejak awal kehadirannya di dunia Islam, mantik menyalakan perdebatan sengit di kalangan para ulama, terutama ahli kalam. Mereka sangat anti kepada mantik dan melarang manusia untuk mempelajarinya. Ibn Khaldun berkata bahwa antipati ini lahir karena persinggungan prinsip ilmu kalam dengan mantik yang melahirkan pilihan: terima mantik maka tinggalkan kalam atau terima kalam maka tinggalkan mantik. Padahal, ilmu kalam adalah ilmu dasar yang bertugas menetapkan akidah islamiah menyangkut keesaan Allah dan kebaharuan alam semesta. Bahkan Al Qadhi Abu Bakar Al Baqillani menyatakan bahwa prinsip-prinsip ilmu kalam adalah bagian dari akidah. Menyerangnya sama dengan berusaha menghancurkan sendi-sendi akidah islamiah.

Kemudian datang Hujjatul Islam Abu Hamid Al Ghazali (w. 505 H) yang mendamaikan keduanya. Kharisma dan argumentasinya berhasil mengakhiri perdebatan ini dan membuat ilmu mantik diterima di kalangan sunni. Meski terkenal sebagai musuh besar filsafat, bahkan berhasil membuatnya pingsan dengan Tahafut ul Falasifah-nya, Al Ghazali sangat menyayang anak kandung filsafat ini. Ia menulis beberapa karya tentangnya, antara lain Mi’yar ul-‘Ilm, Al Mankhul, Mihak un-Nazhar, beberapa lembar di mukaddimah Al Mustashfa dan secara tersirat dalam dialog dengan seorang penganut Syiah Ismailiah di Al Qisthas ul-Mustaqim. Berikut sedikit ringkasan tentang mantik ala Al Ghazali yang bisa penulis tampilkan pada kesempatan kali ini.

Seperti Al Farabi dan Ibn Sina, Al Ghazali berpendapat bahwa mantik adalah aturan-aturan berpikir yang berfungsi meluruskan akal dalam menarik kesimpulan dan membebaskannya dari campuran prasangka dan imajinasi. Tugas utama mantik dengan demikian adalah menjaga akal dari kesalahan berpikir. Mantik bagi akal sepadan dengan posisi nahwu bagi bahasa Arab dan ilmu ‘Arud bagi ritme puisi (syair). Meminjam analogi Al Farabi, mantik bagi akal ibarat neraca dan takaran yang berfungsi mengukur bobot benda yang tak bisa diketahui ukurannya dengan tepat jika hanya menggunakan indera. Atau ibarat penggaris untuk mengukur panjang dan lebar sesuatu yang indera manusia sering keliru dalam memastikannya.

Al Ghazali bahkan menegaskan bahwa mantik merupakan mukaddimah (organon) seluruh ilmu --bukan hanya pengantar filsafat. Maka barangsiapa yang tidak menguasai mantik, seluruh pengetahuannya rusak dan diragukan.

Sebagaimana telah dijelaskan di muka, pengetahuan manusia terbagi dua, yaitu tashawur dan tashdiq. Pengetahuan tashawur terbagi dua: pertama, pengetahuan yang telah ada di otak manusia sejak awal (a priori) sehingga pengetahuan tentangnya tidak membutuhkan penjelasan panjang lebar. Contoh, pengetahuan tentang makna ‘ada’, ‘banyak’ dan beberapa benda-benda inderawi lainnya. Kedua, pengetahuan tentang konsep-konsep samar yang memerlukan penjelasan lebih lanjut. Untuk yang kedua ini diperlukan sebuah definisi (had/ta’rif) yang memperjelas makna kata tersebut. Sementara itu, pengetahuan tashdiq juga terbagi menjadi dua: relasi aksiomatik (musallamah) yang kebenarannya tidak perlu pembuktian dan relasi hipotetik (nazhariah) yang harus dibuktikan kebenarannya. Alat pembuktian itu disebut demonstrasi (sylogisme). Dengan demikian, pokok bahasan mantik tersimpul pada empat komponen, yaitu pembahasan tentang tashawwur, had (definisi), tashdiq dan sylogisme. Di atas kita telah membahas tentang makna tashawwur dan tashdiq, maka pembahasan berikutnya adalah tentang had dan sylogisme.

1. Definisi (Had)

Ahli mantik sepakat bahwa definisi menghasilkan pengetahuan hakikat sesuatu dan tanpanya pengetahuan tashawwur tidak bisa didapatkan. Untuk membuat sebuah definisi sempurna, harus diperhatikan beberapa aturan (qanun) penting berikut ini. Aturan pertama, definisi adalah jawaban untuk sebuah pertanyaan. Karena bentuk pertanyaan yang dilontarkan bermacam-macam, maka jawabannya pun bermacam-macam pula, sehingga mempengaruhi bentuk definisi. Memahami bentuk pertanyaan dengan demikian menentukan kualitas sebuah jawaban, maka pembahasan tentang bentuk-bentuk pertanyaan harus dikuasai terlebih dahulu. Pertanyaan ‘apa’ menuntut tiga hal: penjelasan kata (apa itu reformasi? Reformasi adalah pembentukan kembali), penjelasan tentang uraian sesuatu yang membedakannya dengan sesuatu yang lain dengan ciri-ciri lazimnya (apa itu khamr? Khamr adalah benda cair yang berbusa), dan penjelasan hakikat serta essensi sesuatu (apa itu khamr? Khamr adalah minuman memabukkan yang dibuat dari perasan anggur). Definisi pertama disebut definisi lafzhi, sebab hanya menjelaskan makna kata. Kedua disebut rasmi, sebab hanya menjelaskan ciri eksternal (rasm) sesuatu, bukan hakikatnya. Dan yang ketiga disebut definisi hakiki, sebab ia menjelaskan hakikat dan essensi sesuatu dengan mendalam. Pertanyaan ‘mengapa’ menuntut pembuktian dengan sylogisme yang akan dijelaskan nanti. Dan pertanyaan ‘yang mana’ meminta pemilahan antara dua hal yang hampir serupa. Pertanyaan dengan ‘bagaimana’, ‘di mana’, ‘kapan’ dan bentuk-bentuk lain termasuk dalam penjelasan dari pertanyaan ‘apakah’ yakni menuntut penjelasan tentang sifat sesuatu.

Aturan kedua, seorang pembuat definisi harus bisa membedakan antara sifat essensial (dzati), aksidental (‘aridh) dan lazim dari sesuatu. Sifat essensial (dzati) adalah sifat yang masuk dalam essensi dan hakikat sesuatu, tidak mungkin sesuatu itu dipahami tanpa menyertakan sifat ini. Contoh sifat essensial adalah makna ‘warna’ yang dipahami dari kata ‘hitam’, dan makna ‘benda’ dari kata ‘pohon’, misalnya. Sifat lazim adalah sifat yang selalu menyertai benda namun pemahaman hakikat benda itu tidak tergantung padanya. Seperti bayangan yang menyertai fostur manusia ketika matahari terbit. Memahami hakikat manusia bisa dilakukan tanpa menyertai kata bayangan sedikitpun. Sifat aksidental (‘aridh) adalah sifat yang harus menyertai benda namun bisa hilang cepat atau lambat.

Untuk menyusun sebuah definisi yang logis, diperlukan sifat essensial untuk menjelaskan hakikat sesuatu. Sifat essensial terbagi menjadi umum, selanjutnya disebut genus (jins), dan khusus, selanjutnya disebut spesies (nau’). Makhluk adalah genus untuk kata manusia, binatang dan tumbuhan. Selanjutnya, manusia adalah genus untuk kata Usman, Fatimah dan lain-lain.

Aturan ketiga, dalam membuat definisi logis, pertama kali yang harus Anda lakukan adalah memasukkan semua komponen definisi, yakni genus dan differensia (fashal). Contoh, manusia adalah hewan (genus) yang berpikir (differensia). Kedua, Anda harus inventaris sifat-sifat essensial dari obyek yang hendak didefinisikan. Ketiga, jika Anda menemukan genus yang dekat, jangan pilih yang lebih jauh. Contoh, genus terdekat untuk khamar adalah minuman, maka jangan pilih kata benda cair untuk mendefinisikannya. Keempat, hindari sebisa mungkin kata-kata samar dan kiasan.

Singkatnya, sebuah definisi yang baik harus terbuka-tertutup (muththarid wa mun’akis), yakni terbuka untuk semua entitas dari sesuatu yang hendak didefinisikan (kulli fardin min afrad al mu’arraf) dan tertutup untuk selain entitas-entitas itu.

2. Sylogisme

Ahli mantik sepakat bahwa sylogisme adalah satu-satunya jalan mencapai pengetahuan tashdiq dan melahirkan pengetahuan meyakinkan. Sylogisme adalah beberapa proposisi yang disusun sedemikian rupa dengan syarat-syarat tertentu sehingga melahirkan kesimpulan (natijah) yang dicari. Proposisi ini disebut premis (muqaddimah), ysng terbagi dua menjadi mayor (muqaddimah kubra) dan minor (muqaddimah shughra). Sylogisme yang baik adalah yang tersusun dari premis-premis sahih dan meyakinkan, serta disusun dengan cara yang benar. Ibarat membangun sebuah rumah, yang harus diperhatikan pertama kali adalah bahan material (batu, semen dan kayu) yang membentuk rumah itu, kemudian cara pembuatannya dan terakhir bentuk rumah tersebut. Begitu juga dalam membangun sebuah sylogisme, yang harus diperhatikan pertama kali adalah kata dan makna yang menjadi materi premis, kemudian cara penyusunan premis-premis yang sah, lalu bentuk sylogisme yang dapat menghasilkan kesimpulan. Maka pembahasan sylogisme ini akan dimulai dengan pembahasan tentang makna dan kata, dilanjutkan dengan pembahasan tentang cara penyusunan premis dan terakhir pembahasan tentang bentuk-bentuk sylogisme.

a. Makna dan Kata

Penunjukan kata untuk makna terjadi dalam tiga bentuk: muthabaqah, tadhdmmun dan iltizam. Kata rumah disebut muthabaqah jika merefers kepada makna rumah secara konvensional. Disebut tadhammun jika kata tersebut merefers kepada atap saja, misalnya. Dan relasi sebuah kata dengan makna disebut iltizam jika kata tersebut merefers kepada hal yang diluar pengertian kata itu namun sesuatu yang selalu mengiringinya. Seperti menyebut kata atap untuk menunjuk tembok.

Relasi kata dan makna yang lain adalah sebuah kata disebut mu’ayyan jika hanya merujuk kepada satu obyek tertentu, namun jika merujuk kepada banyak obyek disebut mutlaq. Contoh mu’ayyan, kata Zaid, Ahmad dan lain-lain. Contoh mutlaq, kata manusia, pohon dan seterusnya.

Pembagian kata yang lain adalah mutaradifah, mutabayinah, mutawathiah dan musytarakah. Hubungan antara kata “bisa” dan “racun” disebut mutaradifah (sinonim). Hubungan antara kata “singa”, “langit”, “kunci” disebut mutabayinah (tak ada kesamaan). Hubungan antara kata “Zaid”, “Ahmad”, “Hasan” dengan kata laki-laki disebut mutawathiah (hiponimi). Hubungan antara kata “bisa” yang berarti racun dan kata “bisa” yang berarti mampu disebut musytarakah (homonim).

b. Proposisi

Penyusunan dua makna yang melahirkan justifikasi benar-salah disebut proposisi (qadhiyah). Proposisi terbagi empat: ta’yin (contoh, Zaid seorang sekretaris), umum (contoh, setiap benda pasti berbobot), khusus (contoh, sebagian manusia berilmu) dan muhmal (contoh, manusia dalam kerugian).

c. Kontradiksi

Suatu proposisi kadang dengan mudah disimpulkan kebenarannya hanya dengan melihat kelirunya proposisi yang menjadi lawannya. Contoh, alam ini kekal atau alam ini tidak kekal. Jika proposisi yang pertama benar, maka yang kedua salah, demikian sebaliknya. Syarat sahnya kontradiksi ada enam, yaitu satu dalam subyek, satu dalam predikat, satu dalam relasi (idhafah), satu dalam potensi dan aktual, satu dalam universal dan partikular, satu dalam tempat dan waktu.

d. Macam-macam Qiyas (Sylogisme)

Ahli mantik berkata bahwa dalil yang menghasilkan pengetahuan hanya tiga, yaitu deduksi, induksi dan penyerupaan (tamtsili). Sebab pembuktian hanya bisa dilakukan dengan pembuktian universal atas particular (kulli ‘ala juz’i), partikular atas universal (juz’i ‘ala kulli) dan partikular atas particular (juz’i ‘ala juz’i). Yang pertama disebut deduksi (menempati peringkat pertama dalam pembuktian). Yang kedua disebut induksi (menempati peringkat kedua). Dan yang ketiga disebut penyerupaan (menempati peringkat terendah).

Qiyas penyerupaan adalah perpindahan dari satu particular ke particular lain yang memiliki keserupaan dalam sifat dengannya. Qiyas ini sering digunakan para fuqaha dalam menyimpulkan hukum syar’i atas sesuatu. Jika seseorang bertanya, “Apa itu roti,” lalu diperlihatkan kepadanya sebuah roti, maka selanjutnya ia akan menyebut roti untuk sesuatu yang serupa dengan yang ia lihat itu, meski bentuk dan warnanya berbeda.

Induksi terbagi dua: jika bagian-bagiannya (al afrad) terbatas sehingga bisa diteliti semuanya maka induksi ini sempurna dan melahirkan pengetahuan meyakinkan. Namun jika bagian-bagiannya tak terbatas sehingga hanya menetapkan hukum atas sebagian besarnya, maka disebut induksi tidak sempurna dan tidak menghasilkan keyakinan (zhan).

Terakhir deduksi, jika premis-premisnya terdiri dari materi meyakinkan dengan bersandarkan kepada dalil-dalil aksiomatik (yaitu inderawi lahir, perasaan batin, ekperimental, berita mutawatir dan kepastian rasional), menghasilkan kesimpulan meyakinkan. Qiyas ini disebut demonstrasi (burhan). Jika tidak, maka salah satu dari retorika (khithabi), dialektika (jadali), poetika (syi’ri) atau sofistika (sufusthah).

e. Bentuk demonstrasi

Bentuk demonstrasi ada tiga: Bentuk pertama, yakni proposisi yang saling sepadan (ta’adul) terdiri dari tiga skema;

Pertama, illat (kopula) berada di predikat (premis I) dan di subyek (premis II).

Setiap bir memabukkan.

Setiap yang memabukkan hukumnya haram

Kesimpulan : Setiap bir hukumnya haram

Kedua, illat berada di predikat kedua premis.

Sang Pencipta tidak tersusun

Setiap benda tersusun

Kesimpulan : Sang Pencipta bukan benda

Ketiga, illat berada di subyek kedua premis.

Setiap hitam adalah sifat

Setiap hitam adalah warna

Kesimpulan : Sebagian sifat adalah warna

Bentuk kedua, yaitu proposisi yang saling menentukan (talazum). Pakar logika menyebutnya syarat bersambung (syarti al muttashil). Bentuk ini terdiri dari empat skema, namun hanya dua yang berkesimpulan. Keduanya adalah:

Pertama, menerima sebab berarti menerima akibat.

Jika shalat sah, maka pelakunya suci (telah berwudhu)

Shalat itu sah

Kesimpulan : pelakunya suci

Kedua, menerima negasi akibat berarti menerima negasi sebab.

Jika shalat sah, maka pelakunya suci (telah berwudhu)

Pelakunya tidak suci

Kesimpulan : shalatnya tidak sah

Kedua skema yang tidak berkesimpulan adalah:

Pertama, menerima akibat belum tentu menerima sebab.

Jika shalat sah, maka pelakunya suci (telah berwudhu)

Pelakunya suci, tapi belum tentu shalatnya sah (sebab boleh jadi shalat itu batal karena hal lain).

Kedua, menerima negasi sebab, belum tentu menyimpulkan akibat atau negasi akibat.

Jika shalat sah, maka pelakunya suci (telah berwudhu)

Shalatnya tidak sah, belum tentu karena pelakunya tidak suci.

Bentuk ketiga, disebut bentuk saling menentang (ta’anud). Pakar logika menyebutnya syarat terpisah (syarti al munfashil), sementara ahli kalam menyebutnya Sabr wa Taqsim. Bentuk ini juga terbagi menjadi empat pengandaian:

Contoh: Alam ini kekal atau diciptakan

Pengandaian pertama: Alam ini diciptakan

Kesimpulan: Alam ini tidak kekal

Pengandaian kedua: Alam ini kekal

Kesimpulan: Alam ini tidak diciptakan

Pengandaian ketiga: Alam ini tidak diciptakan

Kesimpulan: Alam ini kekal

Pengandaian keempat: Alam ini tidak kekal

Kesimpulan: Alam ini diciptakan

f. Mantik di Dalam Al Qur'an?

Menariknya, Abu Hamid al Ghazali mengatakan bahwa Al Qur’an menggunakan tiga cara penyimpulan logis ini (ta’adul, talazum dan ta’anud) dalam menjawab argumentasi penentangnya. Sang Hujjatul Islam menamakan ketiganya dengan ‘Neraca Al Qur’an’ (mizan Al Qur'an), serta menafsirkan ayat-ayat Al Qur’an yang menyebut mizan dengan model pembuktian logis ini. Untuk neraca ta’anud, Al Ghazali mengajukan tiga ayat yang sekaligus menandai tiga bentuk skemanya. Ayat pertama, ucapan Ibrahim As ketika berdebat dengan Namruz, “Sesungguhnya Allah menerbitkan matahari dari timur, maka (jika kau tuhan) terbitkanlah dari barat!” (Qs Al Baqarah [2]: 258). Al Ghazali kemudian merangkainya dalam bentuk burhan, ia berkata:

Setiap yang mampu menerbitkan matahari adalah tuhan (premis I)

Allah mampu menerbitkan matahari (premis II)

Kesimpulan: Allah tuhan

Al Ghazali menamakan skema pertama dari neraca ta’adul ini dengan neraca besar. Berikutnya adalah neraca pertengahan, yaitu terdapat dalam ayat (masih tentang Ibrahim As, kali ini ketika ia mencari tuhan lalu kebetulan melihat bulan), “Ketika bulan itu terbenam, ia berkata aku tak suka sesuatu yang tenggelam.” (Qs Al An’am [6]: 7) Uraiannya sebagai berikut:

Bulan tenggelam

Tuhan tidak mungkin tenggelam

Kesimpulan: Bulan bukan tuhan

Skema terakhir dari neraca ta’adul adalah neraca kecil, yaitu terdapat dalam firman Allah, “Mereka tidak menghargai Allah dengan seharusnya ketika mereka berkata Allah tidak menurunkan (wahyu) apapun kepada manusia. Katakanlah, ‘Lalu siapa yang menurunkan Kitab kepada Musa sebagai cahaya dan petunjuk bagi manusia?’” Uraian logisnya sebagai berikut:

Musa As manusia

Musa As menerima wahyu (Al Kitab) dari Allah

Kesimpulan: Sebagian manusia ada yang menerima wahyu

Neraca talazum terdapat dalam ayat, “Jika ada tuhan selain Allah, niscaya langit dan bumi akan hancur.” (Qs Al Anbiya [21]: 22). Rinciannya:

Jika di dunia ini ada tuhan lain, maka dunia akan hancur

Nyatanya dunia tidak hancur

Kesimpulan: Tidak ada tuhan lain

Terakhir, neraca ta’anud terdapat dalam ayat, “Katakanlah (wahai Muhammad), ‘Siapa yang memberi rizki kepada kalian dari langit dan bumi?’ katakanlah, ‘Allah, dan kami atau kalian yang mendapat petunjuk atau dalam kesesatan yang nyata.’” (Qs Saba [34]: 24). Uraiannya adalah:

Kami atau kalian (salah satu dari kita) berada di dalam kesesatan

Kami tidak dalam kesesatan

Kesimpulan: Kalian berada dalam kesesatan

Perhatikan bagaimana Al Ghazali menempatkan mantik bukan sebagai warisan tradisi Hellenistik, tetapi merupakan bagian inheren dari Al Qur’an. Maka jangan heran jika kemudian hari Hujjatul Islam ini memfatwakan bahwa mempelajari ilmu mantik sebuah fardhu kifayah, dan barangsiapa tidak menguasai ilmu ini pengetahuannya patut diragukan.

Ibn Taymiah dan Kritik Mantik

Abul Abbas Ahmad bin Abdul Halim bin Abdussalam bin Abdullah Ibn Taymiah lahir di Haran pada Rabi’ ul Awal 661 H. Pada tahun 667 H, ayahnya membawanya ke Damaskus ketika bangsa Tartar menyerbu Haran. Di kota ini, ia mempelajari hadis, fiqih, ushul, tafsir bahkan juga fiksafat dan logika. Allah menganugerahinya banyak buku, kecerdasan dalam memahami sesuatu serta hafalan kuat sehingga tidak pernah melupakan sesuatu yang pernah dihafalnya. Selain itu, ia juga seorang zuhud dan ikhlas dalam memerintahkan kebaikan dan melarang kemunkaran. Persengketaan yang terjadi antara dirinya dan para pendengki membuahkan penahanan dirinya di benteng (qal’ah) Damaskus, dekat makam Abu Darda. Setelah beberapa hari menderita sakit dipengasingannya, pada tahun 728 H beliau meninggal dunia lalu dimakamkan di pekuburan Shufiah dengan diiringi ribuan manusia.

Ibn Taymiah terkenal sebagai ulama yang sangat keras mempertahankan sunnah dan menentang bid’ah. Termasuk dalam hal ini adalah penentangannya terhadap mantik sebagai produk pemikiran Yunani yang bertentangan dengan tradisi para salaf saleh. Buku-bukunya tentang hal ini antara lain adalah Naqdh ul-Mantiq, Ar-Rad ‘ala Manthiqiyyin dan Nashihat Ahl il-Iman fir Radd ‘ala Mantiq il-Yunan. Dalam tulisan kali ini, saya akan memfokuskan pembahasan kritik mantik Ibn Taymiah kepada satu pengantar, yaitu pernyataan bahwa hukum mempelajari mantik adalah fardhu kifayah, dan dua bahasan pokok yang berkenaan dengan definisi dan sylogisme.

a. Pengantar: Mantik Wajib Dipelajari?

Penegasan Al Ghazali yang menyatakan bahwa hukum mempelajari mantik fardhu kifayah menyulut kritikan dari berbagai ulama hingga berabad-abad kemudian. Abu Bakar Ibn Al ‘Arabi, murid Al Ghazali sendiri, mengomentari, “Al Ghazali, guru kita, menelan filsafat lalu mencoba memuntahkannya kembali, namun ia tidak bisa.” Abu Amr Ibn Shalah menolak pendapat Al Ghazali dan mengatakan bahwa setiap orang yang otaknya cerdas otomatis berpikirnya logis tanpa harus belajar mantik. Berdiri dalam barisan penolak ini, Ibn Taymiah berkata, “Pendapat Abu Hamid (Al Ghazali) ini salah besar, baik dilihat dari segi rasional maupun agama. Dari segi rasional, terbukti bahwa manusia-manusia cerdas yang berbicara tentang ilmu bisa menguraikan pengetahuan mereka tanpa mantik Yunani. Secara agama, siapapun tahu bahwa agama tidak pernah mewajibkan kita untuk mempelajari mantik.”

Ibn Taymiah juga menyalahkan penafsiran kata al mizan dalam Al Qur'an dengan mantik Yunani dengan beberapa alasan. Pertama, Allah telah menurunkan Neraca Qur’ani jauh sebelum Aristoteles menemukan mantik. Kedua, umat Islam telah menggunakan Neraca Qur’ani ini sebelum buku-buku mantik diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasa Arab. Ketiga, sejak masa penerjemahan buku-buku ini hingga sekarang, tokoh-tokoh Islam selalu mengajukan keberatannya terhadap mantik dan menulis bantahan-bantahan terhadapnya. Neraca yang Allah turunkan bersama Al Kitab itu, menurut Ibn Taymiah, adalah neraca keseimbangan (mizan ‘adilah) yang memuat aktualisasi fitrah manusia yang menyamakan dua hal yang mirip satu sama lain (mutamatsilain) dan memisahkan dua hal yang berbeda (mukhtalifain). Sebagai contoh, firman Allah, “Apakah kalian mengira bahwa kalian akan masuk surga padahal kalian belum menemui (kesulitan) seperti umat sebelum kalian?” (Qs Al Baqarah [2]: 214) dalam menyamakan antara generasi saat ini dengan generasi sebelumnya. Dan Allah berfirman, “Apakah (kalian mengira) bahwa Kami akan memperlakukan orang-orang yang beriman seperti para durjana?” (Qs Al Qalam [68]: 35) dalam membedakan antara kedua golongan yang berbeda ini.

b. Bantahan Terhadap Definisi

Benarkah pengetahuan tashawwuri tidak bisa diperoleh tanpa definisi logis dengan lima universalitasnya (kulliyat al khams), yakni genus (jins), differensia (fashl), species (nau’), aksiden umum (‘ardh ‘am) dan aksiden khusus (‘ardh khash)? Ibn Taymiah mengajukan 11 kritik untuk membantah pernyataan ini. Pada kesempatan kali ini, saya hanya akan mencantumkan empat dari sebelas kritik itu.

1. Penegasian (nafy), seperti juga penetapan (itsbat), jika bukan aksiomatik harus dilandasi bukti. Karena tidak ada bukti yang mendukungnya, maka pernyataan ini wajib ditolak.

2. Jika definisi adalah ucapan seorang pembuat definisi, maka ia telah mengetahui benda yang akan didefinisikan ini lewat definisi atau tidak. Jika ya, maka mewajibkan argumentasi berputar (daur) dan berantai (tasalsul) yang tidak akan habis. Jika tidak, maka batal ucapan negasi mereka.

3. Konsepsi hakikat tidak bisa dilakukan kecuali lewat definisi hakiki yang terdiri dari essensi universal (musytarakah) dan terpilah (mutamayyizah), yakni yang tersusun dari genus dan defferensia, dan ini mustahil atau sangat sulit sebagaimana pengakuan mereka sendiri. Dengan demikian, mustahil atau sangat sulit mengkonsepsikan hakikat, padahal terbukti hakikat itu bisa dikonsepsikan manusia, maka batallah pernyataan mereka.

4. Benda-benda konseptual bisa diketahui dengan indera lahir (seperti warna, rasa dan bau) atau dengan indera batin (seperti lapar, cinta, benci, keinginan dan lain-lain). Semua ini bisa diketahui tanpa memerlukan definisi. Jadi, batal pernyataan mereka bahwa konsepsi (tashawwur) tidak bisa dicapai tanpa definisi.

Persoalan berikutnya, benarkan definisi menghasilkan pengetahuan tentang hakikat sesuatu? Menurut Ibn Taymiah, definisi tidak memberikan pengetahuan tentang hakikat, akan tetapi hanya membedakan sesuatu dari lainnya. Definisi seperti nama, hanya membedakan seseorang dari orang lain tanpa menjelaskan hakikatnya. Untuk ini, Ibn Taymiah mengajukan beberapa bukti:

1. Definisi hanyalah pernyataan pembuatnya tanpa bukti. Ketika seseorang berkata, “Manusia adalah hewan yang berpikir”, ini hanya kalimat informatif tanpa bukti. Maka sudahkah pendengar mengetahui kebenarannya tanpa ucapan ini atau belum? Jika sudah, definisi ini tidak menghasilkan pengetahuan tentang sesuatu itu. Jika belum, bagaimana ia bisa meyakini kebenarannya hanya berdasarkan informasi satu orang yang tidak terjaga dari kesalahan?

2. Mereka berkata bahwa definisi tidak bisa dibuktikan, hanya bisa ditentang. Jawab: jika seorang pembuat definisi tidak mengajukan bukti, pendengar bisa saja tidak menerima definisi itu. Sebab ia tidak bisa mengetahui sesuatu yang didefinisikan itu tanpa ucapannya, sementara ucapannya mengandung kemungkinan benar dan salah, maka ia bisa menolak menerimanya.

Sumber kesalahan ahli mantik yang lain adalah pemilahan antara hakikat dan wujud sesuatu. Menurut mereka, keduanya ada di alam nyata. Jadi, hakikat-hakikat universal dari benda-benda parsial, seperti manusia, kuda dan lain-lain, adalah realitas sebagaimana wujudnya yang kita lihat ini. Realitas-realitas ini azali dan tidak bisa berubah, inilah yang mereka sebut sebagai “ide-ide platonis”. Menurut Ibn Taymiah, ini pemilahan yang sangat keliru. Pemilahan yang benar adalah pemilahan antara abstraksi yang ada di otak manusia dengan benda yang ada di alam nyata, sebab pemilahan ini tak diragukan kebenarannya. Dan hakikat berada di alam nyata, bukan di benak manusia (al haqiqah fil a’yan la fil azhan). Sementara memperkirakan adanya hakikat yang tidak didukung dalil ilmiah dan realitas hanyalah sebuah kebodohan.

c. Bantahan Terhadap Sylogisme

Menurut Ibn Taymiah, sylogisme tidak menghasilkan apa-apa selain kerumitan dan kepusingan. Seperti orang yang ditanya, “Mana telingamu?”, ia lalu mengangkat tangan kanannya tinggi-tinggi kemudian menunjukkan telinga kirinya. Meski begitu, Ibn Taymiah mengakui bahwa sebuah sylogisme yang terdiri dari premis-premis meyakinkan (atau disebut demonstrasi [burhan]) menghasilkan kesimpulan yang meyakinkan. Kritik Ibn Taymiah hanya ditujukan kepada pernyataan mereka bahwa sylogisme satu-satunya cara mencapai kesimpulan meyakinkan dengan menafikan cara-cara lainnya. “Mereka benar dalam apa yang mereka tetapkan, namun keliru dalam apa yang mereka negasikan,” demikian Ibn Taymiah, “dan negasi mereka inilah sumber kesesatan dan kefasikan mereka.”

Ibn Taymiah kemudian menyebutkan bukti-bukti kelirunya pernyataan ini. Ia menyebutkan bahwa para nabi dan para wali memiliki pengetahuan yang mereka peroleh tanpa jalan sylogisme. Begitu juga, ilmu firasat yang terbukti kebenarannya, diperoleh tanpa sylogisme. Bagi orang tertentu, terbit bintang tertentu menunjukkan arah Ka’bah, terbitnya bintang ini menunjukkan tenggelam atau terbitnya bintang lain di ufuk, dan lain-lain. Allah berfirman, “Dan dengan bintang, mereka mendapatkan petunjuk.” Juga, bagi orang yang mengetahui jarak antar bintang, melihat posisi bintang memberitahunya waktu malam yang tersisa. Begitu juga, orang tertentu bisa mengetahui nama negeri yang ia datangi dengan gunung, sungai dan angin yang ia lihat dan rasakan. Semua ini tidak menggunakan sylogisme logis ala Yunani sama sekali.

Oleh karena itu, para tokoh muslim tidak menggunakan dalil sylogisme ini. Sebab menurut mereka, dalil adalah sarana yang membawa kepada tujuan. Yakni mengetahui dalil harus membawa kepada pengetahuan yang dituju, atau kepada keyakinan yang benar. Mereka lebih menyukai pembuktian dengan dalil persamaan (tamsil), sebab pembuktian ini lebih meyakinkan dan lebih dekat dengan metode Al Qur'an. Pembuktian ini bertumpu kepada dalil sesuatu me-lazim-kan sesuatu yang lain, atau keduanya saling me-lazim-kan. Contoh: adanya alam semesta melazimkan adanya pencipta. Selain itu, pembuktian ini juga bertumpu kepada kemungkinan yang benar-benar nyata (imkan khariji), bukan kemungkinan rasional semata (imkan dzihni) yang belum tentu ada kenyataannya. Kemungkinan nyata dapat diketahui dengan melihat terjadinya sesuatu yang mirip dengannya atau yang lebih sulit darinya. Ini cara Al Qur’an dalam membuktikan adanya hari kebangkitan. Yakni dengan menguraikan fakta historis terjadinya kebangkitan orang yang telah mati sebagaimana yang terjadi pada kaum Nabi Musa, penghuni gua (ashhabul kahfi), dan mukjidzat Nabi Isa. Atau dengan menjelaskan proses penciptaan manusia, sebab menghidupkan kembali lebih mudah daripada menciptakannya pertama kali.

Penutup: Pengaruh ibn Taymiah

Ketika sekilas saya mengamati buku “Kubra Al Yaqiniat Al Kauniah: Wujud ul-Khaliq wa Wazifat ul-Makhluq” karya Dr Said Ramadhan Al Buthi, saya menemukan sedikit peninggalan Ibn Taymiah di dalamnya. Dalam pengantar cetakan ketiga-nya, Dr Said menulis, “Apakah dalam menguraikan pembahasan akidah islamiah dalam buku ini kami berpedoman kepada filsafat Yunani dan logika formal (mantik shuri)?…Kami tidak menggunakannya sama sekali. Kami hanya menyajikan kepada pembaca dalil-dalil dan bukti-bukti yang diakui akurasinya sepanjang sejarah meski diungkapkan dengan bahasa yang berbeda-beda.”

Selanjutnya, setelah menyebutkan kekurangan dan kelebihan mantik, Dr Buthi berkata, “Kami tidak berkata bahwa filsafat Yunani dan logika Aristoteles semuanya salah. Tidak ada alasan sama sekali untuk menutup mata dan pikiran darinya. Di dalamnya banyak hal yang bermanfaat, namun banyak pula yang menyulut kritikan dari para ulama dan filosof muslim. Orang yang selalu hendak membangun pemikirannya dengan dasar-dasar ilmiah harus mampu memilih yang baik dari orang lain, daripada menolaknya sama sekali.” Ini pendirian Ibn Taymiah yang mengakui adanya hal-hal positif dalam mantik, karena itu ia tidak membantah demonstrasi yang didukung premis-premis meyakinkan, meski negatifnya lebih banyak daripada positifnya.

Kemudian, di pembukaan (tamhid) yang membandingkan metode ilmiah pemikir muslim dan pemikir Barat, Dr Buthi menyebutkan bahwa analisa rasional yang digunakan kaum muslimin dalam membahas sesuatu yang tidak diberitakan oleh Al Qur'an dan hadis mutawatir adalah dilalah iltizam dan qiyas ‘illat. Dan keduanya benar-benar metode alternatif yang ditawarkan Ibn Taymiah. Wallahu A’lam.

Catatan:

Abdurrahman bin Khaldun, Diwan ul-Mubtada wal Khabar fi Tarikh ‘Arab wal Barbar wa man ‘asharahum min Dzaw il-Sya’n il-Akbar (Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun), (Damaskus: Dar ul-Fikr, 2003), h. 486.

Ibid. h. 487

Ibid. h. 488

Lihat Ibid. h. 488-489 sebab ini sangat penting.

Abu Nasr Al Farabi, Ihsha ul-‘Ulum, (Mesir: Dar Al Fikr Al ‘Arabi, tth.), h. 54.

Abu Hamid Al Ghazali, Al Mustashfa fi ‘Ilm Al Ushul, (Beirut: Dar ul Qalam, tth.), jilid I, h. 29. Pernyataan ini menyulut kecaman keras dari Ibn Taymiah dan lain-lain sebagaimana yang akan saya jelaskan di bab berikutnya. Lihat h. 8 dari makalah ini.

Ibid, h. 30.

Kedua pernyataan tentang definisi ini, yakni definisi menghasilkan pengetahuan dan tashawwur tidak bisa dicapai tanpanya, akan dibantah Ibn Taymiah pada bab berikutnya. Lihat h. 9.

Ibid, h. 33-36.

Pembagian sifat benda ini juga kelak akan dibantah Ibn Taymiah. Lihat h. 9.

Ibid, h. 75.

Ibid, h.79.

Ibid, h. 88.

Ibid, h. 90-92.

Ibn Taymiah kelak membantah pernyataan ini. Lihat h. 8.

Abu Hamid Al Ghazali, “Al Qisthas ul Mustaqim” dalam Majmu’at Rasail Al Imam Al Ghazali (Beirut: Dar ul-Kutub il-Ilmiah, tth.), jilid III, h. 14.

Ibid, h. 20.

Ibid, h. 24.

Ibid, h. 26.

Ibid, h. 28.

Ibrahim bin Muhammad bin Muflih, Al Maqshad Al Al Arsyad fi Dzikr Ashhab Al Imam Ahmad,(Riyad: Maktabah Rusyd, 1990), jilid 1, h. 139.

Al Dzahabi, Op. Cit., h. 327.

Ibid, h. 329.

Ibn Taymiah, “Nashihat ahli l-Iman fi r-radd ‘ala Mantiq il-Yunan” dalam Majmu’ Fatawa, (Riyadh: King Fahd, tth. ), h.

Ibid. h.

Ibid. h.

Ibid. h.

Ibid, h.

Ibid. h.

Ibid. h.

Ibid. h.

Dr Said Ramadhan Al Buthi, Kubra Al Yaqiniat il Kauniah: Wujud ul-Khaliq wa Wazifat ul-Makhluq, (Damaskus: Dar ul-Fikr, 1998), h. 17.

Ibid. h. 18.

Ibid. h.40-44

Umar, alumni jurusan Tafsir Hadits UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. Kini tengah tinggal di Damaskus, mengikuti persiapan (i’dady) kuliah di Universitas

Transmisi Kebudayaan Yunani

Dalam Peradaban Islam

Sunaryo

Abstract

The article explores chain of thoughts that connecting Islamic philosophy with Greek philosophy. Article’s writer found relation between two philosophies through thoughts of Plato, Aristotle and Parmenides. The relation between both Islamic and Greek philosophy can be seen within philosophical themes that has been developed in golden age of Islamic civilization and through translated books. Nevertheless, this is not to say that Islamic philosophy was copy carbon of the Greek. Relation between them was in frame of form-matter relation; means that matters of Islamic philosophy was Greek philosophy that attributed with Islam.

Keywords: relation, Islamic philosophy, Greek philosophy, translated books, books translating, illuminations, peripatetic, Platonism, form-matter relation

Pendahuluan

Peradaban Islam dan kebudayaan Yunani merupakan dua hal yang sangat sulit untuk dipisahkan. Mungkin keimpulan seperti itulah yang muncul ketika penulis membaca buku seorang kristenArab, Jamil Shaliba yang berjudul al-Falsafah al-Arabiyyah. Pilar-pilar peradaban Islam yang berhasil melahirkan filsuf, dokter, astronom, ahli matematika hingga hukum berkelas dunia tidak bisa dilepaskan begitu saja dari jasa-jasa ilmuan yang berasal dari kebudayaan pra-Islam, seperti kebudayaan Yunani, Persia dan India.

Berangkat dari tesis itu, penulis sepakat untuk mengatakan bahwa kebudayaan Yunani telah memberikan andil yang sangat besar bagi bangunan peradaban Islam klasik. Agar uraian tulisan ini tidak melebar terlalu jauh, penulis akan mengerucutkan wilayah peradaban Islam pada bidang filsafat. Filsafat sebagai khazanah Islam telah membuktikan diri sebagai lokomotif utama bagi gerakan pengetahuan yang kemudian menjadi fondasi bagi peradaban Islam. Keterbukaan umat Islam terhadap khazanah klasik pra-Islam memberikan ruang bagi proses penerjemahan buku-buku berbahasa Yunani, Persia dan India. Proses penerjemahan ini memiliki pengaruh pengaruh yang sangat besar bagi perkembangan pengetahuan dalam dunia Islam. Filsafat dalam hal ini menjadi bidang yang cukup digandrungi oleh sebagian intelektual Islam pada masa itu.

Lantas bagaimanakah proses penyebaran dan pembentukan filsafat dalam dunia Islam? Filsafat yang berasal dari kata Yunani, Philosophia, berarti cinta kebijaksanaan. Kata ini kemudian diserap ke dalam bahasaArab menjadi al-falsafah, sementara orang yang menggeluti bidang ini disebut al-falasifah (para filsuf). Filsafat Islam dalam hal ini adalah sebuah produk dari proses pemikiran yang dihasilkan oleh para sarjana muslim klasik setelah mengalami persinggungan dengan kebudayaan Yunani. Karena, seperti yang sudah penulis sampaikan, kata filsafat sendiri berasal dari bahasa Yunani mulai dikenal oleh umat Islam setelah membaca buku-buku pemikir dari Yunani. Orang Islam pertama yang dikenal sebagai filsuf Islam pertama adalah Abu Ya’qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi (Wafat sekitar 257 H/ 870 M).

Uraian tentang transmisi kebudayaan Yunani dalam peradaban Islam ini akan penulis mulai dengan perkenalan umat Islam akan kebudayaan-kebudayaan besar pra-Islam yang ada di beberapa wilayah kekuasaan umat Islam yang sedang meluas saat itu. Perkenalan yang didasari atas semangat Islam yang menganjurkan untuk mempelajari pengetahuan dari siapa pun berlanjut pada proses penerjemahan besar-besaran selama kurang lebih dua abad, dari awal abad ketujuh hingga akhir abad kedelapan. Proses penerjemahan ini meliputi dari berbagai kebudayaan, khususnya dari Yunani kemudian Persia dan India. Selama kurang dari dua abad ini, yang terjadi adalah sebuah proses penerjemahan yang melibatkan banyak intelektual Kristen Nestorian yang kebetulan mahir dalam beberapa bahasa penting saat itu, Yunani, Suryani danArab. Baru setelah banyak buku-buku dari kebudayaan non-Islam diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasaArab, mulailah bermunculan produk-produk pemikiran yang disebut filsafat Islam.

Pertautan Dengan Kebudayaan Pra-Islam

Setelah Nabi Muhammad Saw. wafat pada 632 M, para shahabat berkumpul di Majlis Bani Tsaqifah untuk memilih seorang khalifah (pengganti Nabi). Melalui sebuah proses konsensus yang cukup panas dan menegangkan akhirnya muncul Abu Bakar al-Siddiq sebagai khalifah pertama umat Islam. Estafet kepemimpinan kemudian dilanjutkan oleh Umar ibn Khattab. Pada masa Umar terjadi gelombang ekspansi untuk pertama kalinya. Tahun 635 M, kota Damaskus jatuh ke dalam kekuasaan Islam. Tahun 641, Aleksandria menyerah pada tentara Islam di bawah pimpinan ‘Amr Ibn al-‘Ash. Singkat kata, dengan terjadinya gelombang ekspansi pertama ini, semenanjungArab, Palestina, Suria, Irak, Persia dan Mesir sudah masuk dalam wilayah kekuasaan Islam. Paska Umar, kekhalifahan dilanjutkan oleh Utsman ibn Affan, mantu Nabi Muhammad Saw. Namun karena terjadi kecemburuan kekuasaan akibat dari sikap nepotisme Utsman, kekuasaannya diakhiri dengan pembunuhan terhadap dirinya. Kekhalifahan umat Islam saat itu betul-betul mengalami ujian berat. Kemudian tampil Ali sebagai pengganti Utsman. Namun kepemimpinan Ali telah membuat kecewa kubu Utsman karena tidak berhasil mengusut kematian Utsman hingga tuntas. Kepemimpinan Ali ini menjadi puncak dari sistem kekhalifahan dalam sejarah Islam yang kemudian akhirnya digantikan dengan sistem dinasti.

Setelah terjadi perang saudara antara Ali dan Mu’awiyah yang menjadi gubernur Damaskus saat itu, konflik kekuasaan di tubuh kekhalifahan memuncak hingga akhirnya Ali pun dibunuh oleh kelompok yang berasal dari kubunya sendiri karena telah menerima tahkim (arbitrase) dari pihak Mu’awiyah. Pada 661 M, Mu’awiyah membangun dinasti Bani Umayah dan dimulailah gelombang ekspansi yang kedua. Perluasan kekuasaan yang sudah dimulai sejak zaman Umar dilanjutkan kembali setelah beberapa lama banyak mengurusi masalah internal.

Namun konflik internal kembali terjadi di lingkungan dinasti yang menyebabkan kekuasaan Bani Umayah hanya berlangsung selama kurang lebih sembilanpuluh tahun dan kemudian diambil alih oleh Bani ‘Abbasiyah (keturunan Al-Abbas ibn Abd Al-Muttallib – Paman Nabi). Bani Abbasiyah diwarisi kekuasaan yang cukup luas, meliputi Spanyol, Afrika Utara, Suriah, SemenanjungArabia, Irak, sebagian dari Asia Kecil, Persia, Afganistan dan sebagian wilayah Asia Tengah. Di beberapa wilayah kekuasaan itu merupakan pusat kebudayaan besar seperti Yunani, Suryani, Persia dan India. Karenanya beberapa khalifah pada masa Bani Abbasiyah lebih memusatkan pada pengembangan pengetahuan.

Semangat agama yang sangat menghargai ilmu pengetahuan, terekspresi pada masa kekuasaan Bani ‘Abbasiyah, khususnya pada waktu khalifah al-Ma’mun (berkuasa sejak 813-833 M). Penerjemahan buku-buku non-Arab ke dalam bahasaArab terjadi secara besar-besaran dari awal abad kedua hingga akhir abad keempat hijriyah. Perpustakaan besar Bait al-hikmah didirikan oleh khalifah al-Ma’mun di Baghdad yang kemudian menjadi pusat penerjemahan dan intelektual. Sebuah perpustakaan yang sangat bagus sekali yang tidak didapatkan contohnya di dalam kebudayaan Eropa Barat. Para penerjemah yang pada umumnya adalah kamu Nasrani dan Yahudi bahkan penyembah bintang digaji dengan harga yang sangat tinggi.

Buku-buku yang ditejemahkan terdiri dari berbagai bahasa, mulai dari bahasa Yunani, Suryani, Persia, Ibrani, India, Qibti, Nibti dan Latin. Keberagaman sumber pengetahuan dan kebudayaan inilah yang kemudian membentuk corak filsafat Islam selanjutnya. Dan perlu dikui bahwa di antara banyak pengetahuan dan kebudayaan yang ditejemahkan ke dalam bahasaArab, karya-karya klasik Yunani adalah yang paling banyak menyita perhatian. Khususnya karya-karya filsuf besar Yunani seperti Plato dan Aristoteles. Beberapa karya dari kebudayaan Persia dan India hanya meliputi masalah-masalah astronomi, kedokteran dan sedikit tentang ajaran-ajaran agama. Seperti karya Al-Biruni (w. 1048), sejarahwan dan astronom muslim terkemuka, Tahqiq ma li Al-Hind min Maqulah (Kebenaran Ihwal Kepercayaan Rakyat India). Dalam tulisannya itu ia menguraikan kepercayaan fundamental orang-otang Hindu dan menyejajarkannya dengan filsafat Yunani. Atau terjemahan Ibn Al-Muqaffa’ (w. 759) yang berjudul Kalilah wa Dimnah (Fabel-fabel Tentang Guru) diterjemahkan dari bahasa Sanskerta yang merupakan penegetahuan sastra Persia.

Seperti yang dikatakan oleh Shaliba dalam bukunya, Al-falsafah Al-‘arabiyah, terbentuknya filsafat Islam terjadi dalam dua tahap. Pertama tahap penerjemahan dan kedua tahap produksi pengetahuan atau pemikiran. Setelah melewati tahap penerjemahan maka mulailah bermunculan filsuf-filsuf Islam yang mengambil jalur metode filsafat Yunani seperti yang dimulai dari al-Kindi hingga Ibnu Khaldun. Menurut Fazlur Rahman, yang disebut filsafat Islam dalam hubungannya dengan filsafat Yunani harus dilihat dalam konteks hubungan “bentuk-materi.” Jadi filsafat Islam sebenarnya adalah adalah filsafat Yunani secara material namun diaktualkan dalam bentuk sistem yang bermerk Islam. Sehingga dengan demikian tidaklah mungkin untuk mengatakan bahwa filsafat Islam hanya merupakan carbon copy dari filsafat Yunani atau Helenisme. Sementara Shaliba yang kurang lebih sependapat dengan pendapat Rahman, ia mengatakan bahwa salah satu perbedaan filsafat Islam dengan Yunani ada pada maksud dan tujuannya. Menurutnya, tujuan dari filsafat Yunani adalah lebih dilatarbelakangi nilai estetis sementara dalam filsafat Islam karena dorongan ajaran agama (Islam).

Penerjemah dan Buku-buku Yang Diterjemahkan

Perpustakaan Bait al-Hikmah yang didirikan oleh khalifah al-Ma’mun berisi para penerjemah yang terdiri dari orang Yahudi, Kristen dan para penyembah Bintang. Di antara para penerjemah yang cukup terkenal dengan produk terjemahannya itu adalah Yahya ibn al-Bitriq (wafat 200 H/ 815 M) yang banyak menerjemahkan buku-buku kedokteran pemikir Yunani, seperti Kitab al-hayawan (buku tentang makhluk hidup) dan Timaeus karya Plato. Al-Hajjaj ibn Mathar yang hidup pada masa pemerintahan al-Ma’mun dan telah menerjemahkan buku Euklids ke dalam bahasaArab serta menafsirkan buku al-Majisti karya Ptolemaeus. Abd al-Masih ibn Na’imah al-Himsi (wafat 220 H/ 835 M) yang menerjemahkan buku Sophistica karya Aristoteles. Yuhana ibn Masawaih seorang dokter pandai dari Jundisapur (Wafat 242 H/ 857 M) yang kemudian diangkat oleh khalifah al-Ma’mun sebagai kepala perpustakaan bait al-hikmah, banyak menerjemahkan buku-buku kedokteran klasik.

Seorang penerjemah yang sangat terkenal karena banyak terjemahan yang dilahirkannya adalah Hunain ibn Ishaq al-Abadi yang merupakan seorang Kristen Nestorian (194-260 H/ 810-873 M). Ia adalah seorang penerjemah yang dikumpulkan oleh Yuhana Ibn Masawaih dan kemudian belajar ilmu kedokteran darinya. Ia menguasai beberapa bahasa penting saat itu karena memuat banyak kebudayaan besar, seperti bahasa Persia, Yunani, Yunani dan bahasaArab. Hasil terjemahan Hunain ini dihargai emas oleh khalifah setimbang dengan berat buku yang diterjemahkannya. Buku-buku yang besar saat itu ia ringkas sehingga dapat dibaca dengan mudah oleh orang yang menggelutinya. Di antara buku yang ia terjemahkan ke dalam bahasaArab adalah buku Politicus, Timaues karya Plato dan Etika serta fisika karya Aristoteles. Masih banyak penerjemah yang lain yang telah menyumbangkan kemahiran dan penguasaan pengetahuan mereka bagi khazanah perpustakaan Bait al-Hikmah.

Di antara buku-buku filsafat terpenting yang diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasaArab oleh tim yang terdiri atas Hunain, Hubaisy sepupu Hunain dan Isa ibn Yahya murid Hunain adalah Analytica posteriora karya Aristoteles, Synopsis of the Ethics karya Galen serta ringkasan karya-karya Plato seperti Sophist, Permenides, Politicus, Republic dan Laws. Sementara karya-karya Aristoteles seperti Categories, Hermeneutica, Generation and Corruption, Nichomachean Ethics diarabkan oleh Ishaq ibn Hunain dari bahasa Suryani. Selain proses penerjemahan, masih cukup banyak juga buku-buku Yunani dan Suryani yang ditafsirkan atau diringkas oleh para penerjemah yang kebetulan menguasai pengetahuan tentang isi buku tersebut.

Namun demikian, proses penerjemahan yang terjadi secara besar-besaran ini tidak semuanya berhasil mancapai hasil yang sukses sebagai sebuah terjemahan yang layak. Ada beberapa buku terjemahan yang bahkan menyulitkan pembaca untuk memahami isi buku. Di antara orang yang menderita akibat buruknys mutu sebuah terjemahan adalah Ibnu Sina. Menurut Jamil Shaliba, Ibnu Sina pernah membaca buku terjemahan Metafisika Aristoteles sebanyak empat puluh kali, tetapi ia sama sekali tidak dapat mengerti maksud dari tulisan tersebut. Hal ini setidaknya dikarenakan dua hal, pertama karena memang sulit dan begitu dalamnya tulisan Aristoteles tentang Metafisika dan kedua karena kesulitan proses penerjemahannnya ke dalam bahasaArab. Buruknya beberapa mutu terjemahan juga dikarenakan metode terjemahan yang terlalu harfiah dari bahasa non-Arab ke dalam bahasaArab. Ibnu Abi Usbu’aih pernah mengkategorikan tingkat mutu terjemahan ketika itu, yakni tingkat baik seperti terjemahan Hunain ibn Ishaq dan anaknya Ishaq Ibn Hunain, tingkat sedang ada pada terjemahan Ibnu Na’imah dan Tsabit ibn Qurrah. Dan tingkat yang ketiga adalah buruk, seperti yang ada pada terjemahan Ibn al-Bitriq.

Motivasi Gerakan Penerjemahan

Setidaknya ada dua motivasi yang mendorong gerakan penerjemahan yang sudah dimulai sejak zaman Bani Umayah dan kemudian menemukan puncaknya pada dinasti Bani ‘Abbasiyah. Pertama motovasi praktis dan kedua motivasi kultural. Pada motivasi yang pertama (ba’its ‘amali), ada kebutuhan pada bangsaArab saat itu untuk mempelajari ilmu-ilmu yang berasal dari luar Islam. Pengetahuan-pengetahuan tersebut secara praktis dapat membantu meringankan urusan-urusan yang berkenaan dengan hajat hidup umat Islam ketika itu. Yang dimaksud dengan pengetahuan-pengetahuan luar yang dibutuhkan oleh umat Islam saat itu adalah seperti ilmu-ilmu Kimia, kedokteran, fisika, matematika, dan falak (astronomi). Ilmu-ilmu ini secara praktis memang langsung berhubungan dengan hajat hidup umat Islam dalam menyelesaikan masalah-masalah seperti penentuan waktu Shalat, hukum faraidl (pembagian harta waris), masalah kesehatan dan lain sebagainya.

Motivasi yang kedua adalah motivasi kultural (ba’its tsaqafi). Ada kebutuhan pada masyarakat Islam untuk mempelajari kebudayaan-kebudayaan Persia, Yunani untuk menguatkan sistem hukum Islam dan menangkal aqidah yang datang dari luar Islam. Ketika terjadi gelombang kebudayaan luar dalam dunia Islam yang meliputi aqidah kaum Majusi (penyembah api) dan kaum Dahriah, kekhalifahan ‘Abbasiyah mengangap perlu bagi kaum muslim untuk mempelajari ilmu-ilmu logika serta sistem berpikir rasionalis lainnya untuk menangkal aqidah yang datang dari luar itu. Umat Islam dianjurkan untuk mempelajari logika Aristoteles, agar dapat berdebat dengan keyakinan yang datang dari luar.

Selain itu ada sebuah kisah yang diceritakan oleh Ibn al-Nadim tentang motivasi penerjemahan buku-buku filsafat pada masa kekuasaan khalifah al-Ma’mun. Ia menceritakan bahwa pada suatu malam, khalifah al-Ma’mun bermimpi berjumpa dengan seorang laki-laki yang memakai pakaian putih, jidatnya botak, alisnya menyambung dan mata agak kebiru-biruan. Laki-laki ini duduk di atas singgasana khalifah al-Ma’mun. Kemudian khalifah al-Ma’mun bertanya kepada laki-laki itu, “siapa engkau?”. Laki-laki itu menjawab “aku Aristoteles.” Dalam mimpi itu, khalifah al-Ma’mun merasa sangat senang karena dapat bertemu dengan filsuf yang menjadi pujaannya. Kemudian al-Ma’mun bertanya kepada laki-laki yang mengaku sebagai Aristoteles, “wahai sang filsuf, aku ingin bertanya, apa itu ‘baik’?” Laki-laki itu menjawab: “baik itu adalah apa yang baik menurut akal.” “Kemudian apa lagi wahai sang filsuf ?”, khalifah bertanya lagi. “apa yang baik menurut syari’at” laki-laki itu menjawab lagi. “Kemudian apa lagi wahai sang filsuf?” khalifah bertanya lagi. “Apa yang baik menurut kebanyakan (jumhur)” laki-laki itu menjawab, dan tidak ada setelah itu.

Sepintas lalu mungkin kita akan menyimpulkan bahwa mimpi khalifah al-Ma’mun itu hanya sekedar bagian dari kembang tidur semata. Namun Ibn al-Nadim, dalam bukunya al-Fihrist, sangat meyakini bahwa mimpi itu menjadi motivator yang cukup kuat bagi al-Ma’mun untuk menggerakkan penerjemahan pada masa kekuasaannya. Sampai-sampai ia mengirim surat kepada raja Romawi untuk meminta izinnya agar buku-buku yang ada di kerajaan Romawi dapat diterjemahkan oleh para penerjemah yang ada di perpustakaan Bait al-Hikmah. Namun dalam catatan yang lain, gerakan penerjemahan itu buka semata-mata karena mimpi yang dialami oleh sang khalifah, melainkan lebih dikarenakan dari hasil renungan atas mimpi itu bahwa proses penerjemahan yang ia lakukan itu baik dari perspektif nalar maupun syariat. Selain itu mungkin saja terjadinya mimpi itu juga dikarenakan oleh kecenderungan sang khalifah pada mazhab mu’tazilah.

Di balik gencarnya penerjemahan buku-buku Yunani yang dilakukan oleh umat Islam pada masa itu, ada sebuah bidang yang tidak terlalu diminati, yakni bidang sastra, seperti karya Homerus. Mengapa? Ada banyak jawaban atas pertanyaan ini. Di antaranya adalah karena adanya keyakinan dalam masyarakatArab bahwa sastraArab bersifat self sufficient, sehingga mereka tidak terlalu memperhatikan buku-buku sastra yang ada dalam bahasa Yunani. Selain itu sastra juga tidak memberikan pengaruh apa pun tehadap proses penguatan aqidah umat Islam. Namun argumentasi ini tidak terlalu kuat karena pada sisi yang lain umat Islam cukup gemar menerjemahkan buku-buku sastra yang berasal dari kebudayaan Persia dan India yang kebetulan beragama Majusi dan Dahriah. Sehingga muncul alasan yang lain bahwa tidak adanya minat umat Islam untuk menerjemahkan karya sastra Yunani lebih dikarenakan tidak cocoknya karya sastra Yunani bagi masyarakatArab bila dibandingkan dengan karya sastra dari Persia dan India. Sehingga dengan demikian, alasan tidak berkembangnya penerjemahan sastra Yunani tidak bisa dilihat hanya dari satu sisi saja.

Pengaruh Karya-karya Terjemahan

Proses penerjemahan yang berlangsung selama kurang lebih dua abad telah menjadi berkah yang besar bagi umat Islam saat itu. Hal ini dapat dipahami karena proses penerjemahan ini menjadi mediator dalam dialog antara kebudayaan pengetahuan pra-Islam dengan umat Islam yang sedang haus ilmu. Khazanah kebudayaan besar yang meliputi Yunani, Persia dan India sedang mengalami kesepian di negerinya sendiri, di dunia Islam, karya-karya tersebut mendapatkan sambutan yang sangat luar biasa. Sampai-sampai seorang khalifah mau membayar sebuah buku yang sudah diterjemahkan dengan nilai emas seberat buku tersebut. Selain itu, motivasi ini juga dilatarbelakangi oleh keyakinan umat Islam saat itu bahwa peradaban hanya dapat dibangun dengan ilmu pengetahuan yang kuat. Dan dalam melakukan proses itu, Islam yang baru saja berdiri tidak dapat melakukan tugas itu sendirian, melainkan harus dibantu dengan khazanah kebudayaan besar yang ada sebelumnya.

Pengaruh dari proses penerjemahan ini dapat kita lihat pada perkembangan dunia kedokteran, astronomi, matematika, hukum (qiyas dalam ilmu fiqih), politik dan filsafat itu sendiri. Dalam kedokteran, kita mengenal Ibnu Sina, politik pada al-Farabi, matematika pada al-Biruni, astronomi pada Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khawarizmi, sejarah peradaban pada Ibnu Khaldun dan masih banyak lagi para sarjana muslim klasik yang telah menorehkan tinta emasnya bagi peradaban Islam karena bersentuhan dengan karya-karya kebudayaan pra-Islam yang sudah diterjemahkan. Dalam proses penerjemahan itu juga terjadi penyerapan bahasa Yunani yang kemudian menjadi bahasaArab. Seperti kata al-falsafah, al-musiqy, al-kimya, al-jigrafiyah dan lainnya.

Perpaduan antara semangat umat Islam dengan kebudayaan pra-Islam melahirkan sebuah sintesa yang tidak sederhana. Sintesa yang dihasilkan bukan hanya sekedar penjiplakan pengetahuan sebelumnya yang kemudian diberi label Islam karena telah diterjemahkan ke dalam bahasaArab. Lebih dari itu, sintesa ini juga meliputi proses reproduksi yang giat dilakukan oleh para ilmuan muslim. Karya-karya filsafat yang diterjemahkan dari bahasa Yunani tidak berhenti hanya pada hasil terjemahan namun telah merangsang para intelektual muslim untuk mengomentari atau sekedar memberikan sebuah penafsiran atas karya-karya filsuf Yunani itu.

Warna kebudayaan ilmiah pra-Islam yang dominan pada pandangan dunia umat Islam dapat kita lihat dalam bentuk corak berpikir rasional atau dalam metode historis yang dikembangkan oleh para periwayat hadits. Dalam teks-teks yang ditulis pada masa itu, cukup banyak metode atau tradisi filosofis yang tersaji dalam kajian-kajian ilmu alam. Terutama pada kajian-kajian yang mendasarkan diri pada matematika. Hukum qiyas atau analogi adalah salah satu pengaruh logika yang dapat kita lihat dalam wilayah fikih. Pengaruh-pengaruh ini menjadi inheren dalam kebudayaan Islam sehingga dalam proses sejarah yang panjang kadang kita sulit untuk membedakan mana yang mempengaruhi dan yang dipengaruhi.

Beberapa Aliran Filsafat Dalam Islam

Cukup sulit untuk mengklasifikasikan kecenderungan filsafat Islam dalam satu aliran yang rigid. Sebagai contoh, paham Neoplatonisme yang berkembang di kalangan filsuf Islam dianggap sebagai titik temu ajaran Plato dan Aristoteles. Padahal, pada saat ini kita mengetahui bahwa dua filsuf ini memiliki jalan yang berbeda dengan Neoplatonisme yang dimaksud. Buku yang dianggap sebagai karya Aristoteles saat itu adalah Theology. Namun belakangan diketahui bahwa buku tersebut adalah karya tambahan dari Enneads-nya Plotinus. Karenanya akan lebih aman bila kita mengatakan bahwa ada banyak corak Neoplatonisme dari pada hanya ada satu corak Neoplatonisme. Hal serupa juga dinyatakan oleh cak Nur dalam bukunya, Islam Doktrin dan Peradaban, bahwa paham Neoplatonisme yang sampai dan berkembang di kalangan filsuf Islam sudah tercampur dengan penafsiran Aristotelianisme. Sementara ajaran Aristoteles yang dipelajari oleh para filsuf Islam sebenarnya sudah bukan ajaran Aristoteles yang murni melainkan ajaran-ajaran dari para penafsir Aristoteles. Sehingga dengan demikian bukan Aristoteles sendiri yang berpengaruh dalam filsafat Islam melainkan Aristotelianisme.

Untuk meneropong beberapa kecenderungan aliran dalam filsafat Islam, penulis menyajikan dua aliran yang menjadi kecenderungan sebagian besar filsuf Islam, yakni aliran Peripatetik dan aliran Iluminasi. Pada umumnya gaya berfilsafat peripatetik menjadi kecenderungan para filsuf Islam yang berada di wilayah barat seperti Andalusia. Sementara pada aliran Iluminasi, mereka yang mencoba memadukan filsafat Yunani dengan kebijaksanaan timur (oriental wisdom), pada umumnya berdiam di wilayah bagian timur seperti Persia dan Suriah.

Peripatetisme

Filsafat peripatetik dapat kita lihat pada gejala Aristotelianisme. Para filsuf Islam yang masuk dalam kategori filsuf peripatetik diantaranya adalah Ibnu Bajjah (wafat 533 H/ 1138 M), Ibnu Tufail (wafat 581 H/ 1185 M) dan Ibnu Rushd (520-595 H/1126-1198 M). Abad ke-11 menjadi saksi atas munculnya sejumlah ilmuwan yang meletakkan dasar-dasar ilmiah yang genuine. Puncak dari perjalanan ini ada pada kelahiran kembali Aristotelianisme. Peripatetik yang dalam bahasaArab dikenal dengan nama al-Masyai’yyah berarti orang yang berjalan diambil dari kebiasaan Aristoteles yang selalu berjalan-jalan dalam mengajar.

Untuk melihat corak filsafat peripatetik, ada baiknya bila kita melihat beberapa filsuf yang berasal dari wilayah barat ini sekilas. Ibnu Bajjah yang dikenal Avempace dalam bahasa latin telah menempatkan diri sebagai filsuf yang berdiri pada tradisi Neoplatonik-Peripatetik yang diperkenalkan oleh al-Farabi. Bagi Ibnu Bajjah, al-Farabi adalah satu-satunya guru logika, politik dan metafisika yang berasal dari wilayah timur. Tampaknya Ibnu Bajjah memiliki hubungan yang cukup dekat dengan filsuf wilayah timur yang satu ini. Hal ini dapat kita lihat juga pada karya Ibnu Bajjah yang berjudul Tadbir al-Mutawahhid yang mendasarkan pada pemikiran al-Farabi dengan cukup kental. Kedekatannya dengan al-Farabi yang dikenal sebagai guru kedua dalam filsafat di mana guru pertamanya adalah Aristoteles telah memberi warna tersendiri bagi metode filsafat Ibnu Bajjah.

Salah satu pemikiran Ibnu Bajjah adalah tentang empat tipe mahluk spiritual. Tipe pertama adalah bentuk-bentuk dari benda-benda langit (forms of the heavenly bodies) yang sama sekali bersifat imateriil. Ibnu Bajjah menyamakan tipe ini dengan akal-akal terpisah (separate intelligences) yang dalam kosmologi Aristotelian dan Islam diyakini sebagai penggerak benda-benda langit. Tipe kedua adalah akal capaian (mustafad) atau akal aktif yang juga bersifat immateriil. Tipe ketiga adalah bentuk-bentuk materiil yang diabstraksikan dari materi. Sedangkan tipe yang keempat adalah representasi-representasi yang tersimpan dalam tiga daya jiwa: sensus communis, imajinasi dan memori. Seperti bentuk-bentuk materiil, bentuk-bentuk ini juga dinaikkan ke tingkat spiritual melalui fungsi abstraktif yang terdapat pada jiwa manusia. Puncak dari fungsi abstraktif ini ialah pemikiran rasional.

Tokoh filsafat perpatetik lainnya adalah Ibnu Tufail yang lahir di Wadi ‘Asy dekat Granada. Salah satu karya yang cukup terkenal dari Ibnu Tufail adalah sebuah roman yang berjudul Hayy ibn Yaqzhan. Judul karya ini memang sama dengan dengan karya yang telah dibuat sebelumnya oleh Ibnu Sina. Dalam buku ini, Ibnu Tufail menekankan kebijaksanaan timur yang dapat diidentifikasikan sebagai tasawuf yang saat itu banyak ditolak oleh banyak filsuf, termasuk Ibnu Bajjah. Melalui karyanya ini, Ibnu Tufail mengaku dapat memecahkan pertentangan yang timbul antara filsafat dan agama atau akal dan iman. Dua hal yang bertentangan ini dapat diumpamakan sebagai kebenaran internal dan kebenaran eksternal yang pada prinsipnya sama-sama kebenaran. Namun dua macam kebenaran ini tidak bisa digeneralisasikan untuk siapa saja tanpa melihat kecerdasan yang dimiliki oleh orang bersangkutan. Karena kebenaran filsafat hanya dapat dicapai oleh orang-orang khusus yang memiliki kecerdasan yang tinggi maka ia tidak bisa diberikan begitu saja kepada orang awam. Sementara kebenaran agama yang melalui kitab suci Alquran yang menggunakan bahasa inderawi dan makna-makna harfiah akan dapat dengan mudah difahami oleh orang pada umumnya (awam).

Ibnu Rushd merupakan tokoh puncak dalam aliran filsafat peripatetik. Karena perkembangan filsafat paska Ibnu Rushd sudah mengambil jalan yang lain, yakni Iluminasi. Ia lahir pada 1126 M di Kordoba dan mempelajari banyak bidang, mulai bahasaArab, fikih, kalam hingga kedokteran. Seorang khalifah pernah memerintahkannya untuk menjelaskan karya-karya Aristoteles karena sangat sulit untuk dipahami. Ibnu Rushd menulis komentar secara komprenhensif mengenai karya-karya Aristoteles kecuali politics. Karya Aristoteles, Physics, Metaphysics, De Anima, De Coelo dan Analytica posteriora dikomentari oleh Ibnu Rushd dalam tiga versi, “komentar lengkap”, “komentar sedang” dan “komentar singkat.” Karya-karya Ibnu Rushd yang lebih orisinal dapat kita baca pada polemiknya dengan Imam al-Ghazali tentang kesesatan para filsuf pada Tahafut al-Tahafut (kerancuan dari buku Tahafut karya al-Ghazali). Atau pada Fashl al-Maqal dan al-Kasyf ‘an Manahij al-Adillah yang menyerang teologi al-Asy’ary dan menjelaskan hubungan filsafat dan agama yang sangat hangat pada saat itu.

Dalam perdebantannya dengan para teolog mengenai penciptaan, Ibnu Rushd banyak diinspirasikan oleh pandangn Aristoteles. Menurut Ibnu Rushd, ‘penciptaan’ merupakan tindakan menggabungkan materi dengan bentuk atau teraktualisasinya potensi menjadi aktus. Jadi penciptaan bukanlah sesuatu yang berasal dari ketiadaan (creatio ex nixilo). Pandangan Ibnu Rushd yang ia petik dari buah pikiran Aristoteles ini berimplikasi pada proses tergabungnya bentuk dengan materi. Tuhan dalam hal ini menjadi pencipta unsur-unsur dari gabungan itu sendiri, yang tak lain adalah alam semesta. Pengabungan ini dapat berlangsung secara terus-menerus atau sekaligus. Bagi Ibnu Rushd, hanya penciptaan yang terus-menerus (ihdats da’im), seperti yang ia katakan dalam Tahafut al-Tahafut yang layak bagi penciptaan alam.

Illuminasionisme

Filsafat iluminasi yang dalam bahasa Arab disebut dengan Hikmat al-Isyraq dapat kita ikuti jejaknya mulai dari al-Maqtul Syihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi. Ia lahir di Aleppo, Suriah pada 1154 dan dihukum mati oleh Shaladin pada 1191 atas tuduhan kafir seperti yang diklaim oleh para teolog dan fuqaha. Dalam banyak risalah, al-Suhrawardi menyatakan bahwa pendapat-pendapatnya sesuai dengan metode peripatetik konvensional yang ia sebut sebagai metode diskursif yang baik. Namun metode tersebut tidak lagi memadai bagi mereka yang berusaha mencari Tuhan atau bagi yang ingin memadukan metode diskursif dengan pengalaman batin sekaligus. Menurut al-Suhrawardi, agar dapat melakukan tugas ini, seseorang dapat mengambil jalur filsafat iluminasi atau Hikmat al-Isyraq.

Inti dari ajaran hikmat al-Isyraq al-Suhrawardi adalah tentang sifat dan pembiasan cahaya. Cahaya ini, menurutnya, tidak dapat didefinisikan karena merupakan realitas yang paling nyata dan yang menampakkan segala sesuatu. Cahaya ini juga merupakan substansi yang masuk ke dalam komposisi semua substansi yang lain. Segala sesuatu selain “Cahaya Murni” adalah zat yang membutuhkan penyangga atau sebagai substansi gelap. Objek-objek materil yang mampu menerima cahaya dan kegelapan sekaligus disebut barzakh.

Dalam hubungannya dengan objek-objek yang berada di bawahnya, cahaya memiliki dua bentuk, yakni cahaya yang terang pada dirinya dan cahaya yang menerangi yang lain. Cahaya yang terakhir ini merupakan penyebab tampaknya segala sesuatu yang tidak bisa tidak beremanasi darinya. Di puncak urutan wujud terdapat cahaya-cahaya murni yang membentuk anak tangga menaik. Pada bagian tertinggi dari urutan anak tangga ini disebut Cahaya di atas Cahaya yang menjadi sumber eksistensi semua cahaya yang ada di bawahnya, baik yang bersifat murni maupun campuran. Oleh al-Suhrawardi cahaya ini juga disebut Cahaya Mandiri, Cahaya Suci atau Wajib al-Wujud.

Filsuf yang juga banyak diinspirasikan oleh Hikmat al-Isyraq al-Suhrawardi namun kemudian memodifikasinya ajaran tersebut sedemikian rupa sehinga menjadi ilm al-huduri (knowledge by presence) adalah Mulla Shadra. Mulla Shadra lahir di Syiraz, Persia pada tahun 1572 dan belajar pada guru-guru Isyraqi yang pada saat itu sedang menggejala di dalam tradisi filsafat Persia. Karya yang menjadi magnum opus Mulla Shadra adalah Hikmat al-Muta’aliyah (hikmat transendental) yang lebih dikenal dengan al-asfar al-arba’ah (empat perjalanan). Empat perjalanan yang dimaksud oleh Mulla Shadra dikemukakan dalam al-asfar al-arba’ah sebagai berikut: pertama perjalanan dari makhluk menuju Tuhan, kedua perjalanan menuju Tuhan melalui bimbingan Tuhan, ketiga perjalanan dari Tuhan menuju makhluk melalui bimbingan Tuhan, dan yang keempat adalah perjalanan di dalam makhluk melalui bimbingan Tuhan.

Berikut ini penulis tampilkan diagram yang menggambarkan bagaimana Mulla Shadra melanjutkan tradisi isyraqi yang ada sebelumnya:

Cahaya Tertinggi

(Wajib al-Wujud)


Alam Perintah atau Entitas-Entitas Tunak

(Alam Kawruhan)


Bentuk-bentuk Kawruhan

Jiwa Manusia


Falak Universal

(Falak Luar)


Alam Ciptaan

(Alam Materiil)

Salah satu pemikiran Mulla Shadra yang sampai kini masih fenomenal dalam tradisi filsafat di Persia (baca: Iran - saat ini) adalah tentang ‘ilm al-huduri atau knowledge by presence. Ilmu ini biasanya dipertentangkan dengan knowledge by representation (‘ilm al-husuli). Menurut Mulla Shadra perbedaan antara ‘ilm al-huduri dengan ‘ilm al-Husuli ada pada hubungan antara subjek penahu dengan objek yang diketahui. Dalam ‘ilm al-husuli (knowledge by representation), hubungan antara subjek dengan objek jelas terpisah sehingga ada konsep dualisme di dalamnya. Sementara pada ‘ilm al-huduri (knowledge by presence) dualisme itu hilang. Yang ada adalah kesatuan antara subjek penahu dan objek yang diketahui. Salah seorang pakar ‘ilm al-huduri kontemporer, Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi menulis sebuah buku khusus tentang ‘ilm al-huduri dalam The Prisnciple of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence.

Penutup

Seperti yang telah penulis utarakan di muka, gelombang kebudayaan pra-Islam tidaklah dapat dipisahkan dari perkembangan peradaban Islam klasik yang banyak disebut oleh sejarahwan muslim sebagai masa-masa kejayaan Islam atau golden age. Proses penerjemahan buku-buku berbahasa Yunani, Persia dan India hanya salah satu pintu dialog antar peradaban, sementara tanpa proses reproduksi, penerjemahan hanya menjadi tumpukan karya yang sudah dialihbahasakan belaka. Karenanya, dukungan penguasa saat itu dan dengan gairah keilmuan umat Islam yang luar biasa menjadikan gelombang kebudayaan ini tidak sia-sia. Segala upaya, baik materil maupun semangat juang yang telah ditorehkan dalam bentuk maha karya telah menjadi pilar-pilar peradaban Islam yang sangat menentukan.

Bila peradaban Islam klasik banyak ditopang oleh kebudayaan sebelumnya, hal yang sama juga dialami oleh bangsa Barat pada abad kelimabelas. Semangat kelahiran kembali (renaissans) yang dikobarkan oleh masyarakat Eropa Barat tidak bisa dilepaskan dari peran ilmuwan muslim yang telah menularkan semangat pengetahuan pada masayarakat Eropa saat itu. Khusus dalam bidang filsafat, Jamil Shaliba pernah memberikan catatannya atas pengaruh pemikir Islam di dunia Barat (Eropa). Menurutnya pengaruh peradaban Islam klasik bagi peradaban Barat Modern masih lebih besar dibandingkan dengan pengaruh peradaban Yunani bagi peradaban Islam klasik. Pada saat ini, setelah terjadi kebangkitan di dunia Islam, umat kembali harus banyak belajar dari para pemikir barat yang sudah jauh meninggalkan dunia Islam.

Catatan:

BAB IPENDAHULUANA. Latar Belakang MasalahFilsafat akhlak merupakan salah satu khazanah intelektual muslim yang kehadirannya hingga saat ini semakin dirasakan. Islam memberikan perhatian yang sangat besar terhadap akhlak yang dapat dilihat secara historis maupun teologis dalam ajaran Islam itu sendiri. Begitu banyak intelektual muslim yang telah membahas akhlak secara filosofis yang diantaranya adalah Ibnu Miskawaih. Berdasarkan itu penulisan tesis ini akan meneliti Konsep Filsafat Akhlak Ibn Miskawaih dalam Perspektif Historis dengan lima alasan berikut. Pertama, Ibn Miskawaih dikenal sebagai intelektual muslim pertama di bidang filsafat akhlak. Kedua, Ibnu Miskawaih dikenal juga sebagai sejarawan, dokter, penyair, dan ahli bahasa yang semua keahliannya itu didedikasikannya untuk kepentingan filsafat akhlak. Ketiga, konsep akhlak Ibn Miskawaih merupakan perpaduan antara kajian hostoris dan praktis. Keempat, konsep akhlak Ibn Miskawaih belum ada yang menelitinya. Dan kelima, belum ada telaah mendalam terhadap pemikiran filsafat Ibnu Miskawaih dalam perspektif sejarah. B. Pembatasan dan Perumusan MasalahMasalah yang menjadi obyek penelitian tesis ini adalah pemikiran akhlak Ibn Miskawaih dalam perspektif sejarah sebagai seorang cendekiawan muslim yang hidup pada abad 10 M dan awal abad 11 M. Berdasarkan pembatasan masalah ini maka perumusan masalah yang muncul adalah1. Siapa saja tokoh yang mempengaruhi pemikiran akhlak Ibn Miskawaih?2. Siapa orang yang dipengaruhi pemikiran Ibn Miskawaih? 3. Apakah pengaruh Ibn Miskawaih itu terletak pada konsep jiwa manusia atau konsep jalan tengah?C. Penegasan Istilah1. Konsep dan KonsepsiKonsepsi adalah pengertian yang meliputi hal-hal yang parsial, tidak mendasar, aplikatif, empiris, dan praktis. Sedangkan konsep merupakan pengertian abstrak yang meliputi hal-hal yang bersifat universal, mendasar, filosofis, dan teoritis. Sebuah konsep dibangun atas seperangkat konsepsi.2. Filsafat AkhlakFilsafat akhlak adalah pengetahuan yang mendasar tentang kelakuan manusia yang sadar dan menyadarkan. Dan akhlak adalah kemampuan jiwa untuk melahirkan perbuatan secara spontan tanpa petimbangan pemikiran.D. Tujuan PenelitianTesis ini bertujuan menggali nilai-nilai filosofis akhlak al-karimah yang pernah dipaparkan dan diaplikasikan oleh Ibn Miskawaih pada zamannya sekaligus dapat dijadikan usaha perbaikan, penyempurnaan dan penyesuaian dengan tuntutan zaman modern. Tujuan lainnya adalah menjelaskan peta pemikiran Ibn Miskawaih dalam sejarah Islam untuk mengetahui siapa yang mempengaruhinya dan siapa yang dipengaruhinya. E. Penelitian TerdahuluPemikiran filsafat Ibn Miskawaih telah dilakukan oleh Abd al-Aziz Izzat dalam Ibn Misakawaih; Falsafatuhu al-Akhlâqiyyah wa Mashâdiruhâ, Majid Fakhry dalam The Platonism of Miskawayh and its Implications for his Ethics, Muhamad Abd al-Hafidz al-Thaib, Abdul Haq Ansari dalam The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawayh, Taufiq al-Thawil dan Ahmad Abd al-Hamid al-Syair. Sedangkan pemikiran Ibn Miskawaih tentang pendidikan sosial dilakukan oleh Abd al-Jabbar Majid Jamin dalam al-Fikr al-Tarbawi ‘ind Ibn Miskawaih, dan konsep pendidikan akhlaknya telah diteliti oleh Suwito. F. Metodologi PenelitianPenelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian pustaka (Library Reseach) dengan sumber primernya adalah dua karya Ibn Miskawaih dalam bidang filsafat akhlak, yaitu Tahdzîb al-Akhlâq wa Tathhîr al-Arâq dan al-Hikmat al-Khâlidat. Penelitian dilakukan dengan pendekatan filsafat yang analisis datanya dilakukan dengan metode deskriptif, komparatif dan analitik. Hasil penelitian kemudian disajikan dalam bab IV dan V. G. Manfaat PenelitianPenelitian ini bermanfaat dalam menyumbangkan informasi konsep akhlak Ibn Miskawaih yang dapat memotivasi kajian filsafat akhlak dalam menemukan konsep filsafat akhlak yang sesuai dengan kondisi dan situasi modern. H. Sistematika PenulisanPenelitian ini disusun dalam enam bab. Bab Satu merupakan pendahuluan yang memaparkan latar belakang, perumusan masalah, tujuan dan manfaat serta metodologi penelitian. Bab Dua memaparkan biografi Ibn Miskawaih. Bab Tiga memaparkan sejarah perkembangan pemikiran filsafat akhlak. Bab Empat menguraikan filsafat akhlak Ibn Miskawaih. Bab Lima menguraikan pemikiran-pemikiran akhlak yang muncul setelah Ibn Miskawaih. Dan Bab Enam merupakan penutup yang berisi kesimpulan. BAB IIIBN MISKAWAIH DAN SITUASI SOSIAL DI ZAMANNYAA. Riwayat Hidup dan Karya-karya Ibn MiskawaihNama lengkap Ibn Miskawaih adalah Abû Ali Ahmad bin Muhamad bin Ya’qûb Miskawaih. Ia lahir di Rayy di dekat kota Teheran pada tahun 320 H/932 M dan wafat pada usia lanjut di Isfahan pada tanggal 9 Shafat 421 H/16 Pebruari 1030 M. Ibn Miskawaih memiliki keahlian dalam berbagai bidang ilmu. Ia telah menulis 41 buah buku dan artikel yang selalu berkaitan dengan filsafat akhlak. Dari 41 karyanya itu, 18 buah dinyatakan hilang, 8 buah masih berupa manuskrip, dan 15 buah sudah dicetak. Dari 15 naskah yang sudah dicetak penulis hanya menemukan 9 judul, yaitu Tahdzib al-Akhlak wa Tathhir al-A’raq, Kitab al-Sa’adat, al-Hikmat al-Khalidat, Kitab al-Fauz al-Ashghar, Maqalat fi al-Nafs wa al-Aql, Risalat fi al-Ladzdzat wa al-Âlam, Risalat fi Mahiyyat al-‘Adl, Kitab al-Aql wa Al-Ma’qul, dan Washiyyat Ibn Miskawaih.B. Situasi Sosial Politik pada Masa Ibn MiskawaihIbn Miskawaih hidup pada masa Dinasti Buwaihi dari ragkaian kekhilafan Abasiyah yang situasi sosial politiknya tergambar sebagai berikut. Pada periode 945-967 M merupakan masa kejayaan dan kemapanan. Dari tahun 967-1012 terjadi masa stagnasi dan kefakuman karena adanya perebutan kekuasaan sesama keluarga. Dalam peride 1012-1055 M Dinasti Buwaihi memasuki fase kemunduran dan kehacuranC. Situasi Perkembangan Ilmu PengetahuanDinasti Buwaihi sebagai rangkaian dari kekhilafahan Abasiyah mencurahkan perhatian besar terhadap ilmu pengetahuan dan kesusateraan. Pada masa ini muncul ilmuwan-ilmuwan besar seperti Istakhari ahli ilmu bumi, Nasawi ahli matematika, Al-Farabi (w. 950 M), Ibn Sina (w. 1037 M), Al-Farghani Abd al-Rahman al-Shuffi (w. 986 M), Abu al-‘Ala al-Ma’arri (w. 1057 M) dan kelompok Ihkwan al-Shafa.BAB IIISEJARAH PERKEMBANGAN PEMIKIRAN ETIKAA. Pemikiran Etika Para Filosof Yunani1. Pemikiran Etika Sokrates (470-399 SM)Pemikiran etika Sokrates tergambar dalam pandangannya bahwa tujuan hidup manusia ialah kebahagiaan (eudaimonia). Kebahagiaan ini harus dicapai dengan kebaikan atau keutamaan (Arete). Keutamaan harus ditempuh dengan pengetahuan dan pengatahuan harus dipraktekkan dan disampaikan kepada sesama manusia. Hal yang terakhir ini oleh Sokrates disebut intelektualisme etis. 2. Pemikiran Etika Plato (427-348 SM)Plato memandang manusia sebagai makhluk terpenting di antara makhluk hidup yang ada di dunia. Kepribadian manusia berpusat pada jiwanya. Jiwa manusia mempunyai tiga fungsi, yaitu bagian keinginan untuk pengendalian diri sebagai keutamaan khusus, bagian keberanian mempunyai keutamaan yang spesifik yaitu kegagahan, dan bagian rasional mempunyai keutamaan kebijaksanaan. Ketiga fungsi ini diseimbangkan oleh fungsi keadilan. Berdasarkan pendapatnya ini maka menurut Plato keutamaan yang terpenting ada empat, yakni kesederhanaan, ketabahan, kebijaksanaan dan keadilan. 3. Pemikiran Etika Aristoteles (348-322 M)Aristoteles memiliki tiga karya tentang etika, yaitu Ethica Eudemia,Ethica Nicomachea, dan Magna Moralia atau Politike.a. Kebahagiaan sebagai tujuan hidupMenurut Aristoteles kebaikan tertinggi yang dituju manusia adalah kebahagiaan. Dan kebahagiaan sejati dan sempurna adalah apa yang membuat kehidupan pantas dituju pada dirinya sendiri dan tidak ada kekurangan sesuatu apa pun. Dalam hal ini etika bertugas untuk mengembangkan dan mempertahankan kebahagiaan itu. Kebahagiaan memiliki dua unsur, yaitu batin dan dhahir. Unsur batin kebahagiaan adalah ilmu, kebaikan, aktivitas kemanusiaan, kebenaran, dan jangka waktu yang cukup panjang. Sedangkan unsur dhahirnya adalah kesehatan, kesejahteraan ekonomi, persahabatan, keluarga, dan penghormatan. b. Ajaran tentang Keutamaan Ada dua jenis keutamaan yang bisa diperoleh dengan berlaku baik, yakni keutamaan moral dan keutamaan intelektual. Keutamaan moral adalah sikap watak yang memungkinkan manusia memilih jalan tengan antara dua ekstrem yang berlawanan. Keutamaan intelektual berfungsi untuk mengenal kebanaran dan memberi petunjuk tentang apa yang harus dilakukan dalam keadaan tertentu. Berdasarkan keutamaan intelektual ini kebijaksanaan terbagi dua, teoritis dan praktis. Kebijaksanaan teoritis adalah mengenal kebenaran yang merupakan sikap tetap,dan kebijaksanaan teoritis adalah sikap jiwa yang memungkinkan manusia dari benda kongkrit boleh dianggap baik untuk hidupnya.B. Pemikiran Etika pada Masa HellenistikDari kalangan filosuf Hellenisme terdapat dua aliaran yang memiliki perhatian besar terhadap etika, yaitu Epikureanisme dan Stoisisme. Etika aliran Epikureanisme didasarkan pada suatu konsep hidup. Menurut Epikuros kita harus memandang kehidupan sebagai keseluruhan. Untuk itu manusia dituntut lebih mencari kebahagiaan rohani daripada jasmani. Aliran ini mengajarkan bahwa kebahagiaan terbesar adalah persahabatan, ketenangan dan kebebasan, kesederhanaan, tahu diri, penguasaan diri dan hidup gembira dalam situasi apapun. Prinsip dasar etika aliran Stoisisme adalah penyesuaian diri dengan hukum alam. Perbuatan yang baik adalah menyesuaikan diri dengan hukum alam, dan perbuatan buruk adalah tidak mau menyesuaikan diri. Etika Stoa juga bersifat kosmopolitan, mengatasi segala batasan dan merangkul seluruh umat manusia. Dengan kata lain, cita-cita etika tercapai apabila kita mencintai semua orang sebagaimana kita mencintai diri kita sendiri. C. Pemikiran Etika pada Masa Patristik1. Plotinus (204-270 M)Plotinus berpendapat bahwa manusia mempunyai kebebasan dalam memilih antara yang baik dan yang jahat, karena jiwa manusia itu sebagian dari jiwa ilahi. Manusia itu harus bertanggung jawab karena ia diberi pikiran untuk memilih dan kebebasan menentukan pilihan. Pemikiran etika Plotinus berkaitan erat dengan pandangannya tentang keindahan yang menurutnya memiliki pengertian spiritual karena estetika dekat sekali dengan kehidupan moral. Keindahan itu menyajikan keintiman dengan Tuhan yang Maha Sempurna. 2. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 M)Pandangan etika Aquinas menekankan kepada kebaikan keagamaan. Dalam uraiannya ia banyak membahas keimanan. Yang menjadi dasar kebaikan adalah kemurahan hati yang bukan sekedar kedermawanan atau belas kasihan. Kemurahan hati itu terdapat di dalam jiwa yang penuh cinta. Manusia pada akhirnya akan mampu mengenal Tuhan melalui akal, wahyum atau intuisi. Namun menurut Aquinas pikiran lebih penting dari pada kemauan atau intuisi. Melalui pikiran itulah manusia akan sampai kepada kepastian.D. Pemikiran Akhlak para Filosof MuslimFilosof muslim pra Ibnu Miskawaih yang menjadi fokus kajian adalah al-Farabi (258 H/870 M/339 H/950 M). Menurut al-Farabi kesucian jiwa tidak hanya diperoleh melalui badan dan perbuatan-perbuatan badaniah semata, melainkan yang pertama-tama adalah melaui pikiran dan pemikiran. Keutamaan badaniah tidak berarti apa-apa bila dibandingkan dengan keutamaan pikiran. Keutamaan badaniah merupakan kebaikan, sedangkan keutamaan pikiran merupakan raja kebaikan. Menurut al-Farabi hanya dengan ilmu semata manusia dapat menghubungkan alam ketuhanan dengan alam kemanusiaan, malaikat dengan manusia. Dengan demikian manusia bisa sampai kepada kebahagiaan yang sebesar mungkin. BAB IV[1] FILSAFAT AKHLAK IBN MISKAWAIHA. Konsep Manusia Menurut Ibn MiskawaihMenurut Ibn Miskawaih penciptaan yang tertinggi adalah akal sedangkan yang terendah adalah materi. Akal dan jiwa merupakan sebab adanya alam materi (bumi), sedangkan bumi merupakan sebab adanya tubuh manusia. Pada diri manusia terdapat jiwa berfikir yang hakikatnya adalah akal yang berasal dari pancaran Tuhan. Dalam diri manusia terdapat tiga daya jiwa, yaitu daya bernafsu (al-Nafs al-Bahimiyyah), daya berani (al-Nafs al-Sabu’iyyah), dan daya berfikir (al-Nafs al-Natiqah). Daya bernafsu dan berani berasal dari unsur materi, sedangkan daya berfikir berasal dari ruh Tuhan yang tidak akan mengalami kehancuran. B. Ajaran Pokok Keutamaan Akhlak Ibn Miskawaih Ajaran keutamaan akhlak Ibn Miskawaih berpangkal pada teori Jalan Tengah (Nadzar al-Aus^ath) yang dirumuskannya. Inti teori ini menyebutkan bahwa keutamaan akhlak secara umum diartikan sebagai posisi tengah antara ekstrem kelebihan dan ekstrem kekurangan masing-masing jiwa manusia. Posisi tengah daya bernafsu adalah iffah (menjaga kesucian diri) yang terletak antara mengumbar nafsu (al-Syarah) dan mengabaikan nafsu (Khumud al-Syahwah). Posisi tengah daya berani adalah syaja’ah (keberanian) yang terletak antara pengecut (al-Jubn) dan nekad (al-Tahawwur). Posisi tengah daya berfikir adalah al-Hikmah (kebijaksanaan) yang terletak antara kebodohan (al-Safih) dan kedunguan (al-Balah). Kombinasi dari tiga keutamaan membuahkan sebuah keutamaan yang berupa keadilan (al-‘Adalah). Keadilan ini merupakan posisi tengah antara berbuat aniaya dan teraniaya.Selanjutnya setiap keutamaan tersebut memiliki cabangnya masing-masing. Hikmah atau kebijaksanaan memiliki tujuh cabang, yaitu ketajaman intelegensi, kuat ingatan, rasionalitas, tangkas, jernih ingatan, jernih pikiran, dan mudah dalam belajar. Iffah atau menjaga diri memiliki 12 cabang, yaitu malu, ketenangan, sabar, dermawan, kemerdekaan, bersahaja, kecenderungan kepada kebaikan, keteraturan, menghias diri dengan kebaikan, meninggalkan yang tidak baik, ketenangan, dan kehati-hatian. Adapun keberanian berkembang menjadi sembilan cabang, yaitu berjiwa besar, pantang takut, ketenangan, keuletan, kesabaran, murah hati, menahan diri, keperkasaan, dan memiliki daya tahan yang kuat atau senang bekerja berat. Sementara keadilan oleh Ibn Miskawaih dibagi ke dalam tiga macam, yaitu keadilan alam, keadilan adat istiadat, dan keadilan Tuhan. Selanjutnya Ibn Miskawaih berpendapat bahwa posisi jalan tengah tersebut bisa diraih dengan memadukan fungsi syariat dan filsafat. Syariat berfungsi efektif bagi terciptanya posisi tengah dalam jiwa bernafsu dan jiwa berani. Sedangkan filsafat berfungsi efektif bagi terciptanya posisi tengah jiwa berfikir. C. Pengaruh Pemikiran Filosof Yunani terhadap Ibn MiskawaihDalam hal jiwa manusia, yang memiliki tiga daya Ibn Miskawaih memiliki pendapat yang sama dengan Plato dan Aristoteles. Demikian pula mengenai teori Jalan Tengah, Ibn Miskawaih berpendapat sama dengan Plato dan Aristoteles. Hanya saja dalam pemaparan keempat pokok keutamaan itu Ibn Miskawaih lebih banyak dipengaruhi oleh Aristoteles. Perbedaan mencolok antara Ibn Miskawaih dengan Aristoteles terletak ketika membicarakan landasan untuk memperoleh posisi tengah. Aristoteles hanya menyebut akal sedangkan Ibn Miskawaih menyertakan syariat di dalamnya. BAB V PEMIKIR-PEMIKIR AKHLAK SESUDAH IBN MISKAWAIHA. Al-Ghazali (450 H/1058 H-505 H/1111 M)Etika atau akhlak menurut pandangan al-Ghazali bukanlah pengetahuan (ma’rifah) tentang baik dan jahat atau kemauan (qudrah) untuk baik dan buruk, bukan pula pengamalan (fi’il) yang baik dan jelek, melainkan suatu keadaan jiwa yang mantap. Al-Ghazali berpendapat sama dengan Ibn Miskawaih bahwa penyelidikan etika harus dimulai dengan pengetahuan tentang jiwa, kekuatan-kekuatan dan sifat-sifatnya. Tentang klasifikasi jiwa manusia pun al-Ghazali membaginya ke dalam tiga; daya nafsu, daya berani, dan daya berfikir, sama dengan Ibn Miskawaih. Menurut al-Ghazali watak manusia pada dasarnya ada dalam keadaan seimbang dan yang memperburuk itu adalah lingkungan dan pendidikan. Kebaikan-kebaikan dan keburukan-keburukan itu tercantum dalam syariah dan pengetahuan akhlak. Tentang teori Jalan Tengah Ibn Miskawaih, al-Ghazali menyamakannya dengan konsep Jalan Lurus (al-Shirât al-Mustaqîm) yang disebut dalam al-Qur’an dan dinyatakan lebih halus dari pada sehelai rambut dan lebih tajan dari pada mata pisau. Untuk mencapai ini manusia harus memohon petunjuk Allah karena tanpa petunjuk-Nya tak seorang pun yang mampu melawan keburukan dan kejahatan dalam hidup ini. Kesempurnaan jalan tengan dapat di raih melalui penggabungan akal dan wahyu. B. Nasir al-Din TusiSama dengan Ibn Miskawaih, Tusi mengemukakan bahwa tujuan akhlak adalah kebahagiaan utama yang ditentukan oleh tempat dan kedudukan manusia dalam evolusi kosmik dan diwujudkan lewat kesediaannya untuk berdisiplin dan patuh. Tusi juga sependapat dengan Ibn Miskawaih ketika mengatakan bahwa kebajikan atau keutamaan lebih tinggi dari pada keadilan dan cinta sebagai sumber alami kesatuan. Tusi memandang kejahatan merupakan penyimpangan jiwa dari keseimbangan. Tusi berbeda dengan Ibn Miskawaih dalam menjelaskan penyimpangan. Menurut Ibn Miskawaih penyimpangan terjadi hanya dari segi jumlah, sedangkan menurut Tusi penyimpangan juga terjadi dari segi mutu. Berdasarkan itu maka penyebab penyakit moral adalah keberlebihan, keberkekurangan, ketakwajaran akal, kemarahan dan hasrat. C. Pengaruh Pemikiran Akhlak Ibn Miskawaih terhadap Al-Ghazali dan TusiHubungan keterpengaruhan ini dapat dilihat dari beberapa aspek. Dalam hal definisi etika atau akhlak Al-Ghazali dan Ibnu memiliki banyak kesamaan, yaitu suatu keadaan jiwa yang mantap yang direfleksikan dalam bentuk perbuatan-perbuatan mudah tanpa memerlukan pemikiran dan pertimbangan. Kesamaan Ibnu Miskawaih dengan Al-Ghazali dan Tusi juga tampak dalam pembicaraan tentang upaya penyelidikan akhlak harus dimulai dengan pengetahuan tentang jiwa, kekuatan dan sifat-sifatnya. Karena jiwalah sebagai sumber kebaikan, kebahagiaan dan sebaliknya. Dalam menganalisis kekuatan-kekuatan jiwa Al-Ghazali dan Tusi mengikuti filosof-filosof sebelumnya. Yaitu jiwa terbagi ke dalam tiga, jiwa bernafsu, jiwa berani, dan jiwa berfikir. Dalam membuat tabulasi kebaikan pokok, Al-Ghazali dan Tusi tampak mengikuti Ibnu Miskawaih. Empat kebaikan pokok itu adalah kebijaksanaan, keberanian, menjaga kesucian, dan keadilan. Semuanya merupakan jalan tengan dari ketiga jiwa di atas. Landasan untuk mencapai jalan tengah ini, menurut ketiganya, adalah akal dan syariat. Akal berfungsi efektif bagi terciptanya posisi tengan jiwa berfikir, dan syariat berfungsi efektif untuk terciptanya posisi tengah jiwa bernafsu dan jiwa berani. Kejahatan yang merupakan lawan kebaikan merupakan penyakit jiwa atau penyimpangan jiwa dari keseimbangan. Dalam hal ini Tusi dan Ibn Miskawaih memiliki pemikiran yang sama. BAB VI PENUTUP Kesimpulan Pemikiran akhlak Ibn Miskawaih ternyata banyak dipengaruhi oleh pemikiran etika Sokrates, Plato, dan Aristoteles. Selanjutnya pemikiran akhlak Ibn Miskawaih mempengaruhi filsafat akhlak Al-Ghazali dan Tusi. Sokrates mempengaruhi Ibn Miskawaih tentang jiwa sebagai intisari akhlak. Plato mempengaruhi Ibn Miskawaih dalam konsep jiwa manusia yang terbagi ke dalam tiga daya. Dan Aristoteles mempengaruhi Ibn Miskawaih dalam konsep Jalan Tengah dan penjelasan empat pokok keutamaan akhlak. Perbedaan yang mendasar antara Ibn Miskawaih dengan ketiga filosof Yunani itu adalah dalam hal penggunaan landasan teori jalan tengah. Sehingga bisa disimpulkan bahwa secar filosofis pemikiran akhlak Ibn Miskawaih dipengaruhi oleh pemikiran Sokrates, Plato, dan Aristoteles. Sedangkan pendekatan gabungan antara filasafat dan wahyu adalah murni tesis Ibn Miskawaih. Selanjutnya pemikiran akhlak Ibn Miskawaih mempengaruhi pemikiran akhlak al-Ghazali dalam hal konsep jiwa manusia, konsep jalan tengah, dan landasan untuk meraih jalan tengah. Adapaun pengaruhnya terhadap Tusi terletak pada konsep kebahagiaan utama. Dengan demikian dapat dipahami bahwa keterpengaruhan pemikiran akhlak Tusi oleh pemikiran Ibn Miskawaih secara tidak langsung terletak dalam konsep jiwa dan jalan tengah.

Chapers 1 and 2

From The Kernel of the Kernel, by Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi

One of the special matters that Ibn 'Arabi wants to explain in his Futuhat al-Makkiyah is this: "If a gnostic is really a gnostic he cannot stay tied to one form of belief."

That is to say, if a possessor of knowledge is cognizant of the being in his own ipseity, in all its meanings, he will not remain trapped in one belief. He will not decrease his circle of belief. He is like materia prima and will accept whatever form he is presented with. These forms being external, there is no change to the kernel in his interior universe.

The knower of God, whatever his origin is, remains like that. He accepts all kinds of beliefs, but does not remain tied to any figurative belief. Whatever his place is in the Divine Knowledge, which is essential knowledge, he remains in that place; knowing the kernel of all belief he sees the interior and not the exterior. He recognizes the thing, whose kernel he knows, whatever apparel it puts on, and in this matter his circle is large. Without looking at whatever clothing they appear under in the exterior he reaches into the origin of those beliefs and witnesses them from every possible place.

Both the worlds are by the revelation of God.
Look upon the Beauty of Truth from whichever side you want.

A hadith explains like this: When people destined for Paradise reach their stations, the Lord offers a glimpse by parting a little the curtain which hides His Greatness and Grandeur, and says: "I am your most great Lord." That is to say, I am that great God whom for years you have yearned and pined to see. This revelation of God astonishes them and they deny it and they say "Never could you be our Lord," and saying this they rant and rave. At that moment the revelation changes three times and each time they again deny. Then God asks them: 'Is there an indication among you concerning your Lord!' and they answer "Yes, there is." Then He appears to each one according to the degree and ability of understanding of each one's supposition and belief. After this revelation they accept and say, "You are our Lord, the greatest of the greatest." Accordingly the hadith: "You will be looking at your Lord as if at the full moon and will be lost in ecstasy." In spite of it being like this, the people of gnosis definitely affirm God during the first revelation because they have appropriated all the beliefs, and have gained aptitude for all revelations.

They who see their beloved today
Are the ones who see tomorrow.
What will they know of the beloved there,
They who are of the blind here?

Indeed, in the Holy Quran it is said thus: "The person who is blind in this world is also blind in the other," which means: he who has not opened his eye of meaning here will be in the same way blind when he has moved to the other world. Consequently, he will not be able to see the Divine Revelation (when it is first presented to him). What we beg for from God is this that He may preserve all His servants from a belief which goes no further than imitation and pretence.

Here a certain question arises: how does the person who has the aptitude for the state of gnosis understand his own reality! It is answerable in this way: It is necessary that he finds a gnostic who knows his own self and after he has found him, from the bottom of his heart, and with all his soul, make his character to be his character. The person of gnosis, to find his own origin, should hold on to this way and the following Quranic verse points to this meaning: "Search for the means that will take you to Him." The explanation of this may be as follows: There are of My servants those who have found Me. If you want to find Me follow in their footsteps. They become a means for you and they finally lead to Me. If this is so then by serving those people, a person comes to know himself. He will understand whence he came and where he is going and he will have an inkling of the station of the present state.

A hadith explains the purpose of coming into this world thus: "I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known, and I created the creation so that I be known." This order is like this but to know God is not an easy matter, until one becomes a knower of one's self.

The following hadith explains: "He who knows himself knows his Lord." The opposite is also so and this the people of that state understand. Many people of the elite or commoners give different meanings to this hadith as much as their intelligence allows them. God willing, a meaning will be expressed at the level of the elite. However, at this station seven different forms have been noticed, which will be expounded below.

First Form

If a person in his body understands the partial spirit in his form which may be called the speaking self (nafsi-n nâtiqa), if that person's state is like this, he is in the first form. This station is called the station of progress. According to the people of Union, self, heart, spirit, intellect, mystery all mean the same thing. These different names are given to the same thing which takes different forms at different times.

This thing known as the speaking self has neither life nor body but has influence and action outside and inside the body, yet it has neither place nor a sign of existence. Though it has no special location, when ever you put your finger on something it is there and it appears there existent in all its totality. Furthermore, division, partition and things of this sort are not possible for it. It is that which holds in the man's hand, which looks in his eye, which speaks in his tongue, which walks in his foot, which hears in his ear, and in short is present and in control in all his feelings.

It is totally and essentially present in every part of the body, and having circumscribed the whole body, it is transcendent and free from every part of the body. If a finger or a foot were to be cut off, it would suffer no diminution, nor does it lose any part of itself. In any case, it is at its centre as it was always, and remains permanent and present. If the body is annihilated it suffers neither loss of existence nor dispersion. To be able to understand this there are meanings which do not fit into any limit or calculation.

Second Form

Let the one who is in this second form look to the horizons. That is, let him look at the horizons where the Total Self is. . . This is called Intellect, the Qualified Total Spirit, Viceregent. It has no bodily shape and it is not even outside this universe and its heavens, but is englobes all existents and therein it is present and in control. In relation to it, highest top and the bottom of the bottom are the same. It is present in every one of those degrees with its own ipseity. It cannot be parcelled or partitioned. If the skies fell in and the earth shattered, nothing would happen to it.

For example, what difference does it make to the sun and how does it suffer though it enters every tower, palace or house that is built in the world. However, each chimney, room or hall receives light from it according to its window. Just as if those houses were to fall down and the palaces be ruined, nobody would imagine anything would happen to the sun, equally nothing would happen to it. No matter how many people or creatures God has created, He can have determination in, and control over, all of them. No matter how many die from among those that are alive that Qualified Spirit remains present forever and in whatever state it was.

Thus the one who possesses that spirit, when he looks at the horizons, if he knows these states, will understand what the second form is.

Third Form

In this station man receives further developments and sees what is called his partial spirit to be non-existent and annihilated in the Total Spirit, and he comes alive in the Qualified Spirit.

Let him observe that the spirit is the Total Spirit, and that the intellect is the Total Intellect, and observe this with the certainty of the Truth (haqqu-l yaqin) and then throw away from himself anything called 'partial'. Let him understand that everything is tied to the Total. Thus is the third form.

Fourth Form

Then . . . let him continue to ascend in this station. Let him find his spirit annihilated in the Qualified Spirit. And now let him see that the Qualified Spirit is annihilated in the Ipseity of God. Let him be liberated both from the partials and the totals. When this happens to him he sees all businesses annihilated in the acts of God, all Names and Qualities annihilated in the Name and Quality of God, and equally, all ipseities annihilated in the Ipseity of God, and he sees them as non-existent. When he is secure in this then he has reached what is known as closeness through Knowledge ('ilmu-l yaqîn) and closeness through Truth (haqqu-l yaqîn) and he reaches the station of complete witnessing.

Under the cloak of the existents there is nothing other than Him: he comes to know the meanings in this through the interior, and also, having acquired an understanding of the meaning of the Quranic quotation: "Today, to whom does everything belong? To God, the One and Complete Annihilator," he knows certainly that in the interior, there is nothing other than God.

Up to now we have mentioned four forms. These can also be called as follows:

1. Enfus - Interior
2. Âfâq - Horizons, outside existence
3. The union of the first and second forms
4. The annihilation of the first, second and third forms in the Ipseity of God.

Fifth Form

This is such a station that here every station that has been mentioned before should be seen and observed as one. The person who has reached this station is often referred to as Son of Time (ibnu-l waqt).

Sixth Form

The person who has reached this station is a mirror for everything. The traveller in this station finds on his road no one else but himself and thinks of everything as tied to himself. He says: "Inside my cloak there is nothing but God. Could there by anybody else in the two worlds except me?" That is, he is a mirror to everything and everything is mirrored in him. Perhaps, even, also he is the shine of the mirror and what is reflected. He was before this the Son of Time and he used to say: "There is no other existence but God." When he has found this station he will say: "There is only 'I'", and he is often referred to as the Father of Time (abu-l waqt).

Seventh Form

The man who comes to this station is now in complete annihilation. Completely and simply he has reached non­existence, and from now on in subsistence (baqâ') he reaches subsistence (baqâ'). After this one would not speak of him as having state or station. He has here neither observation nor witnessing nor gnosis, and the explanation or interpretation of these is not possible because this place is a station of complete non-existence. Even the word station is used here only to explain because the person here knows of neither station nor sign. Only those with taste understand through taste. May God make this state easy for us.


When the gnostic has reached this station he is in the universe of Oneness and Collectivity ( 'alemi jam'). If it is necessary for him to separate from here he is adorned with a Divine existence. He knows his reality and consequently comprehends God, and then he is no more tied to any of the laws, regulations, beliefs that we understand in the exterior. This is what one wanted explained, and the meaning desired was this.

Without being I did not find the road to that Truth;
There I became alive with the Truth; I found subsistence (baqa').
Myself I annihilated myself; Myself I found myself again.
You will be all when you make nothing of yourself


At last the gnostic understands that whether it be in the enfus or whether it be in the âfâq whatever is manifested is the Ipseity; that existence is One Existence, One Soul, One Body; it is neither separated nor individuated; that everything in immanence is nothing other than His Manifestation and Tools; that from every particle or stem to the greatest mass, God (al haqq) is manifested with all His Qualities and Names, and that this manifestation is according to the understanding and belief of each person. In each place and in each station He shows a different face.

He is able to show His Being either within or without; that which is in the image of everything, that which is understandable in every intellect, the meaning that is in every heart, the thing heard in every ear, the eye that sees in every eye, is Him. . . If He is manifest in this face he is also looking from the other.

The meaning of these again refers to the sentence at the beginning. The demander and the demanded, the lover and the beloved, the believer and the belief, is the same for the gnostic. All this comes to mean that for the gnostic to be tied to any aspect which is to be according to any one belief is not allowed.


Several blind people were gathered in a place. They began to discuss a matter: "We wonder if we could see an elephant." The keeper of the elephants took them to the elephant house. Each one found a part of the elephant and held on to it - some to the ear, some to the foot, some to the belly, some to the trunk. After having known the elephant in this fashion, they began to argue among themselves. The one who clung to the leg of the elephant said the elephant was like a column. The one that held the ear said the elephant was like a napkin, and the one who knew the elephant by its belly said it was like a barrel. In short, whatever member they held on to they knew the elephant like that part; their beliefs were such.

The person who has belief through imitation is in this state, he clings onto something definite and remains there. In that dimensional state they remain imprisoned.

Whoever remains in prison in the definite dimension
Will be totally saddened when laid out in the earth.


Whatever may happen the gnostic will not be caught up in one definite belief because he is wise unto himself. This we have explained above.

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